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My dissertation examines the determinants of interstate dispute dynamics.  When making 
decisions, do state decision makers have an eye on the future as they perform cost-benefit 
analyses, or are they “blinded” by history?  I refer to these two alternatives as “dynamics.”  I 
claim that different disputes exhibit different types of dynamics.  I argue that the importance (or 
salience) of the issue being fought over will influence which dynamic will be present.  Decisions 
regarding disputes over highly salient issues will be most affected by history, while decisions 
regarding less salient issues will be most affected by considerations about the future.  I test my 
argument using a set of unique methodological techniques that can determine which conception 
of conflict dynamics is more helpful, and when.  In general, I find evidence supportive of my 
argument: decisions regarding highly important issues are most affected by history, while 
decisions regarding less-important issues are most affected by considerations about the future.  
The project provides important insights into how we should think about militarized conflict, both 
interstate and intrastate, speaking to potential mediation and resolution strategies. 
Conflict Dynamics in Militarized Interstate Disputes 
Shawna K. Metzger, PhD 
University of Pittsburgh, 2013
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PREFACE 
A dissertation, I’ve decided, is a bit like an iceberg.  Just like only 10 percent of an iceberg’s 
mass is visible above water, the pages that follow are only a small, visible indicator of this 
dissertation project’s true size.  I would be remiss if I did not acknowledge the mass below the 
waterline, as it were.   
First, my colleagues in the Department of Political Science at the University of Pittsburgh 
have been wonderful.  It has been an excellent environment to learn what it means to be a 
political scientist and develop the requisite skills.  My dissertation committee epitomizes this.  
Chuck Gochman, Jude Hays, Burcu Savun, and John Vasquez each brought a unique, yet 
complementary, perspective to the table.  It only bettered the final dissertation as a whole.  They 
also acted as excellent counterbalances, being enthusiastic about the project when I was less-
than-thrilled, and were challenging when I was overly sanguine.  Suffice it to say, this project 
would not have come to fruition without their guidance.  For that, and their support during my 
entire tenure at Pitt, they have my sincerest thanks and gratitude.   
Others at Pitt have also played a part in helping me to understand what comprises “good” 
social science research.  I’ve been fortunate enough to work with Daniela Donno (and Bruce 
Russett) on an “enduring” joint project; our collaboration has been a delight.  Daniela also read 
several parts of this dissertation at various stages, and always had clear, thoughtful feedback to 
offer.  Her willingness to do so, while juggling our project and her other professional obligations, 
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has taught me much about doing research and being an academic.  All of the department’s 
faculty were extremely supportive throughout my graduate career, be it through their candid 
advice or sharp insight regarding this project: among others, I thank David Bearce, Stephen 
Chaudoin, Steve Finkel, Kristin Kanthak, George Krause, and Nita Rudra.  Last, but certainly not 
least, I owe a substantial debt to my fellow graduate students.  They were superb sounding 
boards (and sanity checkers!), particularly my cohortmates, fellow IR students, and officemates: 
Kristen Coopie Allen, Ian Cook, Scott Cook, Will Daniel, Jen Laks Hutnick, Hirokazu Kikuchi, 
Brandon Myers, Sarah Cormack Patton, and Lauren Perez, plus many, many others.   
Parts of this dissertation were presented at Peace Science, in 2011 and 2012, and the 
University of Pittsburgh’s Symposium on Political Violence.  I benefited greatly from the 
discussions that occurred at all these fora.  Gary Goertz, Ashley Leeds, and Shawn Ling Ramirez 
all offered helpful, detailed feedback about the project at pivotal stages.  Also, Bill Thompson 
was kind enough to share his private data on strategic rivalries. 
Finally, my friends and family deserve a badge of honor.  They have dealt with truncated 
holidays, intermittent communication, and infrequent visits for the better part of half a decade.  
Some of them probably found out more than they ever wanted to know about political science in 
the process.  Their support never wavered, though.  Mom, Dad, and Katie deserve particular 
credit.  None of them batted an eye during any part of my collegiate career, when they had 
sufficient cause to run for cover on more than one occasion.  That takes a certain type of long-
suffering, good-humored patience and faith.  I’ll always be amazed by and thankful for it.   
As for a dedication, this dissertation has one, but I’ve often been warned of the power of 
words, once written.  Instead, I will say only this: to wherever the adventure leads next. 
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1.0  INTRODUCTION 
How does an international dispute evolve?  History is rife with examples of these disagreements, 
ranging from small, isolated diplomatic spats to more serious confrontations involving issues 
such as the location of a country’s borders or its right to exist as a sovereign entity.  Such 
disputes feature prominently in the news.  Argentina and Britain’s dispute over the Falkland 
Islands experienced heightened diplomatic tensions and renewed calls for resolution in April 
2012, around the 30th anniversary of the 1982 Falkland War.1  The competing ownership claims 
over various South China Sea island archipelagos have become increasingly vociferous, such as 
the Chinese-Filipino dispute over the Scarborough Shoal.2  Regional organizations, like ASEAN, 
have been paralyzed by member-state discord over these multilateral disputes.3   
                                                 
1 For example: (1) Charbonneau, Louis, 2012, “Argentina’s Fernandez Takes Falklands Claim to U.N.” Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-britain-argentina-falklands-un-idUSBRE85D1P220120614 
(accessed June 20, 2012); (2) “Falklands to Hold Referendum on Status Next Year,” 2012, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/12/us-britain-falklands-referendum-idUSBRE85B0T920120612 
(accessed June 20, 2012); (3) “Falklands Vote to Stay UK Territory,” 2013, BBC, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-21750909 (accessed March 14, 2013); (4) Holden, Michael, 2012, “Britain 
Warns Argentina over Falklands Aggression,” Reuters, http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/06/14/us-britain-
argentina-falklands-idUSBRE85D1NA20120614 (accessed June 20, 2012). 
2 E.g.: (1) “China Summons Manila Envoy over South China Sea Standoff,” 2012, Reuters, 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/04/18/us-china-philippines-idUSBRE83H0DJ20120418 (accessed June 21, 
2012); (2) Spegele, Brian, 2012, “Beijing to Withdraw Fishing Boats From Disputed Shoal,” Wall Street 
Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303379204577474162595763298.html (accessed 
June 21, 2012). 
3 (1) “All Change at ASEAN,” 2013, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/news/asia/21571461-hopes-
calmer-times-under-years-new-management-all-change-asean (accessed February 18, 2013); (2) “ASEAN in 
Crisis: Divided We Stagger,” 2012, The Economist, http://www.economist.com/node/21560585 (accessed 
August 24, 2012). 
 2 
Some disagreements remain entirely peaceful.  Others involve the use of military force.  
If we think about the absence or presence of militarized conflict as characterizing different 
phases of interstate disagreements, how might the attributes of one phase affect the attributes of 
the other?  This broad question about dispute dynamics and militarized conflict serves as the 
focus of my dissertation. 
To date, scholars have conceptualized conflict dynamics in one of two ways.  The first 
consists of work rooted in a game-theoretic, rationalist tradition.  It starts from the premise that 
war, and fighting in general, is ex post inefficient.  If decision makers know this, why do states 
fail to reach peaceful agreements over disputed issues?  James Fearon’s answer to the question is 
that states fight because of incentives to misrepresent private information about their capabilities 
or resolve, an inability to credibly commit to peace, and/or disagreement over what are perceived 
to be indivisible issues (Fearon 1995).   
Many studies have found supportive empirical evidence for the broad rationalist 
argument (e.g., Fearon 1994; Reed 2000; Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke 2010; Slantchev 2003, 
2004).  Game-theoretic research rooted in this rationalist tradition has been especially valuable 
for its insights regarding the connections between how militarized conflicts begin, progress, and 
end.  Most of this work, however, suffers from a dearth of substantive theorizing about the nature 
of, and connections between, these various aspects of war. 
Such explanations can be found in the second approach to conflict dynamics: conflict-as-
process explanations.  Conflict-as-process stories depict war as the outcome of a sequence of 
interactions among disputing parties.  John Vasquez’s “steps to war” is perhaps the most well-
 3 
known conflict-as-process story (1987, 2009).4  The sequence begins with disagreement over an 
issue (or issues) that can be potentially addressed through the use of military force.  Under 
certain circumstances, political leaders may opt to employ threats of force, which in turn may 
escalate to ever higher levels of hostility, eventuating in war.   
Despite the prominence and oft-invoked nature of such arguments within the interstate 
conflict literature, there exist no explicit quantitative studies of the step-by-step element of a 
general conflict-as-process story, though numerous qualitative analyses exist (e.g., Valeriano and 
Marin 2010).5  Research from the broader foreign policy behavior literature, however, has 
produced supportive evidence of the general behavioral pattern suggested by conflict-as-process 
arguments (e.g., Crescenzi and Enterline 2001; Crescenzi, Enterline, and Long 2008; Goldstein 
1992; Goldstein and Pevehouse 1997; Lebo and Moore 2003; Vasquez and Mansbach 1984; 
Ward 1982).   
In thinking about Fearon’s rationalist explanation and Vasquez’s steps to war, an 
intriguing contrast emerges with respect to the underlying causal logic.  The rationalist logic is 
forward looking, i.e., anticipatory.  It asserts that the decision to employ (or not employ) military 
force is based on beliefs regarding how target states will respond.  Will the adversary capitulate?  
Will it respond with a similar level of force?  Will it escalate hostilities?  The conflict-as-process 
logic (what I will call “non-anticipatory”) is more backward looking, i.e., reliant on forms of 
history dependence, such as path dependence.  Particular characteristics of adversaries, context, 
environment, and history have unexpected effects on the probability of escalation, which affects 
                                                 
4 Wright (1965), Bloomfield and Leiss (1969), Rummel (1976), Maoz (1982), Huth and Allee (2002), and Senese 
(2005), among others have also depicted war in this manner and this is implicitly the logic underlying the 
construction of the Correlates of War project’s militarized interstate dispute (MID) dataset (Ghosn, Palmer, and 
Bremer 2004; Gochman and Maoz 1984; Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996). 
5 Or at least no quantitative articles that I have come across, to date. 
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the ability to anticipate an adversary’s response accurately.  Looking at the respective literatures, 
there is evidence to support each view.   
1.1 OVERVIEW OF ARGUMENT 
So, which story is correct—or which story is more correct?  Do militarized conflicts exhibit 
dynamics consistent with the anticipatory logic propounded by rationalists, or do we see 
dynamics more in keeping with the non-anticipatory logic found in conflict-as-process 
arguments?6  While it is quite possible, and even likely, that conflict escalation is a mixture of 
both dynamics in reality, the question I raise is which dynamic is predominant?   
I propose that there is no single answer to this question.  Some conflicts are more likely 
to exhibit a predominantly anticipatory dynamic, while others are likely to be more non-
anticipatory.  I use the anticipatory and conflict-as-process logics to construct a typology of 
dynamic ideal-types to establish the necessary conditions for each story.  I suggest that an 
anticipatory logic—what I call an “anticipatory dynamic”—has two necessary conditions.  First, 
decision makers must use all information at their disposal when choosing a course of action.  
Second, this information must be interpreted ‘correctly,’ in an objective sense.  I define a “non-
anticipatory dynamic” as the absence of either condition. 
I focus on the context surrounding the decision to employ military force to explain when 
each dynamic will be predominant.  I conceptualize “context” as the primary issue over which 
states are in disagreement (hereafter called the “disputed issue”).  My key claim is that the 
                                                 
6 I wish to make clear that the scholarship associated with both logics is more extensive and far richer in detail and 
nuance than presented here.  I have simplified the arguments and accentuated differences to facilitate construction of 
ideal types. 
 5 
overall importance, or salience (Hensel et al. 2008), of the dispute will affect which dynamic is 
predominant.  I contend that decisions to militarize disputes over highly salient issues will be 
likely to follow a non-anticipatory dynamic.  Highly salient issues generally create decision-
making environments in which information will be interpreted subjectively.  Subjective 
interpretations are problematic, for they often lead to information being interpreted incorrectly.  
For instance, states may selectively ignore pieces of information relevant to the decision at hand, 
simply because the information does not comport with a state’s perception of its adversary.  This 
violates one of the two necessary conditions for an anticipatory dynamic, which suggests that the 
predominant dynamic for decisions over highly salient issues will be non-anticipatory.  For 
issues of lesser importance, the stakes are more concrete and less abstract in nature, which is 
conducive to objective reasoning and accurate cost-benefit analyses.  Both are in line with the 
necessary conditions for an anticipatory dynamic.  Thus, the predominant dynamic for decisions 
over issues of lesser salience will be anticipatory. 
I offer two general mechanisms through which issue salience can induce subjective 
interpretations of information: (1) through its impact on the divisibility of issues, and (2) on 
decision-making time pressures.  The mechanisms are best thought of as competing explanations, 
not complements.  First, indivisible issues are phrased in stark all-or-nothing terms, making it 
hard, if not impossible, to find middle ground.  Highly salient issues are more likely to be 
construed as indivisible from the beginning.  Indivisibility is a subjective construct, which 
engenders the subjective interpretation of information about the issue (Allison 1969; Jervis 1968; 
Lebow 1981).  Second, highly salient issues are also often associated with decisional “time 
pressures,” where decision makers have a limited amount of time to debate possible alternatives 
before choosing one of them (e.g., Lebow 1981).  Time pressures create stressful decision-
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making environments, and decision makers’ aversion to this stress can lead to a multitude of 
information processing problems (Janis and Mann 1977).  I delineate between the mechanisms 
by exploiting how “quickly” the effects will appear.  I claim that the effects of an issue 
indivisibility mechanism take some time to manifest, while the effects of a time pressure 
mechanism manifest much more quickly, in relative terms. 
1.2 OVERVIEW OF EMPIRICAL TESTING 
To test my claims, I employ a set of methodological techniques to determine which conception 
of conflict dynamics is more helpful, and when.  I test whether states form accurate beliefs about 
the length of a militarization over a disputed issue.  Examining states’ beliefs about militarization 
length is appealing, because my argument implies that belief accuracy will vary based on the 
dispute’s importance.  States’ beliefs about how long a militarization will last will influence 
whether a militarization is initiated at all.  In general, I find evidence supportive of my argument.  
Disputes over highly salient issues have a stronger non-anticipatory than anticipatory dynamic in 
the form of an issue indivisibility mechanism.  The opposite is true for less salient issues: 
anticipatory dynamics are stronger than non-anticipatory ones. 
More specifically, my empirical analysis is comprised of two major components.  First, I 
investigate beliefs about militarization length using a simultaneous estimation model (SEM).  
The SEM specifies one equation per dynamic, allowing me to check for both dynamics within a 
unified framework.  Existing research usually focuses on one dynamic at the expense of the 
other.  I utilize a simultaneous equation setup that can accommodate both dynamics in a unified 
framework (Hays and Kachi 2009).  The setup allows for interdependence among dispute phases, 
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which is also more consistent with my theoretical argument.  Traditional estimation strategies are 
ill-suited for situations involving interdependence because interdependence violates the models’ 
underlying exogeneity assumption.  I posit that states form accurate beliefs about militarization 
length in disputes over less important issues, but that they form inaccurate beliefs when disputes 
are over highly important issues.  I find support for my argument: highly important issues are 
prone to inaccurate beliefs about militarization length, implying a predominantly non-
anticipatory dynamic.  Less important issues tend to involve accurate beliefs about militarization 
length, implying a predominately anticipatory dynamic.  
In the second portion of my analysis, I examine disputes that never militarize.  I posit that 
peaceful disputes may contain evidence supportive of an anticipatory dynamic.  Peaceful 
disputes can arise for two different reasons.  In the first, the dispute had effectively no chance of 
militarizing.  In the second, the dispute could have militarized, but states formed accurate beliefs 
about militarization length and choose not to do so—i.e., anticipation.  I use split population 
models for testing, as they are well-suited for investigating outcomes that arise for more than one 
reason.  My supposition is supported: peaceful disputes show evidence of an anticipatory 
dynamic.  The evidence is more robust for less salient issues than it is for high salient issues, 
which comports with my general claim that anticipatory dynamics are strongest in disputes over 
less salient issues. 
1.2.1 Contributions 
My argument provides some important insights into how we should think about militarized 
conflict, both interstate and intrastate.  To date, no work has extensively examined the possibility 
that escalatory dynamics may differ across military conflicts.  The insights provided by 
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rationalist models have been valuable in furthering our understanding of conflict processes.  My 
argument suggests that certain conflicts may not ‘follow’ a rationalist-anticipatory dynamic, 
implying that we need to specify where rationalist arguments are valid and appropriate and 
where they are not.   
Additionally, there is little research into or systematic theorizing about the dynamics that 
underlie disputes and little explicit theorizing about how the dynamics of militarized conflict 
might be connected to the broader dynamics of the dispute.  Increasing our understanding about 
dynamics places us in a better position to develop strategies for reducing the occurrence of 
militarized conflict (including war) even in non-anticipatory situations—the aim of Vasquez’ 
(2009) and predecessors’ work (e.g., Richardson 1960).   
1.3 ORGANIZATION 
The rest of the dissertation is structured as follows.  Chapter 2 presents the conceptual basis for 
my two ideal-types of conflict dynamics.  Chapter 3 provides an explanation as to why different 
conflicts exhibit different types of dynamics.  The core of the explanation relates to the salience 
of issues underlying conflicts.  Having laid out the argument, I discuss its applicability to claim 
and conflict duration.  Chapter 4 addresses questions of research design and methodology.  
Chapter 5 empirically assesses the claims I have made about dynamics using militarized conflict 
duration.  Chapter 6 does the same by looking at militarized and peaceful disputed issues.  
Chapter 7 contains concluding remarks, along with an enumeration of avenues for future 
research.  
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2.0  DYNAMICS 101 
How can we understand dispute dynamics?  In this chapter, I create a typology of dynamic ideal-
types by building from existing work on the topic.  A dynamic ideal-type represents the causal 
process yielding some outcome of interest.  Here, I am interested in understanding the causal 
process that leads to dispute militarization.  The typology helps us to think about whether the 
outcomes we observe are consistent with rationalist-anticipatory stories for militarization or 
conflict-as-process stories.   
My dynamic ideal-type typology is comprised of two conceptual dimensions: (1) the 
availability of sufficient amounts of relevant information and (2) states’ information processing 
capabilities.  I obtain two dynamic types by forming groups from the combination of these two 
dimensions.  I discuss the two types in terms of mutually exclusive ideal-types, but disputes may 
be a mixture of both dynamics.  One dynamic type may simply dominate the other.   
The different dynamic ideal-types produce divergent implications about the fundamental 
processes behind militarized conflict.  The first dynamic ideal-type suggests that expectations 
regarding future outcomes have an appreciable causal impact on the decision to militarize (e.g., 
Fearon 1995).  The second suggests that past outcomes, rather than future expectations, will 
better explain the decision to initiate (e.g., Vasquez 2009). 
The chapter is organized into four parts.  I begin by establishing the foundations of my 
typology by using rational expectation theory from economics.  Next, I lay out the two 
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conceptual dimensions of my typology.  The third section discusses the two ideal-types that 
result from the combination of the typology’s dimensions.  I conclude with a brief recapitulation 
of this chapter’s main points and hypotheses. 
2.1 THE TYPOLOGY’S FOUNDATIONS: RATIONAL EXPECTATIONS 
2.1.1 Preliminaries 
A typology of dynamic ideal-types describes the pattern of observed outcomes during a process 
of interest.  Formally, it describes the relationship between the behavior of self-interested actors 
(i.e., actions, a) and how actions combine to yield an observed outcome (o).7  The typology does 
not describe specific decision-making rules or logics that are adopted by decision makers, nor do 
decision makers make a conscious choice to follow one dynamic ideal-type over another.  The 
typology describes general patterns of behavior. 
The general principles motivating my notion of dynamic ideal-types are easiest to see 
with a simple example.  Consider three individuals, each of whom is packing to leave for work in 
the morning.  All live in the same city.  Today, the weather forecast calls for clear skies in the 
morning, but a quick-moving storm system will arrive in the afternoon, bringing heavy rain that 
will last into the night.  The first individual checks the weather forecast, sees that there is a high 
chance of rain later that day, and packs an umbrella.  The second individual, a long-time resident 
of the city, also checks the forecast, but doubts its authenticity.  Weather systems have never 
                                                 
7 I refer to any decision made by a single actor as an “action.” The word “outcome” refers to the result of the actions 
taken by all actors. 
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moved quickly through the area before—clear skies in the morning always mean clear skies the 
rest of the day.  Armed with this knowledge, the second individual leaves for work without an 
umbrella.  The third individual has just moved to the city within the last week, and is still without 
a TV and an internet connection.  The individual looks out the window to check the weather, and 
sees clear skies.  Concluding that there is no chance of rain, the third individual eschews an 
umbrella.  Subsequently, when it pours during the evening commute, as predicted, only one of 
the three individuals is properly equipped. 
Dynamic ideal-types characterize how an individual’s beliefs about rain in the evening, 
indicated by packing an umbrella (a), compare with what actually transpires—rain (o).8  I refer 
to these beliefs as an individual’s “expectation” regarding some outcome.  One of the dynamic 
ideal-types represents the case where an individual’s expectation and the actual outcome are 
identical—e.g., we brought an umbrella because we believed it would rain, and it did rain.  
Individual 1 represents this case, in this example.  The other ideal type obtains from the cases in 
which an expectation and the actual outcome are mismatched, like Individuals 2 and 3.  This is 
the primary purpose of the typology I develop: an explicit framework with which we can 
compare the accuracy of an actor’s expectations regarding an outcome with the actual outcome 
that occurs. 
 
FIGURE 2.1. Stylized Event Timeline 
                                                 
8 This example is vastly oversimplified.  For instance, there is no strategic element between actors’ actions (a) and 
the outcomes that transpire (o).  Nonetheless, I think its simplicity provides a helpful heuristic for understanding the 
subsequent argument, which is more complex. 
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My process of interest is the militarization of interstate disputes.  To understand why states 
militarize such disputes, I begin by describing the “world” in which states operate.  I assume that 
the world is a “rationalist” one, characterized by the same set of assumptions commonly made in 
formal bargaining models of militarized conflict.  These models—and their underlying 
assumptions—represent the dominant viewpoint among recent academic work on militarized 
behavior.   
Figure 2.1 provides a stylized depiction of events as they unfold between two states, i and 
j.  States i and j have divergent preferences regarding an issue, e.g., control over a piece of 
territory.  I treat states as unitary actors, though I will mention domestic actors and decision 
makers at various points in the discussion.  The best outcome (o) for i is generally the worst 
outcome for j, and vice versa.   
At Point A, the dispute between State i and j begins.  Official representatives of i or j’s 
government make explicit statements challenging the issue’s current status quo policy.9  Both 
states are treated as purposeful utility maximizers, meaning they both wish to obtain the best 
possible deal at the lowest cost. 
The states’ central decision makers are tasked with resolving the dispute.10  Military force 
is one of several actions (a) available to decision makers force to resolve the disagreement.  The 
cost associated with different types of actions varies, but employing military force of any sort 
(e.g., verbal threats, mobilization of forces, engaging in active combat) has costs (Fearon 1997; 
Slantchev 2011).  When military force is threatened or employed by at least one state (Figure 
2.1, Point B), the dispute has become militarized.  Presumably, reciprocated fighting at high 
                                                 
9 I recognize that disagreements may exist between subnational actors within one state and the government of 
another state.  However, I focus only on “official” disagreements among states because decisions regarding military 
force are ultimately made by governments. 
10 I use “states” and “decision makers” interchangeably in some parts of the discussion. 
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intensity—what we call “war”—generates the greatest costs.11  States could resolve the dispute 
through peaceful means as well, and obtain comparable agreements to those they would obtain 
from militarizing.  This is the basis of the puzzle articulated most notably by Fearon (1995): why 
does militarized conflict occur, when similar settlements could be reached without incurring the 
cost of militarization? 
For my application to interstate disputes, I define the set of available actions and 
outcomes as follows.  States can take two possible actions at time t: they can take military action 
to resolve the dispute, or they can refrain from militarizing.  The set of available actions, A, can 
be written {Militarize; ~Militarize}.  Two outcomes (o) can result from the actions in A.  First, if 
neither state chooses to militarize, then the outcome is peace.  Second, if at least one state 
chooses to militarize the dispute, then the outcome is military conflict.  The set of outcomes, O, 
can be written {Peace; Militarized Conflict}.  This depiction oversimplifies the reality that state 
decision makers face.  For example, initiating a peaceful settlement attempt (bilateral or 
multilateral) could be a third available action.  My argument about dynamics in interstate 
disputes can accommodate this and other actions and outcomes.  I begin with a simpler scenario 
to facilitate clearly laying out my argument about dynamic ideal-types.  My argument can also be 
generalized to any scenario where we are interested in understanding the processes that generate 
outcomes.   
                                                 
11 The distinction between militarized conflict and war is relevant for empirical work.  Wars are militarized conflicts 
that reach at least 1000 total battle deaths (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996; Singer and Small 1972; Small and 
Singer 1982).  By contrast, “war” is used in the formal modeling literature to ensure that fighting has a non-zero 
cost.  Otherwise, “militarized conflict” and “war” are often treated as implicit synonyms in game-theoretic models.  
When comparing the findings and insights within and across the bodies of empirical and formal work, it helps to be 
aware of these semantic differences.  
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2.1.2 Rational Expectation Theory 
The conceptual underpinnings of the typology are easiest to grasp when defined in terms of 
“rational expectations.”  An oft-used concept in economics (Muth 1961), the concept (or theory) 
of rational expectations describes the causal process yielding some outcome of interest.  
Efficiency in economic markets is probably the best-known application.  Formally, actors 
exhibiting behavior consistent with rational expectations will make efficient use of all available 
information in the present to form unbiased expectations about an outcome in the future (Sheffrin 
1996; Williams and McGinnis 1988, 971).12  They will then choose the action that best 
maximizes their interests.  We can also refer to these future expectations about outcomes as 
“forecasts” or “predictions.”   
Rational expectation theory does not require that actors have perfect foresight.  It 
recognizes that the world is filled with uncertainty, impacting actors’ ability to produce accurate 
predictions.  Rational expectations allow actors to make “mistakes” when forming their 
expectations.  The theory only requires that mistakes are not systematic (i.e., errors must be 
idiosyncratic; on the whole, forecasts must be unbiased).13  Actors have reason to avoid making 
                                                 
12 Some work makes the distinction between a strong and weak form of rational expectations (Brown and Maital 
1981, 493–494; Krause 2000, 289–290; Sheffrin 1996, 14–15).  Strong or fully rational expectations require that all 
available and relevant information be used to form unbiased expectations.  By contrast, weak or partially rational 
expectations require that the expectations only be unbiased (i.e., not all information may be used efficiently).  My 
substantive discussion generally refers to weak rational expectations, as it is the less stringent of the two definitions.  
The distinction matters most for empirical testing, so I revisit this issue during my empirical discussion in Ch. 4. 
13 Formally, rational expectations require that, on average, aggregate forecasts are unbiased.  This can be 
mathematically expressed as follows (Brown and Maital 1981, 493–494; Mishkin 1986, 47–50).  An actor i uses 
some set of information at time t (which I denote as Xt) to form an expectation about o’s value k periods from now 
(which I denote as 𝑜𝑡+𝑘𝑒 ).  Xt can—and is likely to—include information regarding the probable decisions/actions of 
other relevant actors (i.e., a~i,t).  Let 𝑜𝑡+𝑘 be the actual value of o at time t + k.  𝑜𝑡+𝑘 is the product of (1) the 
decisions made by all actors at t and (2) any exogenous shocks to the system.  If aggregate behavior is consistent 
with rational expectations, then the difference between 𝑜𝑡+𝑘 (actual value) and 𝑜𝑡+𝑘𝑒  (expected value), given Xt (the 
information we had at t), should be zero on average: i.e., 𝐸(𝑜𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑜𝑡+𝑘𝑒 |𝑋𝑡) = 0.  The difference between actual 
and expected values is known as the forecast error: 𝜉𝑡+𝑘 = (𝑜𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑜𝑡+𝑘𝑒 ). 
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the same mistake persistently because they are self-interested (i.e., utility maximizers).  In order 
to obtain outcomes that are most congruent with their preferences, actors have an incentive to 
continually (1) assess the accuracy of their previous expectations, (2) gather new information 
and/or update their previous information based on what they observe, and (3) use all this 
information to form new expectations.  Given new expectations about outcomes, actors can 
subsequently adjust their behavior so as to best maximize their respective utilities.  The sequence 
of objective assessment, updating, and expectation formation is better known as Bayesian 
updating or Bayesian learning.  I use the term “learning” to refer to this specific process from 
this point onwards.  
All behavior that is consistent with rational expectations relies on an inherently forward-
looking logic.  However, the converse is not true: all inherently forward-looking logics do not 
produce behavior consistent with the concept of rational expectations.  The key feature that 
distinguishes rational expectation logic from other forward-looking logics is its unbiased-forecast 
property, induced by the self-interested nature of actors.  Krause and Granato allude to the 
importance of self-interestedness by noting that rational expectations yield behavior that “reflect 
not only a prospective or forward-looking orientation, but also goal direction and optimizing” 
(emphasis added, 1998, 136).   
Other forward-looking logics can yield systematically biased expectations, even those 
involving expectations.  Adaptive expectations, for instance, are formed by using past values of a 
variable to predict its future values (Sheffrin 1996, 80–81).  Actors have no opportunity to 
discover if past values are inaccurate, as they incorporate no additional information when 
forming their expectations.  Adaptive expectations therefore need not be unbiased (see, e.g., 
Williams and McGinnis 1988, 970–971).  On the other hand, rational expectations are formed 
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using past values of multiple variables to predict the future value of one variable in particular.  
By using multiple variables, actors have several sources of information, making it possible to 
identify and correct any past inaccuracies.14  The result is unbiased expectations. 
In economics, market efficiency is one of the best-known applications of rational 
expectation theory (Mishkin 1986, 10–12).  Economists also use rational expectation theory to 
explain inflation patterns and business cycles (see Sargent 2008 for an overview).  In many 
economic applications, precedence is usually given to relevant economic information, revealed 
by the market, when actors are forming expectations about future economic outcomes.  Scholars 
of political economy have investigated similar economic outcomes, but they place more 
emphasis on the impact and interpretation of relevant political information, such as electoral 
outcomes and the chance of government dissolution (e.g., for currency markets, Bernhard and 
Leblang 2006; Freeman, Hays, and Stix 2000).  
The concept of rational expectations has also been employed in other areas within 
political science.  For instance, Krause has extensively examined the formation of aggregate 
expectations of economic performance by the American public (Granato and Krause 2000; 
Krause 1997, 2000; Krause and Granato 1998).  McGinnis and Williams have found evidence 
consistent with a rational expectation story for US-Soviet military expenditures during the Cold 
War (McGinnis and Williams 1989; Williams and McGinnis 1988). 
Most importantly, rational expectations underlie classic game-theoretic models of 
militarized conflict.  The parallels can be seen in the four basic components of a rational choice 
model.15  First, A is the set of actions available to a state.  Second, O is the set of possible 
outcomes, given the actions in A.  Third, some function f connects every action in A with a 
                                                 
14 Hereafter, I use the term “expectation” to refer to a rational expectation unless I explicitly state otherwise. 
15 Slantchev (2011, 5–9) provides an excellent, accessible discussion of these various assumptions.   
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consequence in O (f: A → O).16  Finally, states can rank the outcomes in O from most to least 
preferred (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, 4–5).  They then evaluate the entire set of actions 
available to them and select the action that maximizes the chance of obtaining their best 
outcome, taking into account the probable actions of others.  In the parlance of rational 
expectation theory: states form expectations about future outcomes, and then adjust their 
behavior accordingly so as to maximize their utility.  Strategically incorporating beliefs about 
others’ actions when choosing one’s own—backward induction—generates the anticipatory 
behavior synonymous with rationalist assumptions and with rational expectation theory. 
2.2 TYPOLOGY DIMENSIONS 
The unbiased forecasting property of rational expectation theory will hold only if two conditions 
are met.  Specifying both conditions is necessary if we want to use rational expectation theory to 
gain substantive insight into dispute dynamics.  The conditions are the basis for the two 
dimensions of my dynamic ideal-type typology. 
2.2.1 Information Availability: “All Relevant Information” 
The first is the assumption that sufficient information is available to form rational expectations.  
This dimension is best thought of in terms of objective quantity: do states have access to enough 
                                                 
16 Uncertainty can be incorporated through the introduction of a stochastic element into f, akin to exogenous 
shocks/idiosyncratic errors in the rational expectation story.  See, e.g., Signorino (2002, 2003) for an illustration in 
the context of econometric tests of game-theoretic models. 
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information to learn from?  Formally stated, rational expectation theory requires that states use 
all relevant information.   
“All relevant information” appears to be a demanding stipulation at first glance, but the 
term is actually a misnomer.  We cannot really know what comprises the set of all relevant 
information with certainty.  We also do not know what information is actually used by states to 
form expectations about military conflict (Brown and Maital 1981, 493).  Instead, we usually 
have a subset of relevant information whose contents are informed by substantive theory.  All 
relevant information simply means that there is enough information to form unbiased 
expectations.17   
The above suggests that we must be able to answer two questions when applying rational 
expectation theory to a specific outcome of interest.  First, what constitutes the subset of relevant 
information for the outcome of interest?  Second, how readily available is this information?  As 
the outcome of interest here is militarized conflict, I turn to the substantive work on the subject. 
Regarding the first question, classic game-theoretic work on militarization has 
traditionally focused on two types of information.  The first is the probability of State i winning a 
militarized contest against State j.  It is represented by the parameter “p” in most formal models, 
and is also referred to as a state’s military capabilities.  The second type of information is i’s own 
cost of fighting, as well as the perceived cost of fighting for j.  A state’s cost of fighting is 
typically represented by “c” in formal models.  By some, it is also referred to as a state’s 
                                                 
17 For strong rational expectations, actors are required to make efficient use of all relevant information—they use all 
information in Xt to form their expectations.  If this is so, then it implies that Xt will be completely unrelated to the 
forecast error (𝜉𝑡+𝑘): i.e., Corr(𝑋𝑡, 𝜉𝑡+𝑘) = 0 ≡ Corr�𝑋𝑡 , (𝑜𝑡+𝑘 − 𝑜𝑡+𝑘𝑒 |𝑋𝑡)� = 0.  This is referred to as the 
orthogonality property (Sheffrin 1996, 6). 
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“resolve” (Maoz 1983, 199; Powell 1987, 720).18  The parameter captures the opportunity costs 
associated with militarizing. 
Regarding the second question, information regarding militarized conflict is not as 
readily available as one would expect.  There are two reasons why this is so.  First, most 
outcomes examined using rational expectation theory are relatively common occurrences.  For 
instance, the buying and selling of stock shares happens daily, which influences the stock’s listed 
price.  By contrast, militarized conflict is a rare occurrence.  States lack regular opportunities to 
learn and update information about p and/or c, making it more difficult to evaluate the accuracy 
of their expectations and adjust their behavior as needed (Smith 1991; Soros 1994).  History is 
replete with examples.  During the July Crisis of 1914, Imperial Germany realized the perils of 
its unequivocal support to allied Austria-Hungary too late to avoid the imminent war (Lebow 
1981, 143–147).   
Second, majority of the economic outcomes analyzed with rational expectations are 
continuous in nature.  Stock prices are listed as monetary values, which are updated continuously 
as traders buy and sell shares of the stock.  However, militarization is a discrete event.  We can 
only directly observe its presence or absence.  The underlying causal process yielding 
militarization, while continuous, is unobservable.  An equivalent situation would be listing only 
whether a stock’s price was above or below a certain value.  Discrete events are thus less 
informative than continuous ones because the former exhibits less variation, by definition. 
States can—and do—overcome the informational disadvantages associated with 
militarization.  The disadvantages are not insurmountable.  I contrasted militarized conflict with 
one of the classic economic applications of rational expectation theory to make one simple point: 
                                                 
18 I demonstrate the basis for this label in Ch. 3. 
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such informational disadvantages exist for militarization, compared to other types of outcomes.  
As a result, there is a higher potential for states to form inaccurate expectations about military 
conflict, even when states are pure utility maximizers. 
2.2.2 Information Processing Capabilities 
The second condition required for unbiased forecasting to hold is that actors are able to 
efficiently process all relevant information.  The objective component of rational expectations 
suggests that actors will usually ascribe the correct meaning to the information they possess.  If 
they did not, forecasts would be systematically biased and, thus, inconsistent with rational 
expectations.  I refer to this as the “information processing” capability of an actor.  Put 
differently, do actors learn (in the Bayesian sense) what they are supposed to learn, given the 
information available to them?   
Objective actors always learn perfectly; we say that they have perfect or near-perfect 
information processing capabilities.  Actors with near-perfect processing capabilities will 
actively seek out information about the positive and negative effects of all actions in A, and then 
form their expectations using the relevant information they discovered.  Non-objective actors, on 
the other hand, do not have near-perfect information processing capabilities (Rathbun 2007).  A 
greater degree of probabilism is involved in the learning process (Jervis 1976, 222).  Non-
objective actors do not consider all a ∈ A, do not actively search for relevant information, and/or 
selectively ignore available information that is relevant. 
What factors raise the likelihood of imperfect information processing capabilities?  
Answering the question requires knowing about the potential sources of information processing 
problems, of which there are several.  Tetlock and McGuire (1986) divide the body of existent 
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work on the subject into two categories, which are not meant to be exhaustive or mutually 
exclusive.  I find their categories to be a helpful expositional device and employ them here.   
First, information processing problems can arise due to the set of preexisting beliefs and 
assumptions held by decision makers.  These beliefs and assumptions form the cognitive 
structures of decision-making environments.  Operational codes describe decision makers’ 
worldview, and are comprised of a set of philosophical beliefs about the “nature of the political 
universe” and a set of instrumental beliefs about the means employed to obtain one’s preferred 
ends (George 1969, 201–216; Walker 1983, 2011).  The procedures, norms, and guidelines that 
arise out of operational codes influence how (and if) information is interpreted and assimilated 
into the decision-making process.  Bureaucracies can institutionalize these procedures, norms, 
and guidelines (Allison 1969), perpetuating their effect over time.  Work on cognitive maps, 
stereotypes, schemas, scripts, and framing are other examples of research falling under this 
heading. 
Second, information processing problems can stem from the specific rules and procedures 
used by decision makers.  Whereas the first category was primarily concerned with what 
decision makers think about the world at large, the concern here is how decision makers think 
about alternative courses of action.  How sophisticated are decision makers’ reasoning and 
judgment skills?   
There are two general models of individual decision making.  First, cognitive models 
argue that decision makers interpret information so that it is consistent with prior beliefs, 
decisions, and feelings (Jervis 1976).  The drive for cognitive consistency can lead to processing 
problems because information that challenges preexisting beliefs may be heavily discounted or 
ignored.  Further, the complexity and uncertainty surrounding many political decisions lead 
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decision makers to rely on heuristic devices.  Heuristics are processing shortcuts that allow a 
course of action to be chosen quickly and with little analytic effort (Stein 2002; Yudkowsky 
2008).  Many heuristics consistently and deliberately oversimplify how decision makers interpret 
relevant information, producing processing errors that negatively affect decision making 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1974).  Prospect theory specifically suggests that how information is 
presented (i.e., framing) will affect how decision makers interpret it (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979; Levy 1997; Mercer 2005).  Additional examples of research rooted in cognitive models 
include fundamental attribution error, noncompensatory choice heuristics, and cognitive 
dissidence theory. 
Motivational models, on the other hand, suggest that decision makers are driven by a 
desire to avoid fear, guilt, shame, and other forms of psychological stress (Janis and Mann 1977, 
205–206).  They pertain to situations in which decision makers are “motivated” to minimize 
stress, whereas cognitive models’ drive for cognitive consistency requires no such impetus 
(Kaufmann 1994).  A number of factors are associated with psychologically stressful situations.  
Chief among them is the importance of the issue being decided upon; highly stressful situations 
are associated decisions over highly salient, non-trivial issues. 
Aversion to psychological stress can lead to several well-documented forms of 
processing problems.  There is an inverse-“U” relationship between psychological stress and 
information processing.  At one end of the spectrum, too little stress, and decision makers will 
gather too little information.  They will selectively gather information, particularly when they 
believe there is little chance of finding a better alternative to the current policy.  This selectivity 
ranges from passively avoiding negative information to actively seeking supportive information 
while openly ignoring negative information.  At the other extreme, too much stress can lead 
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decision makers to gather too much information.  An example of a highly stressful situation is 
one in which insufficient time for deliberation.  In such situations, decision makers may adopt a 
behavior of “hypervigilance.”  They indiscriminately incorporate all available information, 
without rigorously assessing the information’s reliability and without critically thinking about 
the information’s relevance or implications (Lebow 1981, 110).  Janis and Mann emphasize that 
good decision making can still occur in stressful situations—the peak of the inverse “U”—but 
only under extremely specific and rare circumstances.   
Many of the hallmarks of individual-level models of decision making also apply to 
groups of individuals.  Group decision-making has some additional characteristics that can 
engender information processing problems, one of which is groupthink.  Groupthink “refers to a 
deterioration of mental efficiency, reality testing, and moral judgment that results from in-group 
pressures” in small groups (Janis 1982, 9).  Small, cohesive groups are at the highest risk for 
groupthink behavior, for several reasons.  Smaller groups place a premium on consensus-seeking 
and conformity, at the cost of “realistically appras[ing] alternative courses of action” (Janis 1982, 
9).  Individual members do not critically evaluate or analyze relevant information because they 
self-censor their opinions to conform to the group’s values and norms.  Additionally, smaller 
groups are more prone to developing an atmosphere of invulnerability and self-confidence.  As a 
result, group members discount or disregard relevant information, akin to cognitive consistency 
at the individual level.  The overall result is a “defective” group decision-making process, 
yielding a decision and outcome that are inconsistent with rational expectation theory.   
We can now return to our initial question: what factors raise the likelihood of imperfect 
information processing capabilities?  My interest is not in identifying the specific type of 
processing problem, but to identify the general conditions that make any processing problem 
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more likely to occur.  The preceding discussion suggests three possibilities.  First, situations 
associated with strong cognitive structures make it more likely that decision makers will ignore 
or discount relevant information.  Second, situations that induce psychological stress will be 
more prone to processing problems.  In general, psychological stress increases when stakes 
increase—that is, the potential outcomes are associated with significant gains or significant 
losses (Janis and Mann 1977, 50).  Choosing an appropriate course of action becomes imperative 
in order to sidestep potential loss.  Finally, situations that involve deliberation among a small, 
cohesive, insulated group of decision makers are more prone to processing problems arising from 
groupthink. 
2.3 CONFLICT DYNAMIC IDEAL-TYPES 
By combining the dimensions from the previous section, I obtain my two dynamic ideal-types—
anticipatory and non-anticipatory.  The overall typology of conflict dynamics is displayed in 
Table 2.1.  I treat the dimensions as dichotomous for the purposes of constructing Table 2.1, but 
they need not be in practice.   
TABLE 2.1. Dynamic Ideal-Type Matrix 
  Availability of Relevant Information? Non-Anticipatory 
Subcategories   Yes No 
Perfect/Near-Perfect  
Processing Capabilities? 
Yes Anticipatory Non-AnticipatoryIA 
NA due to 
information 
availability (IA) 
No Non-AnticipatoryIP Non-AnticipatoryIP 
NA due to 
information 
processing (IP) 
 25 
2.3.1 Anticipatory Dynamic 
An anticipatory dynamic is characterized by the availability of relevant information and the 
ability to correctly process it.  The observed outcomes will be consistent with rational 
expectations.  All existing research that explicitly makes use of classic game-theoretic modeling 
to explain the causal process leading to militarized conflict falls under this heading.  I recognize 
that this is a diverse body of work, encompassing a wide range of formal models and specific 
modeling assumptions.  That said, what this work has in common is the broad set of rationalist 
assumptions I have been discussing.  The general relationship suggested by an anticipatory 
dynamic, in proposition form, is: 
Proposition 2.1 (Anticipatory Dynamic): Expectations about future outcomes influence 
the actions taken by a state and the outcomes that result. 
Understanding the basic intuition behind anticipation is important for parts of my argument in 
the next chapter.  I use Fearon’s (1995) basic take-it-or-leave-it bargaining game to illustrate, in 
which States i and j dispute the allocation of some issue.  The total value of the disputed issue is 
normalized to 1.  In line with rationalist assumptions, both states are absolute utility maximizers 
and both have perfect or near-perfect information processing capabilities. 
 
FIGURE 2.2. Basic Crisis Bargaining Game 
Fearon’s bargaining game is comprised of two moves, depicted in Figure 2.2.  First, State i 
makes an offer, suggesting that it receives x amount of the good and j receives the remainder, (1 
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– x).  Second, State j decides whether to accept or reject the offer, evaluating the expected 
utilities associated with each action.  If j accepts i’s offer, then the dispute is ‘RESOLVED’ and the 
game ends.  j’s expected utility from accepting is equal to the offer itself, (1 – x).  If j rejects the 
offer, then MILITARIZED CONFLICT is the result.  Militarization is a costly endeavor (c),19 but the 
winner receives all of the disputed good and leaves the loser with nothing.  The probability of 
victory for i is equal to p and the probability of victory for j is (1 – p).  State j’s expected utility 
for fighting amounts to a lottery over the two war outcomes (victory and defeat), less the cost of 
fighting: (1 – p – cj). 
Fearon’s discussion of rationalist explanations for war is perhaps the most well-known.  
Based on the model above, it notes how other explanations “fail either to address or to explain 
adequately what prevents leaders from reaching ex ante (prewar) bargains that would avoid the 
costs and risks of fighting,” going on to note that “[a] coherent rationalist explanation for war 
must…show why states are unable to locate an alternative outcome that both would prefer to a 
fight” (1995, 380).  Fearon demonstrates the existence of deals that both states prefer to war (see 
fn. 24), yet the latter can still occur for three reasons: incentives to misrepresent p and c, 
commitment problems,20 and issue indivisibility.21  In general, a state will resort to militarized 
conflict when, given available information, it believes that the expected utility associated with 
fighting is greater than the expected utility associated with any other possible outcome. 
Of equal interest is an explanation for why we observe peaceful disputes.  One reason we 
observe peaceful disputes could be because disputants simply cannot militarize them.  I refer to 
these disputes as being “Truly Peaceful” in Ch. 4.  States may lack the ability to project their 
                                                 
19 Note that I have assumed ci ≠ 0 and cj ≠ 0. 
20 Also referred to as an enforcement problem (see Fearon 1998). 
21 Powell (2006) demonstrates that issue indivisibility reduces to a commitment problem. 
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military power far enough to come into contact with one another.  States’ military forces may 
also be committed elsewhere, precluding their use in the dispute.  For example, it is unsurprising 
that the Clipperton Island dispute between France and Mexico (1897-1934) experienced no 
militarization.  Clipperton Island is located 800 miles southwest of Mexico in the Pacific.  There 
was no French presence, military or civilian, on the island when Mexico first initiated the claim 
over Clipperton in 1897.  Throughout the entirety of the dispute, the countries’ military forces 
were not in close proximity, with France being involved with various conflicts on the European 
Continent (“Arbitral Award on the Subject of the Difference Relative to the Sovereignty over 
Clipperton Island” 1932).22  In short, peaceful disputes could remain peaceful because states lack 
the military capability to militarize them; the disputes’ chance of being militarized is near zero. 
Fearon’s model illustrates a second reason why disputes may never militarize: they have 
a chance of militarizing, but are instead peacefully resolved.  Thus, peaceful disputes are a 
consequence of anticipatory behavior.  To see this, begin at State j’s decision node in Figure 2.2.  
State j’s expected utility from rejecting i’s offer is equal to (1 – p – cj).  State j will therefore 
accept any offer (1 – x) whose expected utility is at least as good as the expected utility from 
rejecting it.  This comes out to be (1 – x) ≥ (1 – p – cj).23  Knowing this, State i will offer j 
exactly (1 – p – cj) in order to maximize its own share of the good, x, maximizing its own utility 
in doing so.24 
                                                 
22 In the 19th century, France invaded Mexico on two occasions due, in part, to Mexican default on foreign loans.  
After the victorious second invasion, France began to respond to the growing Prussian threat in Europe withdrawing 
from Mexico in 1866, 31 years before the Clipperton Island dispute began (US State Department n.d.).   
23 The lowest offer that an actor will accept is known as its reservation value.  State j’s reservation value is normally 
written in terms of x, not (1 – x): x ≤ p + cj.  I also assume that states are risk averse and will resolve indifference in 
favor of peace, hence “at least equal to” instead of “greater than.” 
24 State i’s expected utility for peace and war can be computed in a similar manner, yielding x ≥ p – ci.  We can write 
i and j’s reservation values as a single inequality, p – ci ≤ x ≤ p + cj.  The inequality demonstrates the existence of 
potential offers that both sides prefer to fighting—one of Fearon’s key insights (Fearon 1995, 388). 
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A testable implication flows from the above discussion.  Peaceful disputes may result 
from anticipatory behavior; they are not wholly the result of states’ being militarily incapable of 
engaging one another.  One place to look for signs of an anticipatory dynamic, then, is among the 
disputes that never militarize.  In hypothesis form: 
Hypothesis 2.1 (A, Peaceful): Peaceful disputes will show evidence of an anticipatory 
dynamic. 
2.3.2 Non-Anticipatory Dynamic 
My second conflict dynamic ideal-type is a non-anticipatory dynamic.  A non-anticipatory 
dynamic is characterized by outcomes that are inconsistent with rational expectations.25  
Inconsistencies with rational expectation theory will occur if one or both of its necessary 
conditions are not met.  States have a dearth of relevant information with which to form their 
expectations and/or they do not have near-perfect information processing capabilities.  The result 
is biased expectations.  Arguments involving adaptive expectations or other forward-looking, 
non-rational expectation logics fall under this heading, as do conflict-as-process arguments 
(which I will discuss more in a moment). 
A secondary concern of my dynamic ideal-type typology is broadly describing the 
reasons behind expected outcome and actual outcome mismatches, complementing its primary 
task of describing whether actors’ expectations about an outcome comport with the actual 
outcome that occurs.  Returning back to the simple weather example that opened this chapter, the 
reasons for Individual 2 and 3’s actions correspond to one of the typology’s two dimensions.  
                                                 
25 That is, I define a non-anticipatory dynamic via negation: it is the opposite of an anticipatory dynamic, hence its 
name—non-anticipatory. 
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Individual 2’s situation represents an insufficient amount of relevant information.  Individual 2 
would have grabbed an umbrella, had information been available about the weather later that 
day.  By contrast, Individual 3 represents information processing problems.  Individual 3 had 
enough information regarding the weather, but chose to disregard it.   
My dynamic ideal-types are not concerned with the specific way in which individuals 
arrive at their beliefs—e.g., that Individual 2 lacked information about the weather because of 
his/her recent move to the city, while Individual 3 ignored the forecast because of his/her own 
experiences.  In every case, the individuals operate with an identical set of preferences—that is, 
it is better to remain dry and protected from the elements than to be drenched.   
Like the individuals, states at the outset of the dispute have identical preferences: utility 
maximization.  In what I call a “non-anticipatory dynamic ideal-type,” states are trying to 
anticipate future outcomes, but their ability to do so is limited, depending on which necessary 
condition is violated.  Table 2.1 makes evident how a non-anticipatory dynamic can result from 
one of three scenarios.  I group the three scenarios into two broad subcategories.26   
Scenario 1 belongs to the subcategory of non-anticipatory dynamics resulting from 
unavailable information.  States have perfect or near-perfect information processing capabilities, 
but they lack sufficient amounts of relevant information necessary to form accurate expectations.  
Classic game-theoretic work discusses the first scenario at length.  At first, this may seem 
counterintuitive—rationalist arguments explain non-anticipation?—but it is entirely consistent 
with what I have argued.  To see how, one needs only reword the motivating puzzle of Fearon 
(1995): fighting is an outcome that is inconsistent with rational expectations, yet it still occurs—
                                                 
26 I cannot distinguish between the three scenarios, empirically.  I can only detect non-anticipation, not whether non-
anticipation is the result of Scenario 1, Scenario 2, or Scenario 3.  Nonetheless, I discuss each scenario here. 
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why?  One of Fearon’s proffered explanations details why systematic ‘deviations’ from rational 
expectation theory could occur—incomplete information. 
At the start of this chapter, I assumed that states operate in a rationalist world.  The 
hypothetical scenario I laid out was predicated on this assumption.  The discussion in preceding 
sections has highlighted some of the additional implications of a rationalist world.  Since game-
theoretic, rationalist models assume that states possess perfect or near-perfect processing 
capabilities, all disputes begin devoid of processing problems.  We know, though, that some 
disputes do eventually experience processing problems, which begs the question: how do these 
processing problems arise?  The question is even more intriguing in light of the other rationalist 
assumptions—mainly, that states are pure-utility maximizers.  That is, they are always trying to 
anticipate future outcomes.  States thus have an incentive to correct any processing problems that 
arise, so that they can form accurate expectations and obtain the best deal possible.  Why, then, 
do we observe processing problems at all, when states have an interest in ensuring that none 
exist?   
The second and third scenarios comprise the subcategory of non-anticipatory dynamics 
resulting from such processing problems, at least in part.  I group the two scenarios along this 
dimension because they radically depart from the starting “rationalist world” assumption of 
perfect/near-perfect information processing.  In the second scenario, states possess sufficient 
amounts of information, but processing problems prevent accurate expectation formation.  
Interstate rivalries are a good example of the second scenario, particularly major power rivals.  
Definitions of interstate rivalry differ, but all share some common elements.27  Interstate rivals 
are states whose interactions are frequent, competitive, and “psychologically hostile” in nature.  
                                                 
27 See, e.g., Bennett (1996), Goertz and Diehl (2001), Thompson (2001), Mitchell and Thies (2011), and Vasquez 
(2009).  For an overview, see Vasquez and Leskiw (2001). 
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Frequent interactions provide rival states with more opportunities to gather and update 
information about their disputes.  Competitiveness creates additional incentives for rivals to 
gather and update information indirectly, through other channels (Moore 1995; Williams and 
McGinnis 1988).  Major powers have the resources to extensively develop these channels.  They 
are also highly active on the international stage, giving major-power rivals additional 
opportunities to glean very basic information.  Most importantly, definitions of rivalry all 
involve some element of psychological hostility, which refers to how rivals place more emphasis 
“on hurting or denying something to the other side than on gaining something positive for 
oneself” (Vasquez 2009, 79, 83–87).  Decision makers view information about disputes with 
rivals through hostile lenses of dislike and mistrust, coloring the information’s interpretation and 
affecting the course of action chosen.   
In the third and final scenario, a non-anticipatory dynamic arises due to information 
processing problems and a lack of information.  Disputes between minor power rivals 
(Thompson 2001) could conceivably fall under this scenario, instead of the second scenario.  
Minor power rivalries are still characterized by the same frequent, competitive, and 
psychologically hostile interactions as major power rivalries.  Yet, minor powers are less 
involved, internationally, and have fewer resources to deploy for information gathering.  Basic 
information may be less readily available than it is in major power rivalries.  Disputes between 
major power rivals that, for whatever reason, suffered from a dearth of available information 
would also be included in this category.   
The presence of information processing problems in the last two scenarios is an important 
commonality.  Both scenarios are consistent with conflict-as-process stories, of which interstate 
rivalry research is a part.  Conflict-as-process arguments describe escalation as a causal, self-
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perpetuating process that ‘ratchets’ up in hostility, resulting in a “conflict spiral.”  Threats are 
exchanged, the hostility of the interactions escalates, and eventually leads to war (Vasquez 2009, 
169).28  As the dispute escalates, the potential for “stress-induced cognitive impairment, 
misperceived intentions, and emotionally driven behavior” increases (Leng 2004, 52); states’ 
ability to form unbiased expectations is impaired (Moore 1995).  The key intuition behind 
conflict-as-process stories is succinctly stated by Vasquez: “The history of prior 
interactions…establishes a set of expectations and a reservoir of psychological hostility or 
friendship that act as a set of constraints on existing interactions” (emphasis added, 2009, 171; 
see also Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 203–207). 
The self-perpetuating nature of some conflict-as-process arguments is consistent with 
path dependency.  Path dependence is a history-dependent process in which both the occurrence 
and the order (or sequencing) of past events matter (Page 2006; Pierson 2004).  Events 
“occurring at particular times essentially remove certain options from the menu of political 
possibilities.  By doing so, they can greatly alter the consequences of events or processes 
occurring at a later stage” (Pierson 2004, 12).  In addition to closing off certain alternative 
actions, past events also constrain actors to the current course of action by making it difficult and 
costly to select alternatives (Bennett and Elman 2006).   
To explain why history has a constraining effect, scholars have offered several potential 
mechanisms.29  Positive feedback is one such mechanism.  It operates through self-
reinforcement: engaging in a behavior at time t increases the benefits of engaging in the same 
behavior at t + 1 (Pierson 2000, 2004).  Positive feedback is consistent with the self-perpetuating 
                                                 
28 For a criticism of Vasquez’s broader steps-to-war argument, see Levy and Thompson (2010). 
29 See Bennett and Elman (2006, 256–259) for a discussion of other constraint mechanisms. 
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escalatory spiral described in conflict-as-process arguments.30  The decision to militarize a 
dispute becomes not only costly to make, but also costly to reverse (Carpenter and Lewis 2004, 
202).   
In proposition form, the non-anticipatory logic can be stated: 
Proposition 2.2 (Non-Anticipatory Dynamic): The actions taken by a state and the 
outcomes that result are influenced by past outcomes. 
The long arm of history in path-dependent processes is indicative of a general relationship 
between dynamics and “time.”  This is the subject of Section 3.2.2 in the next chapter.  Before 
moving on, I briefly summarize the major points from this chapter. 
2.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I developed a typology of dynamic ideal-types to describe the causal processes 
generating events during an interstate dispute.  I motivated the typology using rational 
expectation theory, from which I distilled the key conditions required for rational expectations to 
hold.  The key conditions formed the basis for the typology’s two conceptual dimensions.  The 
combination of these dimensions yielded my two dynamic ideal-types.  Anticipatory dynamics 
are consistent with rational expectation theory, and require that states have sufficient information 
available to them and that the information is processed correctly.  Non-anticipatory dynamics 
will result when states have insufficient information to form accurate expectations and/or they do 
not correctly process all available information. 
                                                 
30 Path dependence also implies that the sets of outcomes and actions available to actors are endogenous.  
Anticipatory dynamics, by contrast, require that both be exogenous.  
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Which disputes exhibit which dynamic type?  How can we refine the logics associated 
with the above propositions?  Having established the conditions required for each dynamic ideal-
type, I can now offer an explanation in the next chapter.  Table 2.2 summarizes this chapter’s 
propositions and hypothesis. 
TABLE 2.2. Summary of Chapter 2 Propositions and Hypothesis 
Proposition 2.1 (Anticipatory Dynamic): Expectations about future outcomes influence the 
actions taken by a state and the outcomes that result. 
Proposition 2.2 (Non-Anticipatory Dynamic): The actions taken by a state and the outcomes 
that result are influenced by past outcomes. 
 
Hypothesis 2.1 (A, Peaceful): Peaceful disputes will show evidence of an anticipatory 
dynamic. 
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3.0  THE ROLE OF ISSUE SALIENCE 
How can we understand interstate dispute dynamics?  What determines the predominant dynamic 
ideal-type in a dispute?  This chapter makes two principal claims.  First, I claim that different 
types of disputes will exhibit different types of dynamics.  Second, I argue that the importance, 
or salience, of a dispute will affect its predominant dynamic.   
Issue salience is a recurrent theme in conflict research.  Both anticipatory and non-
anticipatory explanations of conflict escalation begin with a disputed issue, and we know that 
states rely on military force only in certain situations.  The disputed issue’s characteristics are 
some of the first factors that can affect the dispute’s bargaining environment, influencing all 
events that subsequently unfold.  Additionally, these factors can condition the effect of other 
variables that potentially influence dynamic type.  It is therefore imperative that we develop a 
clear understanding of how disputed issues affect dynamics.31   
Diehl (1992) makes the general case for the impact of issue area on the decision to 
employ military force (see also Vasquez and Mansbach 1984).  Vasquez refers to the nature of 
the contested issue as one of the “fundamental causes that set[s] off a train of events…that end[s] 
in war” (2009, 7).  He also notes that “the thrust of the evidence shows that only certain kinds of 
issues are commonly associated with war, despite the fact that war is an act of force that, 
                                                 
31 For example, I believe that domestic politics will also affect the dynamic we observe, but that issue salience will 
condition the way in which domestic politics matters.  This is one of the reasons why I have assumed unitary state 
actors. 
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logically, could be used to resolve any issue” (Vasquez 2009, 137).  Research on interstate 
rivalries also has found that different issue areas affect whether states become rivals in the first 
place (Huth 1996a; Rasler and Thompson 2006), as well as how long rivalries last (Bennett 
1998; Dreyer 2012). 
I argue that a dispute’s level of overall salience (which I abbreviate “OS”) will affect the 
availability of information and/or states’ ability to process it.  An anticipatory dynamic requires 
that states have (a) sufficient amounts of information to (b) process with perfect or near-perfect 
ability.  The absence of either condition will impair states’ ability to form accurate expectations, 
increasing the chance of a non-anticipatory dynamic.  I contend that high OS issues will be the 
most prone to violating one or both of these conditions, for one of two reasons.  First, issue OS 
affects the amount of time that states believe they have to gather and process relevant 
information (i.e., “time pressures”).  Or, alternatively, issue OS affects the issue’s perceived or 
actual indivisibility.  Therefore, I hypothesize that the predominant dynamic in high OS issues 
will be non-anticipatory. 
I suggest that a dispute’s overall issue salience has one of these two effects through its 
impact on the effect of “time.”  I leverage the relationship between time, conceptualized as the 
length of the disputed issue (Figure 2.1, Segment AB), and states’ expectations about how long a 
militarized conflict will last (Segment BC) to obtain predictions regarding conflict dynamics.  
Segment AB represents “claim duration.”  Segment BC represents “conflict duration.”  I focus 
on states’ ability to form accurate expectations about Segment BC—that is, the duration of 
militarized conflict.  If my argument is correct, one of its implications is that the accuracy of 
states’ expectations regarding conflict duration will vary as Segment AB becomes longer.   
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The chapter is organized into three major sections.  I first discuss the disputed issue and 
define overall salience.  Second, I show how conflict duration and time provide a way to 
generate specific, testable predictions regarding dynamic types.  Finally, I explain how overall 
salience will affect dynamic type to generate testable hypotheses.  The chapter concludes with a 
brief summary of its major points and a table containing the hypotheses from this chapter. 
3.1 THE DISPUTED ISSUE 
3.1.1 Dispute Initiation 
I begin with the emergence of an interstate dispute (Figure 2.1, Point A).  A dispute exists 
between two states when official representatives of one state’s government make explicit 
statements or claims that either (1) challenge the status quo regarding the issue or (2) are counter 
to the explicit statements or claims made by the official representatives of another state’s 
government.   
Little quantitative work has investigated the factors associated with dispute initiation.  
Huth (1996b) has investigated the initiation of territorial disputes, finding that initiation is more 
likely when the territory is strategically positioned; has economic value; or when i and j’s 
populations have enough ethnic/linguistic similarities to create a potential basis for irredentist 
claims.  Similarly, Frederick (2012) assesses over a dozen potential explanations for territorial 
dispute initiation.  He finds that initiation patterns are different across geographic regions, with 
some explanations finding support in some regions, but not others..  Some work has also been 
done on the initiation of cross-border river disputes.  River disputes are more likely to occur over 
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longer rivers, river basins with little water runoff, or river basins with a high population density 
(Brochmann and Hensel 2009; Hensel and Brochmann 2008).  More recently, Lee and Mitchell 
(2012) find that higher levels of foreign direct investment reduce the chances of territorial, 
maritime, and river dispute initiation.  This is the extent of empirical research on this topic, to the 
best of my knowledge.   
For the purposes of the subsequent discussion, I assume that the onset of a disputed issue 
is exogenous to its militarization and to the initiation of other disputes.  More plainly, disputes 
arise in a more-or-less random fashion, making them unrelated to the process behind militarized 
conflict.  This is a strong assumption to make, I admit.  I think it necessary for theoretical 
preciseness to start.32  Others have made the same assumption for similar reasons (e.g., Huth and 
Allee 2002; Huth, Croco, and Appel 2011; Slantchev 2011).  On substantive grounds, research 
into the behavior of interstate rivals calls the assumption into question almost immediately (e.g., 
Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; Dreyer 2010; Rasler and Thompson 2006; Vasquez and 
Leskiw 2001), as do broader arguments about ‘perverse’ issue linkage (Krebs 1999; Vasquez 
1983, 2009; Vasquez and Mansbach 1984).33  It is hard to assess whether my assumption is valid 
because there have been no empirical tests of these arguments to date.   
3.1.2 Overall Salience 
I employ Hensel, Mitchell, Sowers, and Thyne’s (2008) concept of overall issue salience to 
represent a disputed issue’s importance.  I find the concept useful because of its clear distinction 
                                                 
32 The assumption also simplifies portions of the empirical analysis.  I discuss this more in Ch. 4. 
33 ‘Perverse’ issue linkage arguments suggest that issue linkage has a negative effect on successful bargaining or 
successful cooperation, instead of the positive effect suggested by most issue linkage arguments (e.g., Keohane 
1984). 
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between tangible and intangible salience.  To understand the manner in which this concept is 
formulated, though, some additional foundational definitions are required.   
In general, an issues-based approach portrays the political process as “a quest for values 
satisfaction” by states (Mansbach and Vasquez 1981, 58).  Values can be thought of as ends or 
goals that a state may desire (Hensel 2001, 82).  Some values have ends which can be directly 
seen—referred to as “tangible” values—while the ends associated with other values cannot be 
observed directly (s“intangible” values).34  I will refer to values as “goals” from this point 
onward, so as not to be confused with “value,” which I have been using to broadly describe an 
issue’s overall worth.  
Scholars have created several lists of basic goals and the tangibility associated with each 
goal (e.g., Hermann and Coate 1982; Mansbach and Vasquez 1981); I employ the list used by 
Hensel et al. (2008), reproduced below in Table 3.1.  The list is not exhaustive.  Because goals 
cannot be pursued directly, states pursue “stakes” instead.  Stakes are the “more 
concrete…objects that are seen as possessing or representing the desired” goals.  Linking 
together one or more stakes and goals produces an issue (Hensel 2001, 82). 
                                                 
34 Rosenau (1968, 146) describes a tangible value as one whose means must be purchased before it can be used and 
whose end can be seen directly (“photographable,” in his informal parlance).  An intangible value is characterized 
by unpurchasable means or by an end that can be observed only indirectly.   
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TABLE 3.1. Examples of Basic Goals and Their Tangibility 
Tangible Goals Intangible Goals 
• Security: Safety from external danger 
(absence of threats or protection from 
threats) 
• Survival: Provision of basic human 
needs (food/water/shelter) 
• Wealth: Accumulation of resources, 
goods, or money (beyond basic human 
needs) 
• Culture/Identity: Related to one’s cultural, 
religious, or ideological beliefs or identity 
• Equality/Justice: “Fairness” or impartiality in 
the distribution of other values 
• Independence/Autonomy: Ability to formulate 
and implement one’s own policies 
• Status/Prestige/Influence: The degree of 
respect one is accorded by others 
Source: Hensel et al. (2008, 120).  Lists are in alphabetical order. 
 
Salience refers to the importance of an issue.  It is “the extent to which (but, principally, the 
intensity with which) peoples and their leaders value an issue and its subject matter” (Randle 
1987, 27).  Assuming unitary states, as I have, implies that state decision makers and the 
population assign the same level of importance to an issue.  Hensel et al. define an issue’s 
overall salience as a product of the tangible and intangible salience ascribed to the issue’s stakes 
and/or goals.  Formally, overall issue salience is the general importance of an issue “to the state’s 
leadership or…[to] a substantial portion of its population,” based on whether the issue has a 
relatively high or low amount of both tangible and intangible salience (Hensel et al. 2008, 121).   
In the article, Hensel et al. suggest a hierarchy of issue salience.  They argue that issues 
“that take on relatively high values of both tangible and intangible salience” will generally be the 
most salient, followed by issues with high salience on at least one dimension (“moderate overall 
salience”), followed by issues with low salience on both dimensions (“low overall salience”) 
(2008, 121–122).  The relative values taken on each dimension are primarily determined by 
counting the number of goals associated with the issue, though this is not stated explicitly.  Table 
3.2 reproduces a two-by-two matrix from Hensel et al. depicting the combination of these 
tangible and intangible dimensions.  I have added the overall salience category labels to the 
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table.  Hensel et al. stress that their categorization relies on relative comparisons along their two 
salience dimensions (2008, 121).   
TABLE 3.2. Variations in Disputed Issue Types Based on Tangibility and Salience 
 Relatively Low Intangible Salience Relatively High Intangible Salience 
Relatively High 
Tangible Salience 
MODERATE O.S. 
River (Turkish dam projects on 
Euphrates River) 
Maritime (Cod Wars) 
HIGH O.S. 
Territory (Golan Heights, Alsace-
Lorraine) 
Regime survival (Castro) 
 
 
Relatively Low 
Tangible Salience 
LOW O.S. 
Firms or industries (Airbus 
subsidies, shrimp imports) 
Treatment of individuals (caning of 
[US citizen] Michael Fay [for 
vandalism in Singapore]) 
MODERATE O.S. 
Identity (treatment of Germans in 
South Tyrol) 
Influence (Russia and elections in 
former Soviet republics) 
Source: Table 1, Hensel et al. (2008, 121).  O.S. = overall salience. 
 
High salience is the implicit reference point along each dimension.  Territorial disputes are an 
example of a high overall salience issue.  Territory often has several tangible and intangible 
goals associated with it, such as economic and/or strategic value (tangible) and national prestige 
or identity (intangible).  Achieving these goals often brings benefits to many within a state, 
making them highly coveted by states.35  By contrast, an issue area has a relatively low amount 
of salience if it has significantly fewer tangible and intangible goals associated with it, relative to 
the appropriate high salience category.  The benefits associated with the issue’s stakes and/or 
goals are either negligible or only a small portion of a state’s total population receives them 
(Hensel et al. 2008, 121).  For example, trade disputes involve allegations of one country 
employing discriminatory trade practices (e.g., tariffs, anti-dumping) against another country’s 
                                                 
35 I refer here to the potential first-order (or direct) effect of any goals and benefits associated with a disputed issue.  
I recognize that there may be second-, third-, ..., nth-order (or indirect) effects as well, but these become increasingly 
difficult to parse out in a substantively rigorous way.  I therefore follow Hensel et al. (2008), who also (implicitly) 
focus only on direct effects. 
 42 
goods or services.  Trade disputes are typically associated with one goal, economic wealth, and 
no others (though exceptions, of course, exist).  The potential benefits from a trade dispute affect 
only a small proportion of a state’s overall population, typically—the producers of the goods or 
services being allegedly discriminated against.  
One possible criticism of the overall issue salience categorization scheme pertains to the 
moderately salient category.  Disputes with high tangible salience and low intangible salience 
(H,L) are categorized the same as those with low tangible salience and high intangible salience 
(L,H).  Disputes with high intangible salience are likely more important than disputes with lower 
intangibility, irrespective of tangible salience.  States will expend resources to connect an issue 
with an intangible goal only if the goal is perceived as important enough to justify the 
expenditure.  Intangibility is associated with indirectly observable ends, making it easier for 
states to create a connection between a stake and an intangible goal.36  States will expend the 
effort to explicate the connection between stakes and intangible goals only when they believe the 
issue to be important enough to justify the expenditure.  In short, a de facto selection effect exists 
for issues with high intangible salience: we observe issues with high levels of intangible salience 
precisely because states believe the issue to be highly important.  A refined hierarchy of overall 
salience might read, from most to least salient: high; moderate-high (high intangible, low 
tangible); moderate-low (low intangible, high tangible); low. 
Another potential criticism is that States i and j may not assign the same amount of 
tangible and intangible salience to an issue.  For example, State i may believe a territorial issue 
has high levels of tangible and intangible salience, but State j believes that the same issue has 
only a high level of tangible salience.  In response, Hensel et al. argue that general issue areas 
                                                 
36 By contrast, the ends associated with tangible salience are directly observable; the situation is clearer cut and less 
subject to interpretation. 
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can be broadly “classified as being relatively high or low along each dimension,” even though 
specific, “individual examples of each issue type may vary in both tangible and intangible 
salience” (emphasis added, 2008, 121).  I agree with the intuition behind their rebuttal.  Further, I 
believe the categorization is still valid for my purposes—to create groups with broadly similar 
characteristics.  To show how, I use Hensel et al.’s existing framework to strengthen the 
connection between their rebuttal and their substantive theory. 
An issues-based approach suggests two explanations for different issue salience 
valuations.  First, states may associate the same goals with an issue, but they assign different 
levels of salience to the issue’s goals.  For example, States i and j both believe that some issue is 
associated with security, but pursuing security is more important to i than j.  To accommodate 
the possibility, we need only add a parameter to the basic bargaining model from Ch. 2 that 
captures different valuations.  Let vi and vj represent the issue’s total value to States i and j, 
respectively, where total value is directly related to the issue’s overall salience.  Also relax the 
previous implicit assumption from Ch. 2 that vi = vj = 1, such that vi > 0 and vj > 0.37  Allowing v 
to vary by state simply adds another piece of relevant information that is required for accurate 
expectation formation.  It is also another piece of privately held information that states have an 
incentive to misrepresent. 
The expected utilities can be recomputed to include v.  Since vi ≠ vj, I normalize the size 
of the good so that the reservation values are on comparable metrics, for discussion purposes.38  
In Ch. 2, State j accepted any offer (1 – x) from i whose value was at least (1 – p – cj); written in 
                                                 
37 Some formal work does explicitly include the issue’s total value, v, as a model parameter (e.g., Carter 2010; 
Slantchev 2011).  In models where v is not explicitly included, it is considered to be a component of c, the overall 
cost of fighting.  This is one of the reasons why some refer to c as “resolve” instead of “opportunity costs.” 
38 I normalize by dividing each state’s expected utility by the corresponding v, which amounts to a min-max 
normalization. 
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terms of x, j’s reservation value is p + cj.  The value 1 appears in the expressions because we 
assumed that vj = 1.  If we relax this assumption, State j will now accept any offer x from i whose 
expected utility (for j) is at least equal to (vjp + cj) ≡ (p + cj/vj).  Making a similar substitution to 
find State i’s reservation value, i will make no offer x less than p – ci/vi.  Notice how costs are 
discounted at a greater rate when v is larger, as it would be when the issue is more salient.  As v 
increases, the size of c/v goes toward zero, shrinking the range of offers that both states find 
preferable to militarization.  All else equal, more salient issues are more prone to military 
conflict. 
A second explanation for different issue salience valuations is a more severe version of 
the first.  States may associate different goals with the same issue.  For instance, State i may 
associate an issue with prestige and ideology, but State j associates the same issue with 
independence and autonomy.  The US and North Vietnam during the Vietnam War is one such 
example.  The previous insight about v will still hold if, on the whole, there is a degree of 
regularity as to which goals are associated with which issues (vs. random assignment of goals to 
issues).  Descriptive work on disputed issues lends some support to the notion.  For example, 
studies repeatedly mention security, survival, wealth, and identity as goals associated with 
territorial issues (Carter 2010; Dzurek 2005; Goertz and Diehl 1992; Holsti 1991; O’Lear et al. 
2005; Vasquez 2009).  Some territorial issues may lack some of these goals, and others may have 
additional goals, but the variations can be treated as idiosyncratic.  States can exploit knowledge 
about the “usual suspects” to derive more accurate beliefs about their opponent’s value of v.  
Much of the existing work on issues and militarized conflict falls into the upper-right cell 
of Table 3.2.  Scholars have long focused on the effect of territorial disputes on the outbreak of 
militarized conflict or war (e.g., Carter 2010; Diehl and Goertz 1991; Goertz and Diehl 1992; 
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Lektzian, Prins, and Souva 2010; Senese 2005; Vasquez 2009).  Senese and Vasquez (2008) 
notably examine how territorial disputes affect a range of militarized conflict, including the 
chances of conflict initiation and territory’s effect on the likelihood of escalation to war.39  
Related research provides evidence regarding the difficulty associated with resolving territorial 
disputes.  Hensel and Mitchell (2005) find that territorial disputes with higher levels of salience 
are (1) less likely to be settled peacefully, and (2) more likely to lead to militarized conflict.  
Territorial disputes are also more likely to experience militarization than river or maritime issues 
(Hensel et al. 2008).  Examinations of regime disputes and militarization are far rarer (Tures 
2000). 
Research has also begun into the issue areas from the upper-left cell.  River disputes 
involve disagreements over river navigation rights, water consumption and quantity, or pollution 
(e.g., Brochmann and Hensel 2009; Furlong, Gleditsch, and Hegre 2006; Hensel, Mitchell, and 
Sowers 2006; Kalbhenn 2011; Tir and Stinnett 2012).  Maritime disputes generally involve 
disagreements about oil exploration rights, fishing rights, right of navigation, or maritime 
boundaries (e.g., Nemeth et al. 2006).  Both river and maritime disputes are examples of 
moderately salient issues.  For example, maritime disputes can impact the economies of coastal 
countries that depend heavily on maritime-based industry (e.g., fishing).  This gives them a high 
level of tangible salience.  However, compared to the issues comprising the high overall salience 
category, maritime disputes usually do not have a significant amount of intangible salience 
(Hensel et al. 2008, 122).40  Both bottom cells of Table 3.2 remain largely uninvestigated in the 
quantitative literature on militarized conflict.41 
                                                 
39 Others examine similar connections (e.g., Chi and Flint 2012; Huth and Allee 2002). 
40 Some maritime disputes have higher levels of intangible salience than this statement would initially suggest.  
These disputes are normally linked to a territorial dispute.  A disagreement over the ownership of some set of islands 
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3.2 DISTINGUISHING AMONG DYNAMICS: CONFLICT DURATION 
To parse out the effects of overall salience on dynamic type, we need a way to refine last 
chapter’s predictions, such that we can distinguish among dynamic types.  I claim this can be 
done using the duration of a militarized conflict.  Specifically, I evaluate states’ ability to form 
accurate expectations about the length of a potential militarization.  I refer to this as “conflict 
duration,” equivalent to Segment BC in Figure 2.1.   
3.2.1 Why Conflict Duration? 
We have a real interest in understanding the duration of militarized conflicts because of their 
economic, human, and reputational costs.  Even spats arising from non-militarized conflict can 
have deleterious effects.  As an example, take recent events in China and Japan’s dispute over 
the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in the East China Sea.42  Up to late 2012, three of the five islands 
were nominally owned by a private Japanese landlord.  When the Japanese government bought 
the three islands, China was outraged.  Japanese exports to China decreased sharply, so much so 
that JPMorgan Chase estimates “the sale may have cut Japan’s growth in the latest quarter [4Q 
2012] by about one percentage point.”43  The costs stemming from militarized conflict, even 
those lasting a few days, are just as steep, if not more so.  As militarized conflicts last longer, 
these costs only mount further. 
                                                                                                                                                             
(territory) has implications for countries’ recognized maritime boundaries and exclusive economic zones (both are 
types of maritime disputes).  The intangible salience of these “linked” maritime disputes comes from the related 
territorial dispute, not something intrinsic to the maritime dispute itself.  
41 IPE scholars have examined various aspects of international trade disputes, which fall into the lower-left cell of 
Table 3.2 (e.g., Busch and Reinhardt 2002; Davis and Bermeo 2009; Guzman and Simmons 2002). 
42 E.g., “The Senkaku or Diaoyu Islands: Narrative of an Empty Space,” The Economist, December 22, 2012. 
43 “China-Japan Dispute Takes Rising Toll on Top Asian Economies,” 2013, Bloomberg News, 
http://bloom.bg/UHEigY (accessed January 14, 2013). 
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Expectations about conflict duration are relevant because they influence the initial 
decision to militarize a dispute.  Returning to the basic bargaining model from State j’s 
perspective (a similar logic applies to i), recall that j will militarize if its expected utility from 
fighting, p + cj/vj, is believed to be greater than its expected utility from peace, x.  As fighting is 
costly, any militarized action consumes a portion of j’s finite pool of resources.  All else equal, 
the longer any militarization lasts, the more resources it will consume, and therefore the more 
costly it will be.44  In this light, cj represents j’s expectation about its total costs for the entire 
conflict.  If j added together its expected cost of fighting on day 1, its expected cost of fighting 
on day 2, all the way through day D—the day that j believes the fighting will end—the result 
would be cj.45   
State j’s belief about how long the conflict will last (D) is therefore a vital piece of 
information for computing its total expected utility for fighting.46  Equally important to the 
expected-utility calculation is j’s expected cost of fighting each day, which I refer to as either 
“per-day” or “per-period” costs.  Do per-day costs increase, decrease, or stay the same across the 
course of the militarized conflict?  These are questions related to conflict escalation, which I 
leave for future work.  I treat per-period costs as constant in the subsequent discussion, for 
simplification purposes.47  In sum, forming accurate expectations about militarized conflict 
requires accurate beliefs about D and per-period costs. 
                                                 
44 Leventoğlu and Slantchev’s (2007) punctuated equilibrium model of war illustrates this intuition well.   
45 I arbitrarily chose days as my unit of time; any unit would have worked to illustrate my point.  Additionally, 
depicting per-day (i.e., per-period) costs in this way is incredibly simplistic.  I think it is fine for the illustrative 
purposes of my discussion, but I acknowledge that my treatment would need to be more rigorous if I were formally 
specifying a game-theoretic model to solve.  For a more nuanced treatment, see Powell (2004, 352), whose war-as-
inside-option model divides the per-period cost of fighting into preparation costs (e.g., mobilization) and battle costs 
(the casualties and destruction from actual fighting). 
46 State i’s belief about D is no less important, as it will affect i’s initial offer to j. 
47 In reality, this assumption is doubtful.  Longer conflicts have a greater chance of escalating to the 1000-deaths 
threshold for “war,” suggesting an increase in per-period costs for lengthier conflicts.  The relationship between 
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An inaccurate estimation about D affects j’s expected utility calculation in one of two 
ways.  Overestimation would cause j to behave more peacefully.  If the conflict would last D 
days (“truth,” for expositional purposes), but j believes it would last D + e days (with e > 0), then 
j’s estimate of cj would be too high compared to its true costs (all else equal).  This yields a 
lower expected utility of fighting for j, increasing the range of potential offers that j finds 
preferable to war.48  Peace would be more prevalent.   
By contrast, underestimating D is more troublesome: j will militarize more often.  State 
j’s belief that the fight will last D – e days leads to an underestimate of cj.  This increases j’s 
expected utility from fighting and decreases the range of potential offers j finds preferable to 
conflict.  Historical accounts hint that states tend to underestimate D more than they overestimate 
it.  Before certain conflicts begin, state leaders are “optimistic” about their prospects and often 
predict quick fights resulting in victory, not protracted fights ending in victory (or defeat).  On 
the eve of World War I, for example, the common belief among most of Europe’s leaders was 
that “the coming war…would be short.  The fighting might last three months or perhaps six 
months” (Blainey 1988, 35).49  Instead, the fighting lasted almost 52 months. 
All else equal, I expect states will only militarize a dispute when they expect the fights to 
be short.  Militarization of any sort has economic, reputational, and human costs which accrue as 
a militarization becomes lengthier.  A utility-maximizing state wants to minimize costs, all else 
equal: hence, shorter militarizations. 
                                                                                                                                                             
conflict intensity and duration is likely endogenous.  Conflicts that last longer have a greater chance of reaching the 
threshold for war, but it may also be true that more intense conflicts are likely to last longer.  I take no stance on 
which causal direction is “correct,” only that the general relationship exists.  Evidence of a connection between a 
conflict’s duration and its escalatory pattern is therefore unsurprising (e.g., Cederman 2003). 
48 Specifically, the range will increase by: e*(j’s per-day cost of conflict). 
49 I use the phrase “optimism” differently than it is used in the crisis-bargaining/formal modeling literature.  The 
latter discusses optimism only in terms of both sides’ common belief in victory (p) (Fey and Ramsay 2007; 
Slantchev and Tarar 2011).  Instead, I suggest that optimism involves belief in victory and a short conflict.  
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3.2.2 The Effect of Time on Expectation Accuracy 
How accurate are states’ expectations regarding conflict duration?  My ideal-types suggest that 
the accuracy of states’ expectations will vary over time within the dispute.  In general, time can 
be understood as the number of periods since the start of a process.  Here, I conceive of it as time 
elapsed since the initiation of an interstate dispute (Figure 2.1, Point A—CLAIM DURATION).  
Crucially, my ideal-types imply that time can have one of two effects on expectation accuracy.  
The key difference is whether or not states will possess perfect or near-perfect information 
processing capabilities over the course of an entire dispute.  This equates to the top row versus 
the bottom row of Table 2.1. 
3.2.2.1 Time as Beneficial 
First, the passage of time can have a beneficial effect because it is potentially informative.  This 
will be the case when information processing capabilities are perfect or near-perfect and will 
remain that way throughout the dispute (Table 2.1, top row).  Fearon’s (1995) seminal work tells 
us that incomplete information is one of the causes of militarized conflict.  Any factor that helps 
remedy informational asymmetries is thus beneficial.   
Each additional time period gives states an opportunity to gather additional information, 
helping them to overcome any informational shortcomings.  For instance, states may develop 
new channels for information gathering (Moore 1995).  More fundamentally, actors can assess 
the accuracy of past expectations and make adjustments when forming new expectations.  Game 
theoretically, Leventoğlu and Tarar (2008) demonstrate a similar result.  They show that 
insufficient information yields non-anticipatory dynamics only when an actor is unwilling or 
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unable to wait before making a decision.  That is, time limitations can lead to insufficient 
information.   
What this suggests is that expectations about conflict duration potentially become more 
accurate as time goes on.  States gain opportunities to update and gather information, allowing 
them to refine their expectations.  In the presence of near-perfect processing capabilities, 
increasingly accurate expectations translate to a lesser chance of a non-anticipatory dynamic and 
a greater chance of an anticipatory dynamic.  To summarize the broader rationale as a 
proposition: 
Proposition 3.1 (Time and Information Availability): As more time passes, expectation 
accuracy will improve.   
Notice how this viewpoint relies on an objective world: states interpret information correctly, but 
they may simply lack information to interpret.  Extant work on interstate conflict relies 
predominantly on this view, as it is congruent with game-theoretic work on the subject. 
3.2.2.2 Time as Pernicious 
The effect of time changes if we consider a subjective world in which correct interpretation is not 
a given.  When processing problems can arise, the passage of time may have a pernicious effect 
because of its causal nature.  Exemplified by the discussion of path dependency in Section 2.3.2, 
key attributes of the broader process are altered as time goes on.  The set of A and/or O change as 
various actions a or outcomes o are added to or removed from the respective sets.  There may be 
few indications of the additions or subtractions in the short run, which  makes it harder for actors 
to know “which policies produce which outcomes” (Callander 2011, 643).  The alterations are 
also hard to identify because they are often the unexpected consequence of some action.  The 
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alterations are therefore not only hard to identify, but difficult to anticipate, ex ante (Greif and 
Laitin 2004, 639).   
The passage of time also creates more opportunities for information processing problems 
to arise.  As more time passes, collective subjective emotions can accumulate within a state.  
States may define an issue as part of an “ideological struggle,” using language “that take[s] on 
highly moralistic overtones” with “a sense that this may be the final battle between good and 
evil” or a sense that one’s own survival or way of life is at risk (Vasquez and Mansbach 1984, 
425).  While rhetoric of this sort may be employed for strategic reasons (Krebs and Jackson 
2007), its subjective nature causes emotions to build over time.50  Importantly, the buildup has a 
constitutive effect, affecting the dispute’s bargaining environment and actors’ identities 
(Goddard 2006, 2009).  Disputes become more difficult to resolve, as both sides adopt 
increasingly irreconcilable bargaining positions.  I expand on these points below in Section 
3.3.1.2. 
The emotional buildup colors the way in which states process information regarding their 
adversaries (Jervis 1968; see also Janis 1982; Janis and Mann 1977).  For instance, states may 
selectively ignore pieces of information relevant to the decision at hand, simply because the 
information does not comport with a state’s perception of its adversary.  States may also rely too 
heavily on select pieces of information, chosen because the information does comport with its 
perceptions.  As a result, states’ expectations regarding conflict duration may be inaccurate in the 
presence of processing problems.  Such processing problems become more likely as more time 
                                                 
50 The emotional buildup can be an intentional or unintentional byproduct of symbolic rhetoric.  Some also argue 
that symbolic rhetoric has an increased chance of being used as time goes on (Vasquez 1983, 2009).  Because the 
buildup is gradual, it is difficult to observe and anticipate, ex ante (Greif and Laitin 2004, 639).   
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passes in a pernicious-effect story, even if states are trying to form accurate expectations in an 
effort to evaluate their available courses of action.  
The broader implication is that expectations will not become more accurate as time 
passes.  In fact, expectations may become less accurate.  As a summarizing proposition: 
Proposition 3.2 (Time and Information Processing): As more time passes, expectation 
accuracy will not improve or will get worse. 
 
The pernicious effect of time is evident in Argentina and Britain’s ongoing dispute over the 
Malvinas/Falkland Islands.  The Falkland Islands have been under British control since 1833, but 
Argentina also claims ownership.  Argentina views the sovereignty of the islands as paramount 
to national identity, alleging that the islands were “taken in an act of imperialist high-
handedness” that left Argentina “territorially incomplete” (Freedman 2005, 17).  These claims 
are enshrined in the Argentine Constitution: 
The Argentine Nation ratifies its legitimate and non-prescribing sovereignty over the 
Malvinas, Georgias del Sur and Sandwich del Sur Islands and over the corresponding 
maritime and insular zones, as they are an integral part of the National territory. 
 
The recovery of said territories and the full exercise of sovereignty, respectful of the way 
of life of their inhabitants and according to the principles of international law, are a 
permanent and unrelinquished goal of the Argentine people.51 
While the Malvinas “mattered a great deal to all Argentines” (Freedman 2005, 18), only a 
small—albeit well-organized—minority in Britain had an interest in maintaining ownership of 
the Islands.  Negotiations over the Islands’ sovereignty had been ongoing since the mid-1960s, 
but a resolution remained elusive (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, 7–9). 
                                                 
51 http://www.senado.gov.ar/web/interes/constitucion/english.php  
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At the start of 1982, the governing Argentinian junta decided to pursue a “double policy,” 
in which it would push hard for a negotiated settlement to the dispute while also preparing for 
“the employment of military power should the first alternative fail” (Freedman and Gamba-
Stonehouse 1991, 12).  Secrecy was imperative to the military portion of the plan, lest Britain 
have a chance to send a defensive force to the Falklands.  As a result, Argentina was 
hyperattentive to any hint of an increased British military presence in the region.   
This attentiveness had severe consequences.  In March 1982, a small diplomatic crisis 
erupted over unauthorized Argentinian scrap-metal merchants on the nearby South Georgia 
Islands, also under (disputed) British control as a dependency of the Falkland Islands.  Top 
British officials viewed the South Georgia crisis as unrelated to the Falklands.  However, 
Argentina believed that Britain viewed the two as intertwined (Freedman and Gamba-
Stonehouse 1991, 71).  More importantly, the junta believed that Britain was amassing a 
substantial military force to expel the merchants from South Georgia.  The force would 
ostensibly serve as a stepping stone for a permanent garrison on the nearby Falklands.  With 
Falklands negotiations stalled, losing the military option to resolve the dispute was unacceptable 
to the junta.  Consequently, Argentina decided to invade the Falklands sooner than it had 
planned, resulting in the 1982 Falklands War.   
In truth, the British were not amassing a military force, nor did they intend to garrison 
more forces in the Falklands.52  Notably, Argentinian officials made the decision to invade based 
on several unverified pieces of information.  British parliamentarians’ statements during the 
House of Commons debate on the crisis were erroneously equated with the stances of top British 
                                                 
52 In fact, Britain was planning to reduce their forces in the Falklands.  As part of their annual defense review, the 
British had decided in June 1981 to withdraw the HMS Endurance, Britain’s only semi-regular naval presence in the 
region (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, 19–20). 
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officials.  The junta also relied on unofficial reports from Argentina’s London embassy; the 
reports were based on British media speculation, not official statements from the British 
government (Freedman and Gamba-Stonehouse 1991, 73–77).  In short, Argentinian officials 
placed too much credence in certain information without verifying its veracity or credibility, as a 
consequence of the emotional, symbolic nature of the Falklands.   
3.2.3 Connecting Time and Conflict Duration 
We can map the discussion in Sections 3.2.1 and 3.2.2 on to Proposition 2.1 and Proposition 2.2.  
Proposition 2.1 states: (Anticipatory Dynamic): Expectations about future outcomes influence 
the actions taken by a state and the outcomes that result.  In Section 3.2.1, I introduced and 
justified the use of conflict duration as a “future outcome” in my setting.  I also discussed how 
the decision to militarize constitutes an “action” taken by states that is related to conflict duration 
(cf. Ch. 2).  Rewording the proposition, we obtain: Expectations about conflict duration 
influence states’ decision to militarize a dispute and the observed conflict duration that results.  
This echoes the logic behind Hypothesis 2.1.  Section 3.2.2 explicated how when this action is 
taken may have bearing on conflict duration.  We can also reword the proposition using this idea 
of when: Expectations about conflict duration influence when states decide to militarize a dispute 
and the observed conflict duration that results.  When we discuss “when” in the context of 
militarization, it amounts to CLAIM DURATION.   
We can also conceive of “when” as a past outcome.  It represents a prior sequence of 
peaceful or non-peaceful time periods, none of which have resolved the dispute.  With this in 
mind, we can reword Proposition 2.2.  The proposition states: (Non-Anticipatory Dynamic): The 
actions taken by a state and the outcomes that result are influenced by past outcomes.  
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Rewording the proposition yields: The decision to militarize a dispute and the observed conflict 
duration that results is influenced by when states decide to militarize a dispute. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the set of reworded propositions by standardizing their sentence 
syntax using a “_________ influence(s) _________” form.  By doing so, it becomes evident that 
the two dynamic types suggest different relationships between CLAIM DURATION and CONFLICT 
DURATION.  An anticipatory dynamic implies that expectations about conflict duration will 
influence claim duration.  This is very different from the relationship suggested by a non-
anticipatory dynamic, which is that claim duration influences conflict duration—the converse of 
what an anticipatory dynamic suggests.   
The reworded propositions also map nicely on to the propositions from this chapter.  
Proposition 3.1 concerns the beneficial effect of time.  Time acts as a permissive factor, giving 
actors the opportunity to gather more information about a given dispute.  The primacy of 
information quantity is implicit in Proposition 3.1, while near-perfect processing capacity is 
treated as immutable and a given.  Expectations about conflict duration will therefore become 
accurate as more information accrues, suggesting that outcomes can be perfectly explained by 
expectations.  The reworded Proposition 2.1 reflects this logic.  
Proposition 3.2 concerns the pernicious effect of time.  Time was pernicious because it 
affected the dispute environment in a causal, constitutive way.  States’ ability to form accurate 
expectations about conflict duration potentially diminishes as more time passes.  The reworded 
version of Proposition 2.2 highlights this causal effect of time, as time influences outcomes.   
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TABLE 3.3. Chapter 2 Propositions, Reworded 
Proposition 2.1 Anticipatory Dynamic 
Expectations about 
conflict duration 
influence 
states’ decision to 
militarize a dispute 
and the observed 
conflict duration 
that results. 
Expectations about 
conflict duration 
when states decide 
to militarize a 
dispute and the 
observed conflict 
duration that 
results. 
Proposition 2.2 
Non-
Anticipatory 
Dynamic 
When states decide to 
militarize a dispute influences 
the decision to 
militarize a dispute 
and the observed 
conflict duration 
that results. 
NOTE: “when” is equivalent to CLAIM DURATION. 
 
Importantly, time only has a pernicious effect for non-anticipatory dynamics, specifically, those 
arising from information processing problems.  We can use this fact to help distinguish between 
anticipation and non-anticipation by asking: what factors influence whether time has a pernicious 
effect?  Extant work broadly conceives of time as beneficial, so little has been done in this 
regard.  I argue that the nature of the issue being fought over plays a major role, which is the 
subject I turn to next. 
3.3 EFFECT OF OVERALL ISSUE SALIENCE 
Having established the conceptual definition of “overall salience” and the preliminary basis for 
distinguishing among dynamics, we can now address the key questions motivating this chapter.  
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Why is overall issue salience important for understanding dynamics?  What is the relationship 
between overall issue salience and dynamic ideal-types?  How does overall salience have this 
effect?  I argue that disputes with higher levels of overall salience will be most affected by non-
anticipatory dynamics.  Disputes with lower overall salience, on the other hand, will be most 
affected by anticipatory dynamics.   
I contend that overall issue salience will influence the effect of “time” within a dispute.  I 
argue that the passage of time will be pernicious in disputes over highly salient issues.  The end 
result is that high overall salience has adverse effect, at minimum, on information processing 
capabilities.  In certain situations, overall salience may also adversely affect information 
availability, as decision makers feel they must act decisively and are thus unable to wait for more 
details to filter in before deciding upon course of action.  Either possibility suggests states will 
have difficulty forming accurate rational expectations for decisions pertaining to highly salient 
issues.  A non-anticipatory dynamic will therefore be strongest in these situations.  This general 
claim can be stated in hypothesis form: 
Hypothesis 3.0 (Overall Salience): When an issue has high levels of overall salience, a 
non-anticipatory dynamic will be strongest.  When an issue has moderate or low levels 
of overall salience, an anticipatory dynamic will be strongest. 
A few general characteristics of overall salience set up the basis for this claim.  First, more 
salient issues have higher stakes than other types of issues.  Each state associates the disputed 
issue with sizable benefits: potential gains are large, but so are the losses.  One state will realize 
these gains at the other’s expense, because State i and j’s preferences are divergent, resulting in a 
zero-sum situation.  The possibility of sizable losses increases the psychological stress associated 
with the dispute.  A dispute’s starting stress level “is a direct function of the goal[s]…that the 
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decision maker expects to remain unsatisfied: the more goals expected to be unfulfilled and the 
more important…those goals,” the greater the psychological stress (Janis and Mann 1977, 50).   
In addition, more salient issues are associated with a greater number of stakes and goals.  
Fulfilling all of these stakes and goals simultaneously becomes more difficult.  Experimental 
research has shown that decision makers avoid making trade-offs among various goals (Einhorn 
and Hogarth 1981; George 1980; Steinbruner 2002).  Instead of making thoughtful trade-offs 
between different goals, decision makers focus on obtaining one or two goals, unwittingly at the 
expense of the others.  They then engage in post hoc rationalization to justify their choice with as 
many independent reasons as possible (Jervis 1976, 129–137).  Jervis terms this process “belief-
system overkill.”  The ensuing decisions rely on inaccurate expectations, resulting in suboptimal 
outcomes. 
3.3.1 Non-Anticipatory Dynamics 
The basic characteristics of highly salient issues suggest that these issues have a higher risk of 
information processing problems from the start.  This is not to say that processing problems will 
always affect more salient issues, or that decision makers cannot take corrective steps.  The 
baseline likelihood for processing problems is simply higher when decisions pertain to issues 
with high levels of overall salience. 
These characteristics, along with the propositions made thus far, suggest two mechanisms 
through which issue salience could affect information availability or processing.  We can also 
use these mechanisms to derive testable hypotheses regarding the relationship between claim 
duration and conflict duration. 
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3.3.1.1 Mechanism 1: Time Pressure 
The first mechanism pertains to decisions made near the beginning of a dispute’s lifetime, in its 
earlier stages.  A “time pressure” mechanism broadly suggests that issues are prone to non-
anticipatory dynamics when CLAIM DURATION is small due to insufficient information.  States 
simply have not had enough time to gather relevant information about the dispute.  Insufficient 
amounts of relevant information will lead to an increased chance of a non-anticipatory dynamic, 
even if states possess perfect or near-perfect information processing abilities. 
There are multiple ways in which states can gather information.  Listing them all is too 
extensive of a task, but one is diplomatic communication.  Formal models in which militarization 
does not automatically end the dispute—conflict-as-inside-option models—have focused on the 
importance of such communication.  States can learn additional information based on which 
offers/counteroffers are accepted or rejected, which allows them to refine their expectations 
about militarization (Leventoğlu and Tarar 2008; Powell 2004).  In the models, the revealed 
information is credible because of the possibility that a rejected offer may lead to militarization.  
There have been few chances to exchange offers in the early stages of any dispute.   
If states are aware that there is insufficient information available in the early stages of a 
dispute, why not postpone making any major decisions until later?  States may have a limited 
amount of time to act if they wish to avoid an undesirable (i.e., costly) outcome.  More simply 
put: decision makers are on the clock because time is of the essence (Leventoğlu and Tarar 
2008).  When states face time limitations, they are said to be “impatient” because they cannot 
wait before choosing a course of action. 
Sources of state impatience can vary.  External actors precipitate impatience in 
international crises.  Crises are situations in which states must act quickly to avert a highly 
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undesirable outcome that has a high risk of occurring (Hermann 1969; Lebow 1981).  A defining 
element of crisis is that the issue at stake is highly important, involving “a threat to one or more 
basic goals” of the state (Brecher and Wilkenfeld 1997, 3).  The high stakes create the highly 
stressful decision-making environment associated with crisis situations.  High levels of stress 
makes decision makers less deliberative as they feel “rushed” into choosing a course of action.  
They suffer from reduced attention span, rely more on existing cognitive structures to filter 
information, and become more myopic (Tetlock and McGuire 1986, 168).53  The result is an 
increased likelihood of information processing problems, which only compound the existing 
information availability problem. 
There are several potential criticisms of a crisis-based time pressure mechanism.  The 
biggest is that decision makers may become more deliberative in crisis situations instead of less 
(e.g., Oneal 1988).  The Cuban Missile Crisis is often mentioned as an example (Allison 1969; 
Janis 1982, 132, 148).  Despite the high stakes and perceived time limitations, the Kennedy 
administration carefully deliberated about the most appropriate response to Soviet missiles in 
Cuba. 
I acknowledge that increased deliberation is a possibility.  However, the case studies also 
suggest that Kennedy administration officials made a conscious effort to ensure a high-quality 
decision-making process.  Such quality, in the absence of conscious effort, is not the norm—
processing problems are likely when the issue is highly salient.  Offsetting processing problems 
through active, “vigilant” decision-making behavior seems to be the exception more than the rule 
(Janis and Mann 1977, chap. 3–4).  A pivotal element of this criticism is the idea that 
information processing capabilities are affected by crisis.  However, a dearth of information (in 
                                                 
53 For a recent overview of experimental research on myopicness and time horizons, see Krebs and Rapport (2012). 
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an objective, quantifiable sense) is at the heart of my time pressure mechanism, not processing 
problems.   
A more compelling criticism would thus focus on whether or not crisis situations suffer 
from insufficient information.  The evidence seems more mixed in this regard.  Crises do not 
appear to be regularly associated with information shortages.  Looking at descriptive statistics on 
international crises, crises rarely emerge out of the blue with proverbial “strangers.”  They tend 
to involve states that regularly interact with one another.  Of the 1228 dyadic crises recorded in 
the International Crisis Behavior dataset (Hewitt 2003), 54.0 percent of them involve interstate 
rivals or neighboring countries.54  Add crisis dyads involving at least one major power, and the 
percentage jumps to 83.6.  In general, crisis participants are arguably ‘familiar’ with one another.  
However, it is still unclear whether participants would possess relevant information about the 
specific dispute in question.  In other words: states might know a lot about one another, but they 
may not know as much about the particulars relevant to the current dispute. 
Other countries are not the only potential source of state impatience.  States may also be 
impatient for internal, domestic reasons.55  A time pressure mechanism focusing on domestic 
sources of impatience can sidestep the criticisms associated with a crisis-based mechanism 
altogether.  This alternative logic is laid out in the steps-to-war argument advanced by Vasquez 
(2009; Senese and Vasquez 2008).  In the presence of a perceived external security threat, a state 
tries to increase its security by building up its military, entering alliances, and taking other 
actions consistent with a security-focused mindset.  Doing so makes other states feel less secure, 
inducing similar behavior.  The security dilemma among states affects behavior within states by 
                                                 
54 Rivalry is defined in terms of strategic rivals, which are states that mutually perceive one another to be 
“sufficiently threatening competit[ors] to qualify as enemies” (Thompson 2001, 557). 
55 I walkthrough this reasoning, even though I have assumed unitary states, for the sake of completeness. 
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influencing the formation of domestic constituencies that favor a “firm and often escalatory” 
response to hostile actions or behavior taken by other states (Senese and Vasquez 2008, 15).  
Hard-liners are also characterized as being unwilling to compromise when it comes to foreign 
policy goals (Vasquez 2009, 220).  As the number of hard-liners increase, it becomes easier to 
mobilize public support for more coercive responses.  Berinsky (2007) has found empirical 
evidence consistent with this assertion.  Leaders are pressured (and perhaps encouraged) to take 
a harder tack with their state’s adversary due to the combination of public pressure and hard-
liners’ unwillingness to compromise (Vasquez 2009, 217–218).  Domestic hard-liner pressure, in 
a sense, “rushes” the leadership into making decisions.  The rush prevents leaders from 
collecting additional information that could help inform the deliberations.   
A more general counterargument to a time-pressure story is that more information is 
typically available about higher salience issues than lower salience issues.  The information 
revealed by exchange offers and counteroffers would be less crucial, compared to a more 
information-poor dispute.  Ergo, states would have sufficient information to form accurate 
expectations, even early in the dispute’s lifetime, for high overall salience issues.  I think the 
initial premise is reasonable, but I disagree with the conclusion.  It will only hold if information 
processing capabilities are near-perfect.  Even though a time pressure mechanism is primarily 
concerned with information availability, I have also suggested that more salient issues have a 
higher risk of processing problems. 
When states suffer from information availability problems, they have a decreased ability 
to form accurate expectations about conflict duration.  Lengthier conflicts are associated with 
inaccurate expectations.  In hypothesis form, a time pressure mechanism can be stated as: 
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Hypothesis 3.1 (Non-Anticipation, Time Pressure): When states militarize disputes 
quickly, they end up in protracted militarized conflicts. 
3.3.1.2 Mechanism 2: Issue Indivisibility 
The second mechanism is an “issue indivisibility” mechanism.  It pertains to decisions made 
later in a disputed issue’s lifetime.  The mechanism works through salience’s effect on the actual 
or perceived indivisibility of the issue.  An indivisible issue has few, if any, compromises that 
are acceptable to both disputants (Powell 2006, 170; Toft 2006), making it difficult to resolve the 
disagreement peacefully.  Any division of the good is perceived as destroying some of its 
perceived value v.  Informally, v can be thought of as incredibly large for indivisible issues (v >> 
c).56   
Indivisibility is problematic because it is an inherently subjective construct.57  States 
ascribe greater value to an issue than what its tangible, objective value would suggest (i.e., 
tangible salience).  Whereas the goals and stakes associated with tangible salience generally have 
a shared, identifiable metric to facilitate quantification and comparison, those associated with 
intangible salience do not.  In the extreme, a state may define an issue as part of an “ideological 
struggle,” using language “that take[s] on highly moralistic overtones” with “a sense that this 
may be the final battle between good and evil” or a sense that one’s own survival or way of life 
is at risk (Vasquez and Mansbach 1984, 425).   
More salient disputes have a higher baseline susceptibility to the use of symbolic 
language and rhetoric from the start.  Indivisibility describes the most extreme form of 
                                                 
56 An extremely large v has other implications.  It forces the c/v term in states’ expected utility functions toward 
zero.  States thus have little incentive to refine the accuracy of their beliefs about D, all else equal, when v is large.  
No matter how long or short states believe the militarization will be, the c/v term will still be infinitesimal. 
57 Powell (2006) makes a similar argument, contending that issue indivisibility is inherently subjective, which 
disqualifies it from being one of the “rationalist” explanations for war (cf. Fearon 1995). 
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intangibility, where a good’s value is defined in an entirely symbolic way.  It is easier to use 
symbolic rhetoric when an issue possesses any amount of intangible salience than when it does 
not, for the reasons I laid out in Section 3.1.2 earlier (e.g., fn. 36).  Increasingly symbolic 
rhetoric may be employed for strategic framing purposes so as to strengthen states’ bargaining 
positions (Krebs and Jackson 2007). 
Over time, though, rhetoric can have a persuasive, constitutive effect, either intentionally 
or unintentionally (Goddard 2009).58  Actors’ identities are transformed through such social 
interaction and discourse (Wendt 1999), where identity refers to the “relatively stable, role-
specific understandings and expectations about self” (Wendt 1992, 397).  At the state level, 
transformed identities influence, among other things, whether other states are viewed as foes (on 
this point, see also Vasquez and Mansbach 1984; Vasquez 2009, 79–87).  The cognitive 
structures used by decision makers to process information will reflect the state’s new beliefs 
about the hostile, threatening nature of others.  As a result, an adversary’s behavior may be 
interpreted as being more hostile in its intent than it is, in an objective sense, which may result in 
a response that is more hostile than necessary (again, in an objective sense) (Jervis 1968).   
Changes in states’ identity can alter states’ preferences over outcomes.59  State 
preferences may be altered due to changes in the intrinsic utilities associated with each outcome, 
creating a new rank-ordering of preferred outcomes that may differ from previous orderings.  
Alteration of state preferences may also be due to states’ use of a different calculus to rank 
outcomes.  Anticipation relies on states employing a pure utility-maximization calculus, where 
outcomes are ranked from most-preferred to least-preferred on the basis of one’s own utilities.  
                                                 
58 Some also argue that symbolic rhetoric has an increased chance of being used as time goes on (Vasquez 1983, 
2009). 
59 Game-theoretic models assume that preferences over outcomes are fixed and exogenous.  By contrast, preferences 
over actions are allowed to change. 
 65 
Instead, states may become interested in utility maximization relative to the other disputant (i.e., 
relative gains/losses) (Dreyer 2010; Powell 1991, 1999, 54–58; Vasquez 2009, 79; Waltz 1979).  
Neorealists hint at this worldview, maintaining that “states are positional, not atomistic, in 
character...focus[ing] both on …absolute and relative gains” (emphasis in original, Grieco 1988, 
474).   
At the extreme, states may employ a utility-minimization rule, focusing on minimizing 
the other state’s utility without regard to one’s own (Vasquez 2009, 80).  The unbiased-forecast 
property of rational expectations is predicated on utility-maximizing states, in an absolutist sense 
(i.e., egoistic, concerned only with absolute gains), which produces goal-oriented, optimizing 
behavior.  It is unclear whether unbiased forecasting is still guaranteed when preferences are 
altered regarding utility maximization.  At the least, the probability that states would behave in a 
goal-oriented, optimizing way would seem to be diminished if they do not employ a utility-
maximization calculus.  
Symbolic rhetoric plays a large role in explaining the emergence of rivalry between 
Argentina and Chile in the nineteenth century.  The states were involved in three territorial 
disputes: the ownership of Patagonia; border demarcation in the Andes Mountains; and, later, 
three islands in the Beagle Channel.  All three disputes experienced multiple militarizations.  
Both countries used  “juridical and moral justifications” as the basis for their territorial claims 
(Escudé 1988, 145; Thies 2001, 413).  Thies notes that “it is unlikely that Argentine or Chilean 
leaders realized that they were laying the foundations of an institutionalized rivalry at this point.  
It is even more unlikely that they were able to anticipate the consequences of their territorial 
ambition for the next century of relations between their two states” (2001, 413).60  Extensive 
                                                 
60 For a similar point about rivalries in general, see Goertz, Jones, and Diehl (2005). 
 66 
press coverage in both countries disseminated the rhetoric, engendering a strong sense of 
nationalism among the publics.  The nationalistic fervor became institutionalized in the 
educational curricula, perpetuating the effect of the rhetoric across time.  Even decades later, 
popular backlash scuppered multiple peaceful settlement attempts. 
Another more prominent example is Jerusalem and its symbolic importance to Israelis 
and Arabs alike.  Jerusalem’s symbolic importance also has roots in symbolic rhetoric.  At the 
time of Israel’s independence in 1948, both sides considered the city to be divisible, and both 
preferred an Israeli-Jordanian division to a UN “internationalization” of the city (Goddard 2009, 
122–123).  Israel and Jordan’s 1949 armistice to the Arab-Israeli War accepted the de facto 
division of the city that had developed during the war.  Israel occupied West Jerusalem, and 
Jordan occupied East Jerusalem (Goddard 2009, 136–138).   
However, Israel began using symbolic rhetoric rooted in religion during the late 1960s 
and the 1980s.  Israel retook East Jerusalem and the West Bank during the Six Day War in 1967; 
in the aftermath, the sitting Israeli government invoked religious rhetoric to justify Israel’s 
claims to the recaptured territory (Goddard 2009, 162–167).  As another consequence of the war, 
Palestinians emerged as a distinct identity, separate from Jordanians, for the first time.  The 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), dominated by Fatah, relied on secular nationalist 
rhetoric to justify their claims to a Palestinian state in its early years (Goddard 2009, 178–183).  
Other groups in the Palestinian territories, such as the Muslim Brotherhood, began to challenge 
the PLO’s legitimacy as the dominant force in Palestinian politics in the 1980s.  The PLO added 
religious symbolism to its existing nationalist rhetoric to reinforce its position (Goddard 2009, 
183–187).  In the end, the use of religious, symbolic rhetoric by both Israeli and Palestinian 
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decision makers rendered Jerusalem an indivisible issue, as the sides could no longer reconcile 
their bargaining positions (Goddard 2009, 195–207; Hassner 2003). 
Transforming state identities through social interaction is typically a slow process that 
takes time (Johnston 2001, 499).  It has an increased chance of occurring as more time passes 
since the start of the dispute.  The slow process of identity transformation is exemplified by the 
Anglo-Irish debate over Irish Home Rule, which began in earnest in the late 1800s.  Under 
“Home Rule,” Ireland would be self-governed with its own parliament, but would remain part of 
the British Empire (Goddard 2009, 47).  The Home Rule debate, and the actions taken during it, 
gave way to one of the 20th century’s more intractable disputes: Northern Ireland, also referred to 
as Ulster in the discussions of that era.  Stacie Goddard’s careful case study reveals that the 
construction of “Northern Ireland/Ulster” as an autonomous actor with a distinct identity was the 
unexpected product of political rhetoric surrounding the Irish Home Rule debate once it reached 
the British Parliament (Goddard 2009, 56–57).  
The emergence of an Ulster identity did not occur suddenly.  Unlike the other 23 counties 
on the island of Ireland, which were overwhelmingly Catholic, the nine counties comprising 
Ulster had sizable Protestant minorities.  Yet, the religious commonality was mostly irrelevant 
for most of the Home Rule debate; Ulster was a non-issue (Goddard 2009, 53).  Up until the mid-
1880s, the residents of Ulster were fragmented along class, intra-Protestant, and English-Scottish 
lines, precluding the formation of a collective “Ulster” identity (Goddard 2009, 89–90).   
Things changed in 1886, when the first Home Rule Bill came before the British 
Parliament.  At the time, returning some political power to Ireland—be it Home Rule or other 
major legal reforms—was thought to be “unavoidable” (Goddard 2009, 79).  With this sense of 
inevitability in mind, the British opposition party offered a variety of new counterarguments 
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against the bill.  The rhetoric was employed solely for strategic ends, with the purpose of forcing 
a settlement more in line with the opposition’s anti-Home Rule preferences (Goddard 2009, 83–
86).61  The counterargument that finally gained traction was the “Orange Card”: Irish Home Rule 
would threaten the rights of the Protestants living in Ulster.  Even though the “Ulster problem” 
had never come up before, the opposition “believed that Ulster could be useful in the short term 
as a bluff designed to force [the major Home Rule supporters] to compromise.  After 1886, [the 
opposition] fully intended to ‘tell Ulster to go to the devil’” (2009, 88, 94).   
The rhetorical shift had little short-term impact.62  However, the longer-term impact of 
playing the Orange Card was fatal, in every sense of the word.  By framing Home Rule as a 
“fight against Catholic tyranny,” the opposition’s rhetoric had the unintentional effect of 
unifying the fragmented groups residing in Ulster, creating a new actor with a collective 
identity—a Protestant, anti-Home Rule Ulster (Goddard 2009, 90–92).  Britain’s opposition 
began reluctantly working with the fledgling Ulsterites, so as not to repudiate their own 
counterargument, which reinforced Ulster’s new identity with startling speed.  The reluctant 
cooperation became more pronounced in the 1900s, with Ulsterites taking up key positions in the 
opposition party leadership (Goddard 2009, 93–95).   
By the time that the third Home Rule Bill was proposed in 1912, the debate was no 
longer just about Irish Home Rule, but whether Ulster should be partitioned from the rest of 
Ireland.  Ulsterites were vehemently opposed to being placed under Catholic-Irish rule, as being 
Protestant formed the basis for their identity as a group.  As the bill was being debated, militias 
                                                 
61 Goddard suggests that “despite fierce language, [the opposition] sought negotiation, not deadlock, and had no 
intention of abandoning a negotiated settlement to the Irish question” (2009, 88). 
62 The first Home Rule Bill failed to pass in 1886, but only due to a revolt within the ruling party, which deprived 
the bill of a majority in the House of Commons (Goddard 2009, 48, 60).  The second Home Rule Bill in 1893 passed 
the House of Commons, but was vetoed by the opposition-controlled House of Lords (Goddard 2009, 88). 
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organized to “fight” against Home Rule, in case the bill were to pass and be implemented 
(Goddard 2009, 49–50, 102–103).  The British opposition felt obliged to support the partition 
because of how wedded they had become to Ulster, even though the opposition fundamentally 
hated the idea of partition, as it implicitly agreed to Home Rule—the very outcome the 
opposition was trying to avoid all along (Goddard 2009, 104–105).  Goddard goes on to argue 
that these transformations, in conjunction with other changes in the Anglo-Irish political 
landscape, played a key role in casting Ulster as an indivisible issue among the key actors.63 
In short, none of the above identity transformations happened as soon as the Orange Card 
was played in 1886.  Instead, it took around a quarter of a century for the Ulster collective 
identity to truly coalesce and transform itself into a potent political force.  The effects stemming 
from these transformations would not be evident if we had looked only at 1886, or 1886 and the 
five years prior.  They took a longer time to manifest, which suggests more broadly that 
indivisibility will not immediately have an effect on forming (accurate) expectations.  Time must 
pass before the effects will become observable.  I have referred to this period of time as t, CLAIM 
DURATION.  Elsewhere, it is referred to as the “time horizon.”64   
The necessity of long time horizons has serious implications for testing an issue 
indivisibility mechanism.  Most empirical tests of rational expectation theory and other rational 
choice-based work employ a short time horizon.  This includes most work on militarized 
conflict.65  The implicit assumption is that any effect of interest will manifest quickly.  Existing 
research has therefore neglected the potential implications and effect of time on militarized 
conflict over a dispute.  
                                                 
63 For an abbreviated version of her case study of Northern Ireland, see Goddard (2006). 
64 This phrase is borrowed from Pierson (2004).  I formally define time horizon as the “period of time over which 
meaningful change occurs” (Pierson 2004, 80; see also Abbott 1988). 
65 A notable exception is empirical work on interstate rivalries. 
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In sum, the major implication of the indivisibility mechanism is that information 
processing problems may get worse over time for highly salient issues.  It is easier to define 
highly salient issues with symbolic rhetoric than issues of lesser importance.  As a result, the 
ability to accurately form expectations about conflict duration will decrease as the dispute goes 
on and t increases.  A non-anticipatory dynamic will be more likely.  In hypothesis form: 
Hypothesis 3.2 (Non-Anticipation, Indivisibility): When an issue is contested for a long 
period of time, it becomes defined in indivisible terms, giving rise to lengthy militarized 
disputes. 
3.3.2 Anticipatory Dynamics 
If states have (1) sufficient amounts of information and (2) can process the information correctly 
(in an objective sense), then an anticipatory dynamic will result.  Anticipation suggests that 
expectations about conflict duration will affect CLAIM DURATION.  Therefore, the outcome of 
interest is no longer conflict duration, as it was in the non-anticipatory hypotheses.  Instead, 
CLAIM DURATION is the main outcome for the anticipatory hypotheses.  Issue salience is treated 
as fixed and exogenous in anticipatory stories, sharply contrasting with the non-anticipatory 
scenarios in which issue salience could change over the course of the dispute.66  Anticipatory 
stories consider issue salience to be directly related to the total value of the issue (v), which is 
considered to be an additional component of the costs of fighting.67 
                                                 
66 For non-anticipation, the implicit assumption is that changes in salience are differences in degree, not kind.  Put 
differently, while salience can increase or decrease over the course of a dispute, the overall salience category to 
which the dispute belongs will remain constant. 
67 Some formal work does disaggregate the issue’s total value from c by including it as a model parameter (e.g., 
Carter 2010; Slantchev 2011). 
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3.3.2.1 Strategic Delay 
When states expect lengthy (and hence costly) militarized conflicts, they can react in one of two 
ways.  First, they may elect not to militarize the dispute in t, if the expected benefits from 
fighting are outweighed by the costs of doing so.  Instead, states deliberately take no action or 
pursue other, less-costly resolution strategies.  The decision to forgo militarization is reevaluated 
at t + 1, t + 2, and so on.  If expected conflict duration remains long, and expectations are fairly 
accurate, the implication is that lengthy expected conflicts should lead to longer t’s.  States will 
strategically delay militarizing the dispute, potentially to the point of observing no militarization 
at all.  Hypothesis 2.1 covers part of this idea.  The hypothesis that follows from the rest is:  
Hypothesis 3.3 (Anticipatory: Strategic Delay): When states expect lengthy MIDs, there 
is an incentive to delay militarization as long as possible in order to maximize the 
likelihood of resolution by other means. 
3.3.2.2 Strategic Prevention 
The previous hypothesis rests on the assumption that the passage of time is costless or otherwise 
negligible.  Relaxing the assumption makes peace costly when a dispute exists, suggesting a 
second anticipatory mechanism.  States have an incentive to attack as quickly as possible, in line 
with a general commitment problem logic.  When delays are costly, states are penalized for each 
period in which the dispute goes unresolved.  The source of the delay costs can vary—e.g., 
forgone economic gains, political blowback, international opprobrium—but states are aware of 
the costs with near certainty.  States thus have an incentive to resolve the dispute as fast as 
possible, as neither can credibly commit to leaving the dispute unresolved in the face of a costly 
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peace.  Militarization will result, even when conflicts are expected to be long, when the costs of 
not militarizing are even higher.   
This proffered mechanism is a specific form of the standard “prevention” logic for 
commitment problems, in which states resort to military force in t to prevent the realization of a 
worse outcome (i.e., because acting in later periods will yield outcomes with smaller utilities).  
The other two commonly offered commitment-problem logics—preemption and bargaining over 
an issue that itself is a source of bargaining power (Fearon 1995, 401–409)—also are viable 
explanations for lengthy conflict potentially leading to quicker dispute militarizations.   
The prevention logic differs from the non-anticipatory mechanisms in two key ways.  
First, the standard prevention story assumes that information processing is perfect or near-
perfect, which distinguishes prevention from non-anticipation arising from processing problems 
(the bottom row of Table 2.1, e.g., issue indivisibility/Hypothesis 3.2).  Second, and perhaps 
more crucially, states do not suffer from a dearth of relevant information in a prevention story, 
unlike non-anticipation resulting from objective information shortages (the top-right cell of 
Table 2.1, e.g., time pressure/Hypothesis 3.1).  Commitment problems, in general, are unique in 
that all relevant information is available—i.e., there is “perfect” information (Powell 2002, 23–
27)—and yet, militarized conflict still occurs.  In the logic I offered here, states look forward into 
the future, form accurate expectations, and conclude that militarizing now affords the best 
opportunity for them to obtain an outcome associated with the highest utility possible.  Waiting 
any longer will yield outcomes with lower utilities, hence the need to act now, to prevent these 
less-desirable outcomes (from a pure utility point of view) from occurring.  In short, a strategic 
prevention logic is characterized by near-perfect processing and sufficient amounts of relevant 
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information.  It is thus distinct from the two proffered non-anticipatory mechanisms because 
non-anticipation lacks one of these characteristics, by definition. 
The testable general hypothesis that follows from a strategic prevention logic is: 
Hypothesis 3.4 (Anticipatory: Strategic Prevention): When states expect lengthy MIDs, 
there is an incentive to militarize preventatively to gain a strategic advantage. 
3.4 CONCLUSION 
What is the connection between overall issue salience and militarized conflict?  Why is overall 
issue salience an important factor in a story about conflict dynamics?  When will one conflict 
dynamic type be predominant over the other?  How can these dynamic ideal-types be applied to 
specific questions about militarized interstate conflict—what leverage do they give us?  These 
are some of the questions motivating this chapter.   
I have argued that militarized conflicts over issues with high levels of overall salience 
will be affected most by non-anticipatory dynamics.  In general, overall salience negatively 
affects the ability to process information accurately.  Additional pernicious effects can manifest 
through one of two possible mechanisms: time constraints or issue indivisibility.  Both can 
hamper states’ ability to form accurate expectations.  It is important to note that my argument is 
not deterministic, but probabilistic.  It utilizes the logic of the major works associated with the 
anticipatory and non-anticipatory literatures and expands on them by incorporating additional 
insights from other disciplines.   
To further distinguish between dynamics, I applied my ideal-type framework to 
expectations about conflict duration.  My justification relied on the relationship between claim 
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duration and conflict duration.  The relationship takes the following form when stated in 
informal, intuitive terms: When states decide to militarize a dispute, they think the militarization 
will unfold in a particular way.  How do these thoughts compare with what actually transpires?  
This chapter’s hypotheses, which help to answer this basic question, are summarized in Table 
3.4. 
How can we empirically assess the validity of these hypotheses?  Doing so is not as 
straightforward as it would first appear.  This, and other topics, are the subject of the next 
chapter. 
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TABLE 3.4. Summary of Chapter 3 Propositions and Hypotheses 
Proposition 3.1 (Time and Information Availability): As more time passes, expectation 
accuracy will improve. 
Proposition 3.2 (Time and Information Processing): As more time passes, expectation 
accuracy will not improve or will get worse. 
 
Hypothesis 3.0 (Overall Salience): When an issue has high levels of overall salience, a non-
anticipatory dynamic will be strongest.  When an issue has moderate or low levels of overall 
salience, an anticipatory dynamic will be strongest. 
Hypothesis 3.1 (Non-Anticipation, Time Pressure): When states militarize disputes quickly, 
they end up in protracted militarized conflicts. 
Hypothesis 3.2 (Non-Anticipation, Indivisibility): When an issue is contested for a long period 
of time, it becomes defined in indivisible terms, giving rise to lengthy militarized disputes. 
Hypothesis 3.3 (Anticipatory: Strategic Delay): When states expect lengthy MIDs, there is an 
incentive to delay militarization as long as possible in order to maximize the likelihood of 
resolution by other means. 
Hypothesis 3.4 (Anticipatory: Strategic Prevention): When states expect lengthy MIDs, there is 
an incentive to militarize preventatively to gain a strategic advantage.  
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4.0  RESEARCH DESIGN 
What are the determinants of interstate dispute dynamics?  I have argued that the disputed issue’s 
salience plays a major role.  How can we evaluate dispute dynamics?  I have claimed that the 
relationship between CLAIM DURATION and conflict duration can give us analytical purchase.  
More specifically, I have argued that overall issue salience will be a major determinant of dispute 
dynamics.  The intangibility of highly salient issues impairs states’ ability to form accurate 
rational expectations about conflict duration.  The major implication is that disputes over highly 
salient issues will be strongly affected by past experiences, more so than expectations about the 
future.  In this chapter, I lay out the research design and modeling techniques that allow me to 
evaluate this assertion. 
This chapter has three major sections.  First, I provide my basic operational definitions.  I 
also describe the basic structure of my dataset.  Second, I discuss the models that allow me to test 
my questions about dispute dynamics.  The chapter ends with a brief conclusion in the form of a 
large table that summarizes the major elements of each modeling strategy. 
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4.1 DATA 
4.1.1 Operational Definitions 
I begin by defining my two core concepts: conflict/militarization and disputed issues.  I define 
militarized conflict as the existence of a militarized interstate dispute (MID) between States i and 
j.  A MID, as defined by the Correlates of War (COW) project, is a threat, display, or use of 
military force by one state against another state (Ghosn, Palmer, and Bremer 2004).   
A disputed issue exists when official representatives of i or j’s government make explicit 
statements challenging the issue’s status quo policy.  I use the Issue Correlates of War (ICOW) 
data on disputes over territorial, maritime, and river issues.68  Importantly, the ICOW data 
include disputes that experience a MID and disputes that do not; both categories will be pivotal 
for testing purposes.  I categorize the ICOW dispute types into categories based on Hensel et 
al.’s (2008) overall salience categorization from Table 3.2, as I have argued that different types 
of issues exhibit different dynamics.  This implies that we should see different patterns (or, for 
empirical testing, different coefficients) across overall issue salience categories.   
ICOW’s territorial disputes are high overall salience issues.  They are disputes in which 
one state “claim[s] sovereignty over a piece of territory that is claimed or administered by 
another state” (Hensel 2001, 90).  An example is Argentina and Great Britain’s dispute over the 
ownership of the Falkland Islands.  ICOW’s maritime and river disputes are categorized as 
moderately salient issues.  Maritime issues are disputes “over the access to or usage of a 
maritime area,” such as disagreements about fishing or navigation rights (Mitchell 2002, 1).  The 
                                                 
68 The ICOW data do not cover every potential type of interstate dispute in Table 3.2.  Nonetheless, I think they are 
a good starting point because they contain the major categories that commonly appear in historical narratives.   
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series of “Cod Wars” between Britain and Iceland in the 1950s and 1970s are perhaps the best-
known set of maritime disputes (e.g., Kurlansky 1997).  Finally, river disputes are those “over 
the usage (or misuse/abuse) of a specific river,” with examples including navigation rights, water 
consumption and quantity, or pollution (Hensel 2005, 2).  An example is Iraq and Iran’s dispute 
over navigation rights on the Shatt al-Arab, the river forming part of the countries’ southern 
boundary. 
4.1.2 General Data Structure 
Testing an argument about dispute dynamics places the disputed issue at the heart of the analysis.  
The data are therefore structured by competing claims over a given issue, broken down into 
directed state pairs.  The states are ordered according to their relation to the status quo.  States 
making explicit statements that challenge an issue’s status quo (or statements challenging those 
made by another state) are listed first, followed by the state targeted by the challenger’s 
statement.  I refer to these as “claim-dyads.”  They are my main unit of analysis.   
I group the MIDs with the disputed issue-claims they aim to resolve.69  The top panel of 
Figure 4.1 shows an example coding for Argentina and Chile, in which all dyadic MIDs can be 
assigned to ICOW disputes.  Each line below the figure’s horizontal-“T” axis represents one 
claim-dyad.  The lines are labeled with the name of the claim and whether the claim is over a 
                                                 
69 It is possible for a MID to be associated with more than one claim-dyad, meaning that the MID appears more than 
once in the data.  This can occur for two reasons.  First, the disputed issue and the MID are both multilateral.  The 
MID associated with the Berlin Crisis of 1961, for instance, appears twice in the dataset.  The disputed issue—
control of West Berlin—involves two dyads: US-Russia, and West-Germany-East Germany.  The 1961 MID, related 
to the erection of the Berlin Wall, was also multilateral, and involved the same two dyads (among others).  Second, 
the MID is related to a linked territorial/maritime dispute.  Argentina and Chile’s disagreement over the ownership 
of three islands in the Beagle Channel (territory) also affected the maritime boundary claimed by both countries.  
The five MIDs occurring over the maritime portion of the Beagle dispute also appear for the related territorial 
dispute.  (Figure 4.1 shows only four MIDs for the Beagle/maritime dispute because two of the MIDs occur in the 
same year.)  In total, 14 MIDs appear twice in the dataset.  
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territorial (T), maritime (M), or river (R) issue.  The x-axis denotes calendar years; the y-axis is 
unitless.  Each line’s endpoints are located at the first and last year that the claim-dyad was 
active.  MIDs occurring over a claim-dyad appear as triangles on that claim-dyad’s line for the 
year in which the MID began.70  For instance, Argentina and Chile’s dispute over Patagonia 
began in 1841, ended in 1903, and experienced 8 MIDs.71  Accordingly, the line representing 
Patagonia stretches from 1841 to 1903 and has 8 triangles plotted along it.   
 
Panel A.  Claim-dyad specific: Timelines broken down by disputed issues 
 
Panel B.  Dyad-specific: One unified historical timeline 
FIGURE 4.1. Chile-Argentina Issue-Dyads 
A claim-dyad strategy has a few advantages over the design strategies employed most frequently 
in interstate conflict research.  Most studies take a “dyad-specific approach”: they consider all 
MIDs that occur between two states, without considering how the dyad’s MIDs map to different 
disputed issues.  Dyads are the key conceptual unit instead of claim-dyads.  This effectively 
                                                 
70 Hollow triangles indicate MIDs that are ineligible to enter some of my estimation samples, for reasons I discuss in 
Section 4.2.1.2. 
71 The eight MIDs began in 1843, 1873, 1876, 1877, 1878, 1879, 1891, and 1900, respectively. 
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amounts to “collapsing” the five claim-dyad lines from the top panel of Figure 4.1 into a single 
line.  I do this in the bottom panel of Figure 4.1.  All of Chile and Argentina’s MIDs are plotted 
along a single axis.  As the bottom panel makes evident, we lose important nuance regarding the 
underlying issue in a dyad-specific approach.   
 
Panel A.  Partial: Greece-Turkey. 
 
Panel B.  None: North Korea-South Korea 
FIGURE 4.2. Historical MID Patterns: Examples of MID-ICOW Match Rates 
A claim-dyad approach is not without its drawbacks.  The biggest problem is that the underlying 
claims associated with some MIDs do not appear in ICOW.  The ICOW data do not cover all 
possible types of disputed issues between states, nor is ICOW’s coverage of territorial, maritime, 
and river disputes worldwide.  In some cases, every dyadic MID can be matched with underlying 
dispute, as ICOW has data on all the disputed issues in question (e.g., Chile and Argentina, 
Figure 4.1).  In other cases, only some of the MIDs can be matched (e.g., Figure 4.2, Panel A).  
At worst, none can be matched (e.g., Figure 4.2, Panel B).  Unmatched MIDs (labeled as 
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“uncateg(orized)” in the figures) do not enter any of my estimation samples at all.72  I believe 
that my smaller sample of MIDs biases me against finding supportive results, as I have fewer 
cases to substantiate my hypotheses. 
A new claim-dyad is recorded during disputes over the same issue when part of the 
original claim is resolved, or if there is a change in the identity of the challenger or target73 
(Hensel and Mitchell 2007, 5; Hensel 2001, 91–94, 2008, 5–6).74  As an example, Table 4.1 
shows how the Finnish-Russian dispute over Karelia and Petsamo appears in my dataset. 
TABLE 4.1. Karelia and Petsamo Claim-Dyads 
Dyad Name 
(Non-Directed) Dispute Name Challenger Target Start End MID? 
1 RUS-FIN Karelia and Petsamo FIN RUS 1918 1920 Yes 
2 RUS-FIN Karelia and Petsamo RUS FIN 1938 1940 Yes 
3 RUS-FIN Karelia and Petsamo FIN RUS 1941 1944 Yes 
4 RUS-FIN Karelia and Petsamo RUS FIN 1941 1944 Yes 
5 RUS-FIN Karelia and Petsamo FIN RUS 1945 1947 No 
        
                                                 
72 A claim-dyad focus also sidesteps some of the problems associated with a dyad-centric focus.  The MID data 
contain a “revisionist type” variable containing information about the “principal object that the state sought to 
change” (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 178).  There are four possible revision types: territory, policy, regime, or 
other; maritime and river issues are some of the issues classified as “Policy.”  Usually, researchers loosely interpret 
revision type as denoting the primary issue under contention in the MID.  Cases with “other” revisionist types are 
usually dropped from the analysis.  However, Henehan and Vasquez (2001, 129) note that four wars—the most 
serious and severe type of MID—have causes so complex that they are categorized as “other.”  The authors also 
note that all four wars involve territory in some way, raising questions about the validity of analyses that drop MIDs 
coded as “other”.  By contrast, all four wars appear without a problem in my claim-dyad dataset.  Each is 
unambiguously associated with the appropriate territorial dispute. 
73 This could also happen, for instance, in the case of military conquest (Hensel 2008, 6).   
74 In this way, the coding rules for new claim-dyads are similar to the rules for grouping militarized incidents into 
new MIDs (see Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 174–177).   
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The dispute is comprised of five claim-dyads: 
1. The first claim-dyad begins soon after Finland gains its full independence from Russia in 
1917.  Finland challenges Soviet rule in East Karelia in 1918 by launching several 
expeditions to free the population from socialist rule (Solsten and Meditz 1988).  The 
claim is resolved in 1920 with the Treaty of Dorpat, in which Finland renounces its 
claims to East Karelia in exchange for sovereignty over Petsamo (Huth and Allee 2002, 
317).   
2. A new claim-dyad begins in 1938 when Russia challenges Finnish territorial holdings.  
The Russians demand that Finland cede or lease some of its islands in the Gulf of 
Finland, located in a strategic position off the coast of Karelia, as part of a mutual 
assistance pact (“No. 74 Finland-USSR Boundary” 1967, 5).  Finland’s refusal to sign the 
pact eventually leads to the Winter War (1939-1940) and a Soviet victory.  The war’s 
peace treaty forces Finland to cede almost all of Finnish Karelia to the Soviets (among 
other territorial concessions) (Solsten and Meditz 1988). 
3. The third claim-dyad begins in 1941 when Finland attempts to reclaim the territory lost 
during the Winter War, beginning another war in the process (Continuation War, 1941-
1944).  The claim ends with the Moscow Armistice in 1944.  The armistice reestablishes 
the borders set by the 1940 peace treaty and requires Finland to cede Petsamo back to the 
Soviets, the victors of the conflict.   
4. The fourth claim-dyad is a counterclaim by the Soviets to Finland’s claim in (3).  It also 
ends with the Moscow Armistice.75 
                                                 
75 This is one of the dataset’s two “simultaneous counterclaims”—instances in which (1) the challenger-target 
ordering in one claim-dyad is reversed in another and (2) the two claim-dyads occur at the same time.  The other 
occurs between Iran and Iraq over the Shatt al-Arab. 
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5. The last Karelia and Petsamo claim-dyad begins with Finland making a claim in 
September 1945.  It ends with the Paris Peace Treaties of 1947, the peace treaty that 
formally concludes the Continuation War.  It stipulates that Finland concede another 
small piece of territory near Petsamo to Russia (“No. 74 Finland-USSR Boundary” 
1967).  The Finnish-Russian border established by the Paris Peace Treaties is still in 
place today. 
Disputed issues involving multiple state pairs are coded in a similar way.  For example, Wrangel 
Island has two claim-dyads in the dataset: one between the US and Canada, and another between 
Russia and Canada.  Appendix A contains the full list of disputes entering the dataset, after 
excluding those with missing control variable data.  
4.1.3 Main Dependent Variables 
I use three different dependent variables to test my story about dispute dynamics: CLAIM 
DURATION, MID?, and MID DURATION.  CLAIM DURATION captures when a claim-dyad is 
militarized.  It records the number of months elapsed between the start of a claim-dyad and a 
MID.  I take these data from the ICOW’s dataset on disputed issue settlement attempts.  CLAIM 
DURATION is a “total time” variable, as it continuously counts the number of months that have 
passed within a claim-dyad, never resetting to zero.  Total time is appropriate because one of my 
non-anticipatory mechanisms does not have an immediate effect.  The effects from an issue 
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indivisibility mechanism must accumulate, and will therefore take some time to appear once the 
claim-dyad has begun.76 
The last two dependent variables are related.  MID? is a dummy variable that indicates 
whether a claim-dyad militarized.  The specifics vary, depending on the model.  I discuss the 
particulars as I lay out each model’s specification.  The other dependent variable is MID 
DURATION.  It records the number of months that MID lasts based on the MID’s recorded start 
and end dates.  I use the COW MID data and Maoz’s dyadic MID data (2005) to code this 
variable.77  A MID starts on the day in which State i takes an overt, “explicit, non-routine, and 
governmentally authorized action” against State j (Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 169).  MIDs 
end when disputants agree to stop fighting78 or neither side takes military action for six months 
(Jones, Bremer, and Singer 1996, 175–176).  Using the Karelia and Petsamo example, Table 4.2 
illustrates how CLAIM DURATION and MID DURATION are coded. 
TABLE 4.2. Karelia and Petsamo: Duration Dependent Variable Codings 
Dyad Name 
(Non-Dir.) Chal. Target Claim Start 
# of 
MIDs? 
y1: CLAIM 
DURATION 
y2: MID 
DURATION 
1 RUS-FIN FIN RUS 4/1918 1 13 16.900 
2 RUS-FIN RUS FIN 8/1938 1 14 5.200 
3 RUS-FIN FIN RUS 5/1941 1 1 38.367 
4 RUS-FIN RUS FIN 12/1941 1 0.0083 38.367 
5 RUS-FIN FIN RUS 9/1945 0 17 . 
NOTE: y1 and y2 are both recorded in months. 
                                                 
76 Alternatively, the variable could be measured using a “gap time” formulation.  A gap-time coding would record 
the number of months since the claim-dyad’s start date and reset to zero after every MID.  Measuring time using a 
“gap time” formulation is prevalent conflict research; peace spell counters for cubic spline construction are the best 
example.  The inappropriateness of a CLAIM SPELL measure for my theoretical argument provides us with an avenue 
for robustness checks, which I discuss in the chapters to come (e.g., Figure 5.3). 
77 Before the release of the third version of the MID data, there were no official dyadic MID data from COW.  
Creating a dyadic dataset from the MID-participant data often resulted in inaccuracies for multilateral MIDs.  Zeev 
Maoz created a dyadic MID dataset that corrected for any inaccuracies.  He also added more detailed information 
about each dispute-dyad, such as dyadic-level start and end dates, which, in the case of multilateral MIDs, could 
differ from the MID’s overall start and end dates.   
78 Specifically, the disputants reach a formal resolution, sign a cease-fire, or agree to a mutual troop withdrawal. 
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4.2 ESTIMATION STRATEGY 
I examine my question about dynamics using two categories of estimation techniques.  Each is 
aimed at the hypotheses arising from one theoretical chapter a particular concern raised by my 
substantive argument.  I begin by focusing on the connectivity between CLAIM DURATION and 
MID DURATION.  To examine this relationship, I employ a simultaneous equation model (SEM) 
(Hays and Kachi 2009).  The second technique addresses my concern about claim duration and 
sample selection through the use of a split-population framework (Svolik 2008; Xiang 2010). 
4.2.1 Duration SEM 
4.2.1.1 Model Rationale 
To test Chapter 3’s hypotheses, we need an estimation strategy that satisfies three criteria.  First, 
it must account for the factors influencing CLAIM DURATION.  Second, it must account for the 
factors influencing MID DURATION.  Third, it must accommodate the connection between CLAIM 
DURATION and MID DURATION.  The nature of the connection is different across dynamic types.  
On the one hand, anticipation suggests: (expectations about) MID DURATION ⇒ CLAIM 
DURATION.  On the other hand, non-anticipation suggests: CLAIM DURATION ⇒ MID DURATION.  
The third criterion is problematic from an econometric standpoint, because the two 
dynamic types suggest that claim duration and MID duration could simultaneously affect one 
another.  The problem, then, is one of simultaneity bias: CLAIM DURATION and MID DURATION 
are both endogenous.  Traditional estimation strategies require one of the two to be exogenous, 
or else estimates will be systematically biased and inaccurate.   
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A simultaneous equation model (SEM) setup meets all three criteria.  We can specify one 
equation per dynamic type to capture the relationship suggested by each, taking care of (a) and 
(b).  Criterion (c) can be addressed by including the dependent variable of one equation as an 
independent variable in the other.  I then jointly estimate the equations using maximum 
likelihood.  The general form of the SEM becomes:79 
CLAIM DURATION = αANT(MID DURATION) + Xβ1 + Z1γ1 + ε1 <ANTICIPATORY DYNAMIC> 
MID DURATION = α~ANT(CLAIM DURATION) + Xβ2 + Z2γ2 +ε2 <NON-ANTICIPATORY DYN.> 
I use Hays and Kachi (2009)‘s SEM estimator for continuous-time durations.80  The SEM has a 
few nice properties that make it well-suited to the question under investigation.  First, the 
connection between CLAIM DURATION (y1) and MID DURATION (y2) is explicitly modeled by 
including y1 as a regressor in y2’s equation and vice versa.  This makes the α’s, which represent 
the degree of direct dependency among the outcomes (i.e., y2’s effect on y1 for α1, αANT), the main 
parameters of interest for my hypotheses.   
Second, since both dependent variables appear as regressors in the SEM, the estimator 
thus places expected values of y (vs. actual) on the right-hand side of the equations.  I can 
explicitly test whether expectations about future outcomes influence the past (an anticipatory 
dynamic) or whether the past affects future outcomes (a non-anticipatory dynamic).81  Finally, 
specifying two equations and jointly estimating them allows for the possibility that both 
dynamics may be present, but that one dynamic may have a ‘stronger’ effect than the other.  This 
is in line with what I argue regarding predominant dynamic types.  If both α’s are statistically 
                                                 
79 Technical details of the estimator can be found in Appendix C.3. 
80 Hays and Kachi’s model is log-linear, with the idiosyncratic error (ϵ) distributed as Type I Extreme Value 
(minimum).  The dependent variables are assumed to have Weibull distributions (Hays and Kachi 2009, 6).  Hays 
and Kachi investigate the general properties of this estimator via simulation. 
81 It is worth noting that, even though the realized values of CLAIM DURATION and MID DURATION are observed 
sequentially, expectations about each are formed simultaneously.   
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significant, a Wald test can show us whether one of the coefficients is significantly larger in 
magnitude than the other. 
In general, the statistical significance of the α’s indicates the causal directionality of the 
relationship between CLAIM DURATION and MID DURATION.  A significant αANT implies that MID 
DURATION has a direct effect on CLAIM DURATION—an anticipatory dynamic (Proposition 2.1).  
A positively signed αANT corresponds with a strategic delay story (Hypothesis 3.3); lengthier 
MIDs give rise to longer CLAIM DURATIONs.  A negatively signed αANT is consistent with a 
strategic prevention logic, in which shorter MIDs are associated with longer CLAIM DURATIONs 
(Hypothesis 3.4).  Based on my argument, I expect αANT to be significant in the sample of 
moderately salient issues.   
Moving to non-anticipation, a positively signed α~ANT is consistent with an issue 
indivisibility story, where longer disputes produce longer militarized conflicts (Hypothesis 3.2).  
A negatively signed α~ANT is consistent with a time pressure story, where shorter CLAIM 
DURATIONs lead to longer MIDs (Hypothesis 3.1).  I have argued that highly salient issues are 
most prone to non-anticipatory dynamics, so I expect α~ANT to be significant in the sample of 
highly salient issues. 
4.2.1.2 Specification 
Each row in the SEM dataset represents one militarization occurring between two states over a 
given disputed issue.  The claim-dyad-MID is the specific unit of analysis.  I disaggregate to this 
level so that I can match data on the length of individual militarizations with data on when each 
militarization begins during the claim-dyad.  Returning to the Karelia-Petsamo example, four of 
the five claim-dyads each experience one militarization.  The result is four observations in the 
SEM dataset.  As another example, Argentina and Chile’s territorial dispute over the Beagle 
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Channel islands contains one claim-dyad that experiences 19 MIDs.  There are therefore 19 
claim-dyad-MID observations in the sample. 
TABLE 4.3. Spatial Domains of ICOW Disputed Issue Data 
Salience High  Moderate 
Issue Area Territory Maritime River 
Spatial W. Hemisphere, N./W. Europe 
W. Hemisphere, 
all of Europe 
W. Hemisphere, 
N./W. Europe, 
Middle East 
NOTE: Data on river and maritime disputes do not begin until 1900.  
Only territorial disputes are in the sample for 1885-1899. 
 
I examine all claim-dyads that experience at least one militarization between 1885 and 2000.82  
The spatial domain varies depending on issue type due to the coverage of the ICOW data (see 
Table 4.3).  Because I have assumed that claim onsets are exogenous to one another and to 
militarization, the different spatial domains are not problematic for the questions I examine here.  
A more pressing concern is the generalizability of these results to other regions.  There is 
no strong ex ante reason to suspect differences across regions, in terms of militarization patterns 
over each type of disputed issue.  For instance, in the case of territorial disputes, Frederick 
(2012) has found different territorial dispute initiation (i.e., claim onset) patterns across regions.  
However, he does not investigate whether these regional differences translate into different 
territorial dispute militarization patterns as well.  Thus, it remains unclear whether we should 
expect different dispute militarization patterns across regions.83   
                                                 
82 This temporal domain is a function of data availability for one of the control variables (trade flows). 
83 An alternative to ICOW’s data on territorial disputes is Huth and Allee’s (2002) territorial dispute data.  Huth and 
Allee’s data covers a larger spatial domain than ICOW, examining all territorial disputes regardless of region, but 
for a narrower time frame (1919-1995 only).  I elect not to use Huth and Allee’s data because of the difficulty in 
adding detailed information on MIDs—which I require to identify the SEM—to their dataset efficiently.  I leave this 
task as an avenue worth exploring in the future.  Notably, Huth and Allee’s data do provide a way to investigate 
militarization patterns across regions.  A preliminary analysis reveals that, between 1919 and 1995, territorial 
 89 
I run the model on two separate samples of disputed issues because I argue that different 
types of issues exhibit different dynamics, implying different α’s (in terms of their significance 
and signage) across groups.  One sample contains dyadic claims over issues with high levels of 
overall salience.  The other contains dyadic claims over issues with moderate levels of overall 
salience.  The different ICOW issue types are placed in overall salience categories based on 
Hensel et al.’s (2008) categorization from Table 3.2.  There are 175 claim-dyad-MIDs in the 
SEM estimation sample.  The crosstab is displayed in Table 4.4. 
TABLE 4.4. SEM Sample: Claim-Dyads and MIDs 
 HIGH O.S. 
Territory 
MODERATE O.S. 
Maritime/River Total 
Claim-Dyads 22 43 65 
Claim-Dyad-MIDs 81 94 175 
    
The SEM makes use of two dependent variables: CLAIM DURATION and MID DURATION, both of 
which were described in Section 4.1.1.  Seven variables are included as controls in both 
equations (the X’s).  The variables are motivated by previous research on militarized conflict.84  
All values are recorded for the year in which the relevant duration begins.85  For disputes that 
experience multiple MIDs, I “update” the CLAIM DURATION control variables by taking their 
values at the end of the last MID (e.g., Figure 2.1, Point C).  DEMOCRACY records the average 
Polity2 score for the dyad; the data come from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall and Jaggers 2005).  
INTERDEP controls for the dyad’s level of economic interdependence using the average of each 
state’s total trade flows in a given year divided by the state’s GDP (Barbieri, Keshk, and Pollins 
                                                                                                                                                             
disputes in the Americas and Europe (ICOW’s spatial domain) are no more likely to militarize than territorial 
disputes in the rest of the world. 
84 Some, but not all, of the variables were aggregated into the same dataset using EUGene (Bennett and Stam 2000).   
85 This amounts to Figure 2.1, Point A for CLAIM DURATION and Figure 2.1, Point B for MID DURATION. 
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2008; Oneal and Russett 2005).  IGO is a count of the number of i and j’s shared IGO 
memberships, generated using COW’s IGO membership data (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and 
Warnke 2004).  CONTIGUITY is a dichotomous variable, coded 1 if the two states share a land 
border or are separated by less than 150 miles of water (Small and Singer 1982).  MPDYAD is 
coded 1 if i or j is a major power in t, as defined by COW.  SETTMIL keeps a running count of 
MIDs over the claim-dyad, added to provide a rudimentary correction for multiple MIDs over a 
claim (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 160).  Finally, LINKED is a dichotomous variable that 
is coded 1 if a maritime or river dispute is related to a territorial dispute (or vice versa) and 0 
otherwise.  I control for LINKED because moderately salient issues that are related to highly 
salient issues might behave more like the latter (see fn. 40).86 
Instrumental variables are required to identify the SEM because it is nonrecursive.  CLAIM 
DURATION appears as a regressor in MID DURATION’s equation, and MID DURATION appears as a 
regressor in CLAIM DURATION’s equation.  If z is being used as an instrument for y1, it must 
satisfy the exclusion assumption: z must affect the other dependent variable (y2) only through its 
effect on y1.  That is, z only has an indirect effect on y2.  Unsurprisingly, z must also be a strong 
predictor of y1 (i.e., a strong instrument).  Finding strong instruments that meet the excludability 
assumption is notoriously difficult (Goenner 2011; Sovey and Green 2011).  I believe the effort 
worth undertaking because of my interest in the connection between CLAIM DURATION and MID 
DURATION.  To be consistent with my theoretical story, any instrument must represent 
information available to States i and j when they were forming their expectations.  That is, no 
instruments can be used whose values are only observable ex post.   
                                                 
86 I also detail the reasoning behind LINKED in Ch. 5, when I discuss the scatterplot of MID DURATION vs. CLAIM 
DURATION (Figure 5.1). 
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Four instruments meet these criteria (the Z’s).87  One instrument appears in the CLAIM 
DURATION equation, and the other three appear in the MID DURATION equation.  The sole 
instrument in the CLAIM DURATION equation, Z1, is multilateral claim (MLATCLAIM), which I code 
using the ICOW data.  MLATCLAIM is coded 1 if other disputes have occurred between any two 
states over the same issue in the past (e.g., the same tract of land) and 0 otherwise.  For example, 
various parts of Alaska were disputed by the US, Britain, and Russia.  The very first dispute over 
Alaska, between Britain and Russia, is coded as 0 for MLATCLAIM, since there were no prior 
disputes over Alaska at that time.  All subsequent disputes over Alaska—involving the US and 
Russia in one case, and the US and Britain in the other—are coded as 1.  States may proceed 
more cautiously when resolving disputes over issues with a prior history of disputes, so as not to 
re-involve any additional states.  Longer dispute times may result, suggesting a relationship 
between MLATCLAIM and CLAIM DURATION.  Alternatively, such disputes may take less time to 
resolve, as earlier disputes may have established a common framework for addressing key 
elements of the dispute. 
The MID DURATION equation contains three instruments (Z2).  The first instrument is 
MLATMID, which is coded 1 if the dyad in question is joining an ongoing MID.  For instance, 
say that States i and j initiate a MID, and that State k joins the MID later by attacking i.  
MLATMID would be coded 1 for i and k’s observation, but 0 for State i and j, since i and j could 
not have known of k’s eventual involvement when the MID began.  We only know ex post that i 
and j’s MID will become multilateral.  Some argue that militarizations involving more 
belligerents will be longer (e.g., Blainey 1988, 197), while others argue that such militarizations 
will be shorter because of the collective action problems that plague larger coalitions (e.g., 
                                                 
87 Rudimentary tests show that the set of instruments usually satisfy the exclusion restriction.  However, they are 
weak instruments, which can sometimes cause complications for obtaining accurate estimates. 
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Bennett and Stam 1996, 243–244).  In both cases, though, a significant relationship exists 
between MID DURATION and the number of belligerents.88   
Second, POWERRATIO is the ratio of the dyad’s highest to lowest CINC scores (Singer, 
Bremer, and Stuckey 1972).  I take the natural log of the ratio to help compensate for the 
variable’s skewness.  The ratio of CINC scores captures the balance of military power between 
the two states.  I expect balance of military power will affect CLAIM DURATION only through its 
impact on expected MID DURATION, as military power is only relevant if it can potentially be 
brought to bear by militarizing the dispute.  Militarizations in which the balance of power favors 
one side tend to be shorter than militarizations in which the sides are equally matched, as the 
stronger side can quickly defeat its weaker opponent (Bennett and Stam 1996).   
Third, I believe that presence of a third-party ally is good third instrument for similar 
reasons as POWERRATIO.  It represents potential interveners in the event of militarization, in turn 
affecting the balance of power, which affects militarization length for the reasons I have 
discussed above.  ALLY3P is a dummy variable coded 1 if either state in the dyad has an 
offensive or defensive alliance with another state.  It is coded using the Alliance Treaty 
Obligations and Provisions data (Leeds et al. 2002). 
In certain respects, the SEM estimator is similar to extant tests of rational expectation 
theory.  These tests take one of two forms.  In the first, researchers have some measure of actors’ 
expectations.  Survey questions can ask actors about the expected value of an outcome k periods 
in the future (𝑜𝑡+𝑘𝑒 ) (Mishkin 1986, 44–47; Sheffrin 1996, 14–21).  Scholars can then evaluate 
the accuracy of 𝑜𝑡+𝑘𝑒  by comparing it with o’s actual value in t + k (𝑜𝑡+𝑘).  An example is 
                                                 
88 MLATCLAIM need not be, and often is not, a determinant of MLATMID.  The two variables are barely correlated 
(Corr = -0.024), because claims can be multilateral without a MID being multilateral.  For example, Paraguay and 
Argentina’s disagreement over the central Chaco region is not a multilateral claim.  Yet, the MID that ensues over 
the claim is multilateral (the War of the Triple Alliance)—Brazil joins in, taking Argentina's side against Paraguay. 
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Krause’s (2000, 292–293) research on inflation expectations among the American public, where 
he uses a survey question about price movements as his measure of inflation expectations (𝑜𝑡+𝑘𝑒 ) 
and compares respondents’ answers to the actual inflation numbers (𝑜𝑡+𝑘).  In the second form 
of rational expectation testing, researchers have no observed data on actors’ expectations.  
Practitioners must specify a system of equations to test their hypotheses (Mishkin 1986, 21–22, 
47–51; Sheffrin 1996, 140–144).  One equation generates a ‘predicted’ expectation, and in the 
other, the prediction becomes a regressor.  The SEM framework is most similar to the second 
approach.  The estimator relies on multiple equations to generate predicted expectations, which 
serve as regressors. 
Table 4.5 displays summary statistics for the variables in the SEM sample. 
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TABLE 4.5. Descriptive Statistics – SEM Sample 
 Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Dependent Variables     
CLAIM DURATION (mths.) 409.046 405.616 0.008 2042 
MID DURATION (mths.) 3.760 8.794 0.033 97.133 
Instruments     
Multilateral claim 0.429 0.496 0 1 
Multilateral MID 0.046 0.209 0 1 
Third party alliance 0.669 0.472 0 1 
Power ratio 0.743 0.222 0.159 0.999 
Controls     
Democracy (mean)     
@ CLAIM DURATION 2.346 5.258 -9 10 
@ MID DURATION 2.763 5.568 -9 10 
Interdependence (mean)     
@ CLAIM DURATION 0.215 0.135 0.039 0.855 
@ MID DURATION 0.223 0.134 0.037 0.684 
Shared IGO mshps.     
@ CLAIM DURATION 32.314 17.725 0 68 
@ MID DURATION 36.623 18.524 0 75 
Contiguity     
@ CLAIM DURATION 0.760 0.428 0 1 
@ MID DURATION 0.766 0.425 0 1 
Major power dyad?     
@ CLAIM DURATION 0.280 0.450 0 1 
@ MID DURATION 0.280 0.450 0 1 
Militarization count 4.629 4.572 1 19 
Linked issue 0.503 0.501 0 1 
Territorial issue?* 0.463 0.500 0 1 
* Included as control in pooled sample only 
N = 175 for all variables (aggregate estimation sample) 
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4.2.2 Split Population 
4.2.2.1 Model Rationale 
One troublesome aspect of the SEM analysis is its exclusion of claim-dyads that never 
experience militarization, as the estimator cannot accommodate such cases.  If we pretend that no 
such restriction exists, Table 4.6 shows the cross-tab of peaceful and militarized claim-dyads that 
could, hypothetically, enter the SEM sample.  Hypothesis 2.1 suggests that peaceful claim-dyads 
may also show signs of an anticipatory dynamic.  The population of peaceful claim-dyads may 
be comprised of two groups: (1) those claim-dyads that could have militarized, but did not, and 
(2) those that could not have militarized (what I refer to as “Truly Peaceful” disputes; the 
capitalization is intentional).  In the extreme, not accounting for unobserved heterogeneity of this 
sort could induce sample selection bias.  Coefficient estimates would be biased, affecting 
hypothesis testing.  My concern is that the 148 peaceful claim-dyads (shaded row) contain 
meaningful information in the form of unobservable heterogeneity.   
TABLE 4.6. Crosstab of Militarization and Overall Salience 
SEM SAMPLE 
 HIGH O.S. 
Territory 
MODERATE O.S. 
Maritime/River Total 
MID 22 43 65 
Peaceful 27 121 148 
Total 49 164 213 
NOTE: Unit of analysis = claim-dyad. 
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I investigate this possibility by using a series of split population models, using a different dataset 
structure from the SEM dataset.89  Split population models recognize the unobserved 
heterogeneity within a group, and account for it during the estimation process.  Formally, split 
population models are employed when multiple data generating processes are associated with a 
single observed outcome.  In my application, the single observed outcome with multiple data 
generating processes is MID? = 0—the peaceful claim-dyads.  Peaceful disputes could occur for 
the two reasons I laid out in the previous paragraph.  Examples of split population models 
include bivariate probit models with partial observability (e.g., Meng and Schmidt 1985; Poirier 
1980; Xiang 2010) and zero-inflated count models (e.g., Hall 2000; Lambert 1992).   
Split population models are designed to test the assertion that not all peaceful claim-
dyads are Truly Peaceful.  This is important, since anticipation suggests that some claim-dyads 
will never militarize—states form accurate rational expectations and conclude that militarizing 
the dispute would be counter to their interests.  Both dynamic types suggest that time has an 
effect on the accuracy of expectations.  Further, when and whether a dispute militarizes are 
questions that go hand in hand.  A reasonable place to check for a split population, then, would 
be the time at which a dispute militarizes (CLAIM DURATION from the SEM), if it militarizes at 
all.   
I use two different estimators to check for a split population.  I describe the estimators in 
simple terms here; the technical details are in the first two sections of Appendix C.  The first is a 
Weibull split population model, developed by Milan Svolik (Svolik 2008).  In the simplest terms, 
the estimator combines a Weibull model and a logit model together.  Svolik’s estimator contains 
two equations, which correspond with the Weibull and logit components.  The dependent 
                                                 
89 I describe the split population dataset structure in the next section. 
 97 
variable for the Weibull equation is the y1 dependent variable from the SEM.  It is sufficient to 
conceive of this as CLAIM DURATION, for now.90  For peaceful disputes, CLAIM DURATION counts 
the number of months between the start and end of the dispute.  It is easiest to think of the 
Weibull as the “main” equation.   
If we are to obtain accurate estimates for the Weibull equation, we must include 
information from all the disputes that could militarize (non-Truly Peaceful).  This amounts to all 
the disputes in the “MID” row of Table 4.6 and some of the disputes from the “peaceful” row.  
Information from any dispute that cannot militarize should be excluded from the Weibull.91  The 
problem is, we are unsure which peaceful claim-dyads should be included or excluded.  This is 
the purpose of the logit equation.92  The dependent variable for the logit equation is a dummy 
variable that records whether a dispute stays peaceful (i.e., it is coded 1 when MID = 0); let π 
represent this probability. 
Teasing out the heterogeneity in the population of peaceful disputes is now 
straightforward.  Truly Peaceful disputes have little or no risk of militarizing; the logit will 
reflect this by returning a large value for π.  For non-Truly Peaceful disputes, the logit will return 
a larger value for (1 – π).  We must also incorporate the information from these disputes into the 
Weibull equation so that our coefficient estimates are as accurate as possible, as they could have 
militarized, but did not.  The key is to recognize that CLAIM DURATION is right-censored for non-
Truly Peaceful disputes.  We have not observed the dispute long enough for militarization to 
occur.  We can employ the well-established, routine procedures for accommodating right-
                                                 
90 The dependent variable will technically be CLAIM SPELL, for reasons that I discuss over the course of the next two 
chapters. 
91 Excluding “irrelevant” observations is the same reason why, in classic studies of dyadic MID onset, we want to 
include only those dyads capable of militarizing. 
92 For this very reason, the logit equation is sometimes referred to as the “splitting” equation.  Its role is to generate 
estimates that help “split” the population of peaceful disputes in the likelihood function. 
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censored durations in survival models (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 2004, 16–19).  The end 
result is an estimator that takes the form of Table 4.7, row 1.93  The table also lists the 
comparable forms for standard Weibull models. 
TABLE 4.7. Word Depiction of Various Duration Log-Likelihoods 
Model Description Militarizes (MID)  Peaceful (no MID) 
(1) Svolik’s SP Weibull = Sample: all disputes  (1 – π)*(regular Weibull) + (π + [(1 – π)*(right-censored Weib.)]) 
(2) Standard Weibull = Sample: all disputes (regular Weibull) + (right-censored Weibull) 
(3) Standard Weibull = Sample: excludes peaceful  (regular Weibull) + 0 
NOTE: π = probability that a dispute is Truly Peaceful.  (2) and (3) assume that π = 0. 
 
The presence of different groups among peaceful disputes is a testable proposition with a split 
population model.  The logic of the test follows from the informal discussion in the previous 
paragraphs.  First, I estimate two models: a Weibull model with the split-population element 
(Table 4.7, row 1) and a Weibull model without the split population element (Table 4.7, row 2).  
Then, I compare the log-likelihoods of the two models with a likelihood-ratio (LR) test (Maller 
and Zhou 1995).94  If the data contained no split population, adding a split population component 
would give us no additional analytic purchase over when disputes militarize.  The difference 
between the log-likelihoods would be statistically insignificant.  A statistically significant LR 
test suggests that a split population does exist among peaceful disputes.  Some peaceful claim-
dyads are Truly Peaceful, but importantly, some are not.  If an anticipatory dynamic is in effect, 
                                                 
93 The actual log-likelihood for Svolik’s estimator is in Appendix C, Equation [1]. 
94 The likelihood-ratio test statistic is equal to -2([log-likelihoodReg. Weibull] – [log-likelihoodSP Weibull]).  The test 
statistic is distributed χ2, with ([degrees of freedomReg. Weibull] – [degrees of freedomSP Weibull]) degrees of freedom 
(Greene 2012, 526–527). 
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and it causes some at-risk disputes not to militarize, the test statistic should be statistically 
significant. 
As a robustness check, I also estimate the models using a bivariate probit (biprobit) with 
partial observability (Meng and Schmidt 1985; Poirier 1980), which also accommodates split 
populations.95  Political scientists have used biprobit models with partial observability to analyze 
a variety of phenomena.  Vreeland (2003) analyzes the determinants of IMF loan programs, 
noting that we will only observe an IMF program when a government requests an IMF loan and 
the IMF agrees to lend.  Absence of either condition results in an observationally equivalent 
outcome—no loan is made—even though there are two possible reasons why no loan is made.  
For a more topical example, Xiang (2010) investigates MID onset using a partial observability 
model.  He notes that MID onset is observed only when the state pairs have the opportunity and 
the willingness to fight.  Both are necessary, but not sufficient, conditions for a MID to occur.  If 
two states do not experience a MID, it could be due to lack of opportunity or lack of willingness 
(or both).  We cannot tell which reason is responsible for the outcome we observe.  
Biprobit models with partial observability have two equations.  The dependent variables 
are identical dichotomous variables, coded 1 if a MID occurs in a claim-dyad-year and 0 
otherwise (MIDYR).  Different covariates are included in each equation to capture the different 
underlying concepts: IMF decision vs. government decision for Vreeland, opportunity vs. 
willingness for Xiang, and for me, CLAIM DURATION vs. TRULY PEACEFUL.  To obtain the first in 
a discrete-time setup, I add a logged version of CLAIM DURATION to the right-hand side.  This 
produces a survival model with a log-normal hazard.  Instruments further distinguish between the 
                                                 
95 Appendix C contains the empirical proof of this assertion.  This approach is still lacking in some respects, which I 
also discuss in Appendix C.  Nonetheless, biprobit with partial observability still is an improvement over certain 
elements of Svolik’s estimator. 
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explanations for whether and when a dispute militarizes.  I discuss these more in the next 
subsection.   
In biprobits, a LR test also reveals whether a split population is present.  ρ is the 
parameter of interest.  If ρ is equal to zero, then there is no correlation between the error terms 
for the equations.  A split population does not exist, and the LR test will be insignificant.  If the 
unobservables of each equation are correlated, then ρ will not be equal to zero, and the LR test 
will come back statistically significant.  This would be consistent with an anticipatory dynamic. 
4.2.2.2 Specification 
I shift to a discrete-time setup for the split-population analyses.  The unit of analysis is the claim-
dyad-year; each row represents a year in which a claim is ongoing between two states.  Covariate 
values are recorded for that year.  I estimate the proposed models on separate samples of highly 
salient and moderately salient disputes.  I expect that the split-population test statistic will be 
significant in the moderately salient sample, indicating the presence of an anticipatory dynamic.  
I am agnostic as to the test statistic’s significance in the highly salient sample, which I discuss 
further in Ch. 6.   
Table 4.8 shows the cross-section of claim-dyads that could enter the split-population 
sample, broken down by issue salience and the occurrence of militarization.  There are 99 claim-
dyads in the highly salient sample, which yields 2228 claim-dyad-years.  There are 214 claim-
dyads in the moderately salient sample, which yields 3455 claim-dyad-years.  The different 
dataset structure increases the number of claim-dyads that enter the split-population sample, 
relative to the SEM sample.  This is because the SEM’s continuous-time setup required that there 
were no missing data for the year in which (a) CLAIM DURATION began and (b) MID DURATION 
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began.  The discrete-time analysis does not have this limitation because it contains data for each 
year of a dispute, not just the years in which CLAIM DURATION and MID duration began. 
TABLE 4.8. Crosstab of Militarization and Overall Salience  
SPLIT POPULATION SAMPLE 
 HIGH O.S. 
Territory 
MODERATE O.S. 
Maritime/River Total 
MID 42 50 92 
Peaceful 57 164 221 
Total 99 214 313 
NOTE: Unit of analysis = claim-dyad. 
 
For the Svolik estimator, the first dependent variable will be CLAIM SPELL.  The reason for this 
will become clear over the next two chapters.  Throughout this chapter, I have mostly referred to 
the first Svolik dependent variable as “CLAIM DURATION” to simplify matters.  The second 
dependent variable is a dummy variable coded 1 if a dispute never militarizes and 0 otherwise.  
For the biprobit, the dependent variable in both equations is the same: a dummy coded 1 if the 
claim-dyad militarizes in year t and 0 otherwise.  The dependent variables will nonetheless have 
different substantive interpretations based on the covariates that are included on the right-hand 
side.  The first equation will be equivalent to CLAIM SPELL and the second equation will be 
equivalent to TRULY PEACEFUL, as I will now explain further. 
Instruments are still important for my split population models.  Svolik’s model can be 
estimated off functional form, but good instruments make identification easier.96  The biprobit 
requires instruments to be identified.  Two of the four SEM instruments appear without 
                                                 
96 I reestimate all of the main Svolik models without instruments (i.e., I include the same covariates in both 
equations and identify off functional form).  I report these models as robustness checks in Ch. 6.  The functional-
form Svolik models are plagued by the same convergence problem when SETTMIL, the count of militarizations over 
the claim, is included as a control as biprobit.  As a result, they are estimated without SETTMIL. 
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modification; ALLY3P and POWERRATIO are included as instruments in the CLAIM DURATION 
equation.  A third SEM instrument, MLATCLAIM can be recoded to take advantage of the claim-
dyad-year data structure.  The new variable, MLATCLAIMYR, is coded 1 if multiple claims are 
ongoing over the issue in year t and 0 otherwise.  The last SEM instrument, MLATMID, is 
unusable in the split-population analysis.  Its coding is predicated on the observation being a 
claim-dyad-MID (or claim-dyad-MID-year, in this case).  It has no equivalent for claim-dyad-
years in which no MID occurs. 
The split population control variables are essentially the same as the SEM control 
variables.  Six of the seven SEM variables reappear: DEMOCRACY, INTERDEP, IGO, CONTIGUITY, 
MPDYAD, and LINKED.  The seventh control, SETTMIL, is included in the main models with 
Svolik’s estimator, but not in the biprobit models.  Including SETTMIL causes convergence 
problems in biprobit’s estimation procedure. 
Table 4.9 displays summary statistics for the variables in the split population sample. 
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TABLE 4.9. Descriptive Statistics – Split Population Sample 
 N Mean St. Dev. Min Max 
Instruments      
Multilateral claim in t  
    High 2228 0.129 0.336 0 1 
Moderate 3455 0.370 0.483 0 1 
Third party alliance      
High 2228 0.428 0.495 0 1 
Moderate 3455 0.616 0.486 0 1 
Power ratio      
High 2228 0.627 0.248 0.129 1 
Moderate 3455 0.616 0.237 0.140 1 
Controls      
Democracy (mean)      
High 2228 3.380 4.594 -9 10 
Moderate 3455 4.400 5.389 -9 10 
Interdependence (mean)      
High 2228 0.251 0.173 0.044 1.117 
Moderate 3455 0.260 0.257 0.027 3.964 
Shared IGO mshps.      
High 2228 26.092 17.874 0 93 
Moderate 3455 35.762 17.820 0 101 
Contiguity      
High 2228 0.648 0.478 0 1 
Moderate 3455 0.645 0.479 0 1 
Major power dyad?      
High 2228 0.500 0.500 0 1 
Moderate 3455 0.551 0.497 0 1 
Militarization count      
High 2228 0.859 2.089 0 17 
Moderate 3455 0.459 1.200 0 11 
Linked issue      
High 2228 0.411 0.492 0 1 
Moderate 3455 0.272 0.445 0 1 
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4.3 CONCLUSION 
Table 4.10 provides a succinct summary of the material discussed in this chapter by comparing it 
along several key dimensions.  It also indicates the chapters to which each analysis corresponds.  
I now turn to estimating these models and reporting my findings.   
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TABLE 4.10. Overview of Empirical Models for Testing 
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5.0  EVALUATING DYNAMICS: MID DURATION 
In this chapter, I investigate the relationship between issue salience and conflict dynamics using 
a simultaneous estimation model (SEM).  The SEM specifies one equation per dynamic, which 
allows me to test for both dynamics in a unified framework.  Specifically, I evaluate the 
relationship between the time elapsed from the start of a disputed issue-claim—“claim 
duration”—and conflict (MID) duration.   
I find robust support for my argument.  Disputes over highly salient issues have non-anticipatory 
dynamics.  They are more prone to inaccurate beliefs about MID duration as more time passes 
during the claim-dyad.  Moderately salient issues, on the other hand, are more prone to 
anticipatory dynamics.  States tend to form accurate expectations about MID duration, which 
affects when a claim-dyad experiences militarization. 
My findings have several implications.  First, deviations from “rational expectations” are 
not idiosyncratic, as many current game-theoretic works argue.  Empirical evidence that disputes 
over highly salient issues are most affected by a non-anticipatory dynamic suggests a systematic 
pattern, not idiosyncrasy.  I also use the SEM to replicate the analysis of two recent articles 
examining MID duration.  I show that failing to account for “claim duration” (broadly 
understood) produces biased and inaccurate estimates.  Additionally, by drawing attention to the 
importance of claim duration, my argument speaks to scholars’ current conceptualization of 
“time” (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Beck 2010; Carter and Signorino 2010a, 2010b; Licht 
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2011).  This is potentially relevant to not only academic researchers, but policy makers seeking 
to mediate disagreements among or within states.  The potential importance of “when” an event 
occurs is not discussed often in interstate conflict research, but it is frequently discussed in the 
literatures on historical institutionalism and path dependence.  My empirical findings suggest 
that the non-anticipatory dynamic in play is also a path-dependent one.  Not only do past 
occurrences matter for conflict duration, but the order of the occurrences matters. 
Chapter 5 has four sections.  I first provide descriptive statistics about CLAIM DURATION 
and MID DURATION.  Next, I report and discuss the results of my main analysis.  Third, I show 
the ramifications of my argument and estimation procedure by replicating the results from two 
previously published articles on MID DURATION.  A brief summary of the chapter’s findings and 
concluding remarks end the chapter. 
5.1 DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Before beginning the analysis, it is helpful to see the distribution of the data.  Figure 5.1 shows 
the relationship between the two dependent variables, plotting CLAIM DURATION against MID 
DURATION.  Each point represents a MID over a claim-dyad.  The scatterplot provides some 
initial descriptive evidence broadly in line with my argument.  First, MIDs over highly salient 
issues (shaded circles) appear to exhibit a distinct pattern from MIDs associated with moderately 
salient issues (all squares).  The squares tend to cluster near the axes, whereas the circles have a 
bit more spacing from the x-axis.  The cluster of moderately salient points in the upper-right 
quadrant is intriguing because the points seem to follow the pattern for highly salient issues.  
These dyadic MIDs are over river and maritime claims related to ongoing territorial claim-dyads.   
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Another interesting observation arises once we distinguish between moderately salient 
issues with a link to ongoing territorial disputes (shaded squares) and those with no link (hollow 
squares): the pattern of shaded squares is more similar to the pattern of shaded circles than the 
pattern of hollow squares.  If, as I have argued, highly salient issues are prone to being defined in 
intangible ways, then moderately salient issues with “links” to highly salient issues may behave 
more like the latter.  This is precisely what we see. 
 
FIGURE 5.1. Scatterplot of CLAIM DURATION vs. MID DURATION 
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5.2 MAIN EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
5.2.1 Principal Results 
Table 5.1 contains the main results for the baseline specifications noted in Ch. 4.  The shaded 
rows denote the parameters of interest for my hypotheses.  The reported coefficients represent 
the direct effect of the covariates on each dependent variable (Paxton, Hipp, and Marquart-Pyatt 
2011).  The coefficients are expressed in log-duration times, as the SEM is a Weibull accelerated 
failure time model.  Coefficients cannot be interpreted as substantive effects on y,97 but signage 
and significance have the same meaning as usual.  Variables that increase duration times will 
have positively signed coefficients, while variables that decrease duration times will have 
negatively signed coefficients.  The α’s are unique in that we can interpret them as elasticties 
(Gujarati 2002, 175–177).  A 1 percent increase in MID DURATION will produce a αANT percent 
change in CLAIM DURATION; a 1 percent increase in CLAIM DURATION will produce a α~ANT percent 
change in MID DURATION. 
I begin by analyzing the sample of issues with high overall salience.  I argued that 
conflicts over such issues should have a predominantly non-anticipatory dynamic, which will be 
indicated by a statistically significant α∼ANT parameter.  Claim duration should directly affect 
MID duration (α~ANT), even after controlling for the potential effect of expectations about MID 
duration on claim duration (represented by αANT).  Should αANT also be statistically significant, 
then predominance suggests that α∼ANT’s magnitude should be larger and statistically different 
from that of αANT (i.e.: |α∼ANT| > |αANT|).  We can compare the magnitudes in this way because 
                                                 
97 The coefficients represent the substantive effect of x on ln(y).  See Appendix C.3. 
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CLAIM DURATION and MID DURATION are measured using the same metric (time, in months).  An 
issue indivisibility mechanism corresponds with a positively signed α∼ANT, while a time pressure 
mechanism corresponds with a negatively signed α∼ANT.   
Model 1 contains the main estimates for the highly salient sample.  The results are 
consistent with my argument.  α∼ANT is highly significant and positive, suggesting that CLAIM 
DURATION affects MID DURATION.  The positive sign is consistent with an issue indivisibility 
mechanism (Hypothesis 3.2).  Militarized conflicts occurring later in a disputed issue (relative to 
the claim-dyad’s start) will last longer than earlier-occurring conflicts.  Specifically, a 1 percent 
increase in CLAIM DURATION produces a 0.29 percent increase in MID DURATION.  However, αANT 
is also weakly significant.  This suggests that, in addition to affecting MID DURATION, CLAIM 
DURATION is affected by MID DURATION.  A negative αANT suggests a strategic prevention 
mechanism (Hypothesis 3.4).  As the expected duration of a military conflict increases, the 
militarization will occur earlier in a claim-dyad.  A 1 percent increase in MID DURATION 
produces a 0.077 percent decrease in CLAIM DURATION. 
Since both α’s are significant, I check for predominance by comparing the magnitude of 
the two parameters using a Wald test.  The p-values from this Wald test are reported in Table 
5.1, above the N.  In line with my argument, I find that a non-anticipatory dynamic is 
predominant for militarizations over highly salient issues: |α∼ANT| is significantly larger than |αANT| 
(p = 0.047, one-tailed).  As a robustness check, I remove the insignificant variables and 
reestimate the model (reported as Model 2).98  These results should be interpreted with some 
caution, as they treat some variables as unofficial instruments by excluding them from one 
equation.  Nonetheless, the main results from Model 1 continue to hold.  My broad supposition 
                                                 
98 I use a weak definition of insignificance: the variable fails to obtain one-tailed significance at the 0.10 level. 
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that highly salient issues will exhibit predominantly non-anticipatory dynamics is supported 
(Hypothesis 3.0). 
Next, I analyze the sample of issues with moderate overall salience.  I expect that an 
anticipatory dynamic will be predominant, indicated by the statistical significance of αANT.  
Model 3 contains the main results for this sample.  The results again are in line with my 
expectations, though the evidence is weaker.  αANT is weakly significant and negative, supportive 
of Hypothesis 3.4 (strategic prevention).  A 1 percent increase in MID DURATION produces a 0.13 
percent decrease in CLAIM DURATION.  I find no empirical support for Hypothesis 3.3 (strategic 
delay).99  α~ANT is statistically insignificant, which suggests that, after controlling for the effects 
of expectations, CLAIM DURATION has no influence on the length of MIDs over maritime or river 
issues.  Model 4 shows that the results hold when the insignificant variables are removed from 
Model 3.  I conclude that my main hypothesis regarding overall salience (Hypothesis 3.0) is 
supported.  As the overall salience moves from moderate to high, dynamic-type predominance 
switches from an anticipatory dynamic to a non-anticipatory dynamic.  
                                                 
99 This is likely the product of excluding peaceful disputes from the analysis, as the SEM cannot accommodate these 
disputes.  I explore the possibility in the next chapter. 
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TABLE 5.1. Main Results: Simultaneous Effect of Claim Duration and MID Duration  
 Model 1 
High 
Model 2 
High 
Model 3 
Moderate 
Model 4 
Moderate 
Model 5 
Pooled 
Claim Duration      
Multilateral claim† -0.753*** -0.753*** -0.705** -0.671** -0.596*** 
MLATCLAIM (0.206) (0.193) (0.347) (0.328) (0.203) 
Democracy (mean) 0.007  -0.049 -0.055* -0.018 
DEMOCRACY (0.025)  (0.034) (0.031) (0.024) 
Interdependence (mean) -1.244 -1.142 -0.217  -0.285 
INTERDEP (0.950) (0.917) (1.301)  (0.901) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.009 0.009 -0.005  0.016** 
IGO (0.006) (0.006) (0.012)  (0.006) 
Contiguity -2.046*** -2.125*** 1.816*** 1.822*** 0.827* 
CONTIGUITY (0.621) (0.610) (0.531) (0.532) (0.424) 
Major power dyad? -0.865 -0.929 0.731 0.815 0.995** 
MPDYAD (0.581) (0.569) (0.562) (0.512) (0.431) 
Militarization count 0.073*** 0.067*** 0.301*** 0.287*** 0.090*** 
SETTMIL (0.023) (0.022) (0.096) (0.080) (0.031) 
Linked issue 0.095  -0.542 -0.506 0.202 
LINKED (0.199)  (0.391) (0.383) (0.217) 
Constant 7.781*** 7.925*** 3.833*** 3.611*** 3.945*** 
 (0.828) (0.798) (0.824) (0.585) (0.610) 
αANT (MID Duration) -0.077* -0.067* -0.130* -0.130* -0.057 
 (0.056) (0.049) (0.093) (0.089) (0.059) 
λ1
-1 1.397*** 1.405*** 0.714*** 0.712*** 0.801*** 
 (0.135) (0.134) (0.062) (0.061) (0.050) 
 
(continued on next page) 
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 Model 1 
High 
Model 2 
High 
Model 3 
Moderate 
Model 4 
Moderate 
Model 5 
Pooled 
 
(continued from previous page) 
 
MID Duration      
Multilateral MID† -1.220 -0.352 -1.414 -1.255 -0.549 
MLATMID (0.880) (0.703) (0.979) (0.951) (0.658) 
Third party alliance† 0.276  0.119  0.136 
3PALLY (0.650)  (0.651)  (0.414) 
Power ratio† -2.272 -2.264* -1.112  0.137 
POWERRATIO (1.401) (1.372) (1.369)  (0.946) 
Democracy (mean) -0.141*** -0.117*** -0.023  -0.041 
DEMOCRACY (0.047) (0.035) (0.047)  (0.031) 
Interdependence (mean) 4.564*** 4.028*** 4.129** 3.926** 2.500** 
INTERDEP (1.493) (1.309) (1.724) (1.650) (1.201) 
Shared IGO mshps. -0.006  -0.036* -0.045*** -0.019 
IGO (0.015)  (0.021) (0.015) (0.013) 
Contiguity 1.943 0.662 0.066  0.298 
CONTIGUITY (1.534) (0.591) (0.600)  (0.592) 
Major power dyad? 1.221  -1.359* -1.127** -0.482 
MPDYAD (1.179)  (0.788) (0.508) (0.566) 
Militarization count -0.038  0.217** 0.245*** 0.112*** 
SETTMIL (0.061)  (0.103) (0.087) (0.040) 
Linked issue -1.712*** -1.594*** 0.824 0.779 0.065 
LINKED (0.425) (0.361) (0.518) (0.493) (0.293) 
Constant -0.296 1.114 1.854 1.337 0.827 
 (1.987) (1.416) (1.427) (0.853) (0.970) 
α~ANT (Claim Duration) 0.291** 0.214** -0.101 -0.092 -0.096 
 (0.143) (0.097) (0.095) (0.084) (0.081) 
λ2
-1 0.757*** 0.752*** 0.639*** 0.631*** 0.618*** 
 (0.069) (0.068) (0.053) (0.052) (0.037) 
|αANT| = |α~ANT| (p, Wald1T) 0.046** 0.058* 0.432 0.401 0.378 
N 81 81 94 94 175 
Log-Likelihood -258.112 -259.543 -379.228 -380.020 -687.822 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables except α’s (one-tailed); † = instruments.   
λ-1: inverse of Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses.   
Model 5 also includes a control for territorial issues in both equations (statistically insignificant; not reported) 
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To get a better sense of the substantive effects, I compute the expected value for each dependent 
variable via simulation, akin to the popular Clarify package in Stata (King, Tomz, and 
Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001).  Ideally, we would choose different values 
of CLAIM DURATION to compute its effect on MID DURATION (or vice versa).  However, I cannot 
directly manipulate the value of CLAIM DURATION (or MID DURATION).  Both variables are 
endogenous variables in the SEM.   
Instead, I apply a shock to the idiosyncratic error term of CLAIM DURATION’s equation (or 
MID DURATION’s equation).  The idiosyncratic errors (ϵ) represent the exogenous, random 
factors that influence the y’s.  Manipulating the value of ϵ1, the idiosyncratic error for the first 
equation, will affect the value of y1, CLAIM DURATION.  However, manipulating the value of ϵ1 
will also influence the value of y2, MID DURATION, because of the SEM’s nonrecursiveness.  I set 
SETTMIL and the binary control variables to their median values and all other control variables to 
their means for all the calculations.  I use the reduced-form of the SEM to compute the effect of 
introducing a one-unit shock to an equation’s idiosyncratic error on the expected value of CLAIM 
DURATION (y1) and MID DURATION (y2).100 
TABLE 5.2. Exogenous Error Shock: Highly Salient Sample 
 (1) 
No shocks 
(2) 
ϵ1 shocked 
CLAIM DURATION (y1) 552.123 2221.224 
MID DURATION (y2) 1.483 2.277 
Durations measured in months.  Simulations based on Model 1 
(1000 replications), N = 81.  Control variables: SETTMIL, all binary 
variables = sample median, all others = sample mean 
 
                                                 
100 The reduced-form equations are displayed in Appendix C.3.  The appendix also contains additional details about 
the way these calculations are made. 
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Table 5.2 displays the expected durations for the highly salient sample, based on Model 1, under 
two scenarios.  In disputes over highly salient issues, non-anticipation is the predominant 
dynamic, indicated by the statistical significance of α~ANT in Model 1 and the Wald test for 
predominance.  The results specifically suggest that an exogenous shock to ϵ1 should lengthen 
CLAIM DURATION, and thus yield lengthier MIDs.  An issue indivisibility mechanism would be 
consistent with this signage.  The expected value of MID DURATION is therefore the value of 
interest for highly salient issues (shaded row).   
In the first scenario, neither error term is shocked.  With the control variables at the 
previously mentioned values, disputes over territorial issues last 552.1 months before 
militarizing and the subsequent MIDs last 1.5 months when no shocks are introduced.  The 
second scenario introduces a one-unit shock to ϵ1, the error term of CLAIM DURATION’s equation.  
If time has a pernicious effect, the expected value of MID DURATION should appreciably increase 
if we shock ϵ1.  The shock lengthens the value of CLAIM DURATION, CLAIM DURATION is a 
regressor in MID DURATION’s equation, and lengthier CLAIM DURATIONs lead to longer 
militarization lengths (indicated by a positively signed α~ANT).  This is precisely what happens in 
the second scenario.  MIDs last over 50 percent longer than they did in Scenario 1, with an 
expected value of 2.2 months in Scenario 2.  The increase in value nicely showcases the positive 
sign on α~ANT in Model 1.   
TABLE 5.3. Exogenous Error Shock: Moderately Salient Sample 
 (1) 
No shocks 
(2) 
ϵ2 shocked 
CLAIM DURATION (y1) 343.259 317.299 
MID DURATION (y2) 1.751 3.346 
Durations measured in months.  Simulations based on Model 3 
(1000 replications), N = 94.  Control variables: SETTMIL, all binary 
variables = sample median, all others = sample mean 
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Table 5.3 displays two different scenarios for the moderately salient sample.  The calculations 
are based on Model 3.  In disputes over moderately salient issues, anticipation is the predominant 
dynamic, indicated by the statistical significance of αANT.  Anticipation suggests that expectations 
about MID DURATION should affect CLAIM DURATION.  Specifically, the negative sign on αANT 
suggests that an exogenous shock to ϵ2 (which lengthens MID DURATION) will yield shorter 
CLAIM DURATIONs.  A strategic prevention story is consistent with this signage.  The expected 
value of CLAIM DURATION is therefore the value of interest for moderately salient issues (shaded 
row). 
Scenario 1 computes the expected durations for each dependent variable in the absence of 
shocks.  Like the highly salient simulations, the simulations for the moderately salient sample set 
the control variables equal to either their median values (SETTMIL and all binary variables) or 
their mean values (all other controls).  In Scenario 1, moderately salient claims last about 354.6 
months.  The subsequent MIDs are 1.9 months in length.  Scenario 2 introduces a shock to ϵ2.  
The shock will increase the value of MID DURATION, which in turn should decrease the value of 
CLAIM DURATION.  The simulation results bear this out.  The expected value of CLAIM DURATION 
decreases in value to 320.2 months, down from 354.6 months in Scenario 1 (9.7 percent 
reduction).  The reduction in value showcases the negative sign on αANT in Model 3.  
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5.2.2 Robustness Checks 
Table 5.4 contains selected additional robustness checks for the main results.101  Model 6 and 
Model 7 check the strength of the instrument set.  For the most part, the instruments are good 
predictors of the dependent variables.  However, Model 6 and Model 7 show that the three 
instruments for MID DURATION vary in statistical significance.  Only ALLY3P is significant in the 
highly salient sample, while MLATMID and POWERRATIO are only significant in the moderately 
salient sample.  Rerunning the models with only the significant instruments does not affect the 
results, shown by Models 8 and 9.  The different levels of significance is unsurprising, given that 
some of the instrument diagnostics performed in Chapter 4 indicated the weakness of the 
instrument sets (see fn. 87).  More positively, the same diagnostics also indicated that the 
instruments generally met the exogeneity assumption. 
In a way, the current coding of CLAIM DURATION is a conservative test for an issue 
indivisibility mechanism.  CLAIM DURATION records the amount of time between the start of a 
claim-dyad over an issue and the onset of a dyadic MID over the claim.  However, some issues 
experience multiple claims between the same two states.  In Chapter 4, we saw that the 
Karelia/Petsamo dispute contained five claim-dyads, but all five claim-dyads involved the same 
two states, Finland and Russia.  I have argued that, over time, a disputed issue (not a claim, 
necessarily) between states may develop an intangible element.  This suggests an alternative 
coding that uses the start date from the first dyadic claim among all the dyad’s claims (e.g., 1918 
for all five Karelia/Petsamo claims between RUS-FIN, vs. 1918, 1938, 1941, 1941, and 1945). 
                                                 
101 Many other checks are reported and discussed in Appendix D.  Details about each model’s specification are 
provided in the interpretation key underneath Table D.1. 
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TABLE 5.4. Basic Robustness Checks for Table 5.1 
 Model 6 
High 
SEM 
Model 7 
Moderate 
SEM 
Model 8 
High 
SEM 
Model 9 
Moderate 
SEM 
Model 10 
High 
DV1 = dyad start 
Claim Duration      
Multilateral claim† -1.163*** -0.543 -0.751*** -0.603* -0.677*** 
MLATCLAIM (0.203) (0.340) (0.205) (0.324) (0.226) 
Democracy (mean)   0.007 0.008 0.008 
DEMOCRACY   (0.025) (0.034) (0.021) 
Interdependence (mean)   -1.268 -0.776 -2.660*** 
INTERDEP   (0.950) (1.196) (0.807) 
Shared IGO mshps.   0.009 -0.045*** 0.000 
IGO   (0.006) (0.011) (0.007) 
Contiguity   -2.057*** 1.075** -1.976*** 
CONTIGUITY   (0.620) (0.443) (0.567) 
Major power dyad?   -0.875 0.296 -0.714 
MPDYAD   (0.580) (0.462) (0.562) 
Militarization count   0.072*** -0.015 0.048*** 
SETTMIL   (0.023) (0.069) (0.015) 
Linked issue   0.101 -0.460 0.160 
LINKED   (0.199) (0.356) (0.221) 
Constant 6.648*** 5.638*** 7.797*** 5.438*** 8.479*** 
 (0.133) (0.227) (0.827) (0.731) (0.725) 
αANT (MID Duration) -0.059 -0.017 -0.071 -0.104* -0.034 
 (0.055) (0.097) (0.056) (0.081) (0.045) 
λ1
-1 1.120*** 0.618*** 1.400*** 0.789*** 1.643*** 
 (0.107) (0.054) (0.134) (0.067) (0.156) 
 
(continued on next page) 
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 Model 6 
High 
SEM 
Model 7 
Moderate 
SEM 
Model 8 
High 
SEM 
Model 9 
Moderate 
SEM 
Model 10 
High 
DV1 = dyad start 
 
(continued from previous page) 
 
MID Duration      
Multilateral MID† -0.236 -1.918**  -1.195 -1.044 
MLATMID (0.792) (0.942)  (0.983) (0.821) 
Third party alliance† -0.723** -0.162 0.217  0.326 
3PALLY (0.363) (0.532) (0.663)  (0.632) 
Power ratio† 1.717 1.483*  -1.224 -2.276 
POWERRATIO (1.357) (0.819)  (1.124) (1.443) 
Democracy (mean)   -0.120** -0.011 -0.137*** 
DEMOCRACY   (0.047) (0.044) (0.042) 
Interdependence (mean)   4.862*** 4.305** 4.628*** 
INTERDEP   (1.613) (1.676) (1.606) 
Shared IGO mshps.   -0.008 -0.041** -0.005 
IGO   (0.016) (0.017) (0.016) 
Contiguity   0.936 0.018 1.732 
CONTIGUITY   (1.309) (0.600) (1.460) 
Major power dyad?   0.500 -1.475** 1.284 
MPDYAD   (1.048) (0.710) (1.174) 
Militarization count   -0.024 0.180* -0.015 
SETTMIL   (0.061) (0.095) (0.039) 
Linked issue   -1.385*** 0.885* -1.598*** 
LINKED   (0.395) (0.528) (0.537) 
Constant -0.435 0.395 -1.292 2.065* 0.023 
 (1.211) (0.751) (1.598) (1.146) (2.056) 
α~ANT (Claim Duration) 0.067 -0.139* 0.257** -0.071 0.202* 
 (0.114) (0.101) (0.148) (0.091) (0.134) 
λ2
-1 0.651*** 0.547*** 0.740*** 0.632*** 0.753*** 
 (0.059) (0.044) (0.068) (0.052) (0.068) 
|αANT| = |α~ANT| (p, Wald1T) 0.470 0.246 0.076* 0.412 0.087* 
N 81 94 81 94 81 
Log-Likelihood -290.906 -405.972 -260.151 -367.843 -247.613 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables except α’s (one-tailed); † = instruments 
λ-1: inverse of Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses. 
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FIGURE 5.2. Scatterplot of ISSUE DURATION vs. MID DURATION 
The difference between the dyad-based coding of ISSUE DURATION and the current claim-based of 
CLAIM DURATION is evident by comparing Figure 5.2 (dyad) and Figure 5.1 (claim).  In Figure 
5.2, the mean length of ISSUE DURATION is (unsurprisingly) higher.  We are effectively checking 
larger blocks of time for potential non-anticipatory effects.  To be consistent with issue 
indivisibility, the alternative coding should return results closer to dynamic ideal-types in the 
highly salient sample.  α~ANT should be positively signed and significant, and αANT should be 
insignificant.   
The last model in Table 5.4 (Model 10) uses ISSUE DURATION as the first dependent 
variable for the sample of highly salient issues.  As suspected, evidence of non-anticipation 
becomes much stronger.  The evidence of a significant non-anticipatory effect remains intact, but 
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there is no longer any evidence of a significant anticipatory effect.  The model reflects the ideal-
type predictions; no tests for dynamic predominance are needed. 
Moving to other validity concerns, the reported results could also be an artifact of the 
overall salience categorization scheme.  One criticism of the categorization relates to the 
possibility of variation within the overall salience categories.  The supportive evidence of my 
argument could be the product of this within-category heterogeneity.   
Fortunately, we can investigate this possibility.  The ICOW data contain issue-specific 
salience variables, which are coded as an index ranging from 0-12.  The components of the index 
vary by issue type (displayed in Table 5.5).  If we add the index variable as a control for within-
category salience, the main results should be unaffected. 
Table 5.6 reports the models that have within-category salience as a control variable.102  
The two reported models use CLAIM DURATION as the first dependent variable, as they are based 
on the main specification from Table 5.1 (also reproduced for reference as shaded columns in 
Table 5.6).  The main results do not change with the addition of within-category salience in the 
highly salient sample (Model 11).  α~ANT remains positive and significant, while αANT is 
insignificant.  The main results also stay the same in the moderately salient sample (Model 12), 
with one caveat.  As expected, αANT stays negative and weakly significant.  However, counter to 
expectations, α~ANT is also negative and weakly significant.  As CLAIM DURATION increases in 
length, shorter MIDs result.  The evidence is consistent with a time pressure mechanism 
(Hypothesis 3.1).  The Wald test also shows that αANT and α~ANT are not statistically 
distinguishable from one another.  I discuss the curious nature of these results in a moment.   
                                                 
102 Since the index’s composition differs by issue, it would be best to also run the analysis on separate samples of 
river and maritime issues.  However, there are not enough river observations to run the maximum likelihood-based 
SEM (river N = 16). 
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TABLE 5.5. Within-Category Salience Indices 
Territory Maritime 
+2 Natural Resources? +2 
1 
HOMELAND TERRITORY 
Per state: associated with 
homeland territory?  
+2 Strategic Location? +2 Strategic Location? 
+2 Any large cities?  
(population > 100k) 
+2 Fish stock? 
+2 
1 
HOMELAND 
Per state: Claimed as homeland 
territory (vs. dependent) 
+2 Migratory fish stock? 
+2 
1 
IDENTITY 
Per state: Identity basis for claim 
(e.g., ethnic, religious) 
+2 Oil? 
+2 
1 
SOVEREIGNTY 
Per state: Exercised sovereignty 
over claim in past 200 years? 
+2 Other resources? 
(i.e., not fish, oil) 
River 
Source: ICOW v.1.1 
documentation (in 
particular, Hensel and 
Mitchell 2007, 16–22). 
+2 
1 
HOMELAND TERRITORY 
Per state: Runs through 
homeland territory? 
+2 
0.5 
1 
NAVIGATION 
Per state: Local transport only  
Per state: Nat’l, int’l transport 
+2 
0.5 
1 
POPULATED AREAS 
Per state: Only towns/villages 
Per state: Major cities  
+2 
0.5 
1 
RESOURCE EXTRACTION 
Per state: For local goods only 
Per state: For nat’l, int’l goods 
+2 
0.5 
1 
HYDROELECTRIC POWER  
Per state: Local power only  
Per state: Nat’l/int’l power 
+2 
0.5 
1 
IRRIGATION USE 
Per state: Local use only  
Per state: Nat’l/int’l use 
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TABLE 5.6. Robustness: Within-Category Salience 
 Model 11 
High 
Table 5.1, 
Model 1 
Model 12 
Moderate 
Table 5.1, 
Model 3 
Claim Duration     
Multilateral claim† -1.138*** -0.753*** -0.099 -0.705** 
MLATCLAIM (0.211) (0.206) (0.364) (0.347) 
Democracy (mean) 0.003 0.007 -0.068** -0.049 
DEMOCRACY (0.023) (0.025) (0.034) (0.034) 
Interdependence (mean) -0.280 -1.244 -0.556 -0.217 
INTERDEP (0.800) (0.950) (1.165) (1.301) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.024*** 0.009 -0.003 -0.005 
IGO (0.007) (0.006) (0.011) (0.012) 
Contiguity -0.853 -2.046*** 1.615*** 1.816*** 
CONTIGUITY (0.638) (0.621) (0.462) (0.531) 
Major power dyad? 0.083 -0.865 0.885* 0.731 
MPDYAD (0.587) (0.581) (0.506) (0.562) 
Militarization count 0.039* 0.073*** 0.240*** 0.301*** 
SETTMIL (0.022) (0.023) (0.091) (0.096) 
Linked issue 0.249 0.095 -1.035*** -0.542 
LINKED (0.171) (0.199) (0.368) (0.391) 
Within-cat. salience index 0.234***  0.338***  
 (0.061)  (0.084)  
Constant 4.487*** 7.781*** 1.395 3.833*** 
 (1.135) (0.828) (0.957) (0.824) 
αANT (MID Duration) -0.052 -0.077* -0.129* -0.130* 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.089) (0.093) 
λ1
-1 1.524*** 1.397*** 0.771*** 0.714*** 
 (0.146) (0.135) (0.067) (0.062) 
 
(continued on next page) 
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 Model 11 
High 
Table 5.1, 
Model 1 
Model 12 
Moderate 
Table 5.1, 
Model 3 
 
(continued from previous page) 
 
MID Duration     
Multilateral MID† -1.053 -1.220 -1.471 -1.414 
MLATMID (0.893) (0.880) (0.950) (0.979) 
Third party alliance† 0.235 0.276 0.023 0.119 
3PALLY (0.664) (0.650) (0.641) (0.651) 
Power ratio† -2.521* -2.272 -0.486 -1.112 
POWERRATIO (1.513) (1.401) (1.378) (1.369) 
Democracy (mean) -0.128*** -0.141*** -0.024 -0.023 
DEMOCRACY (0.049) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) 
Interdependence (mean) 4.504*** 4.564*** 4.632*** 4.129** 
INTERDEP (1.514) (1.493) (1.664) (1.724) 
Shared IGO mshps. -0.007 -0.006 -0.051*** -0.036* 
IGO (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.021) 
Contiguity 1.567 1.943 0.071 0.066 
CONTIGUITY (1.613) (1.534) (0.584) (0.600) 
Major power dyad? 0.850 1.221 -1.143 -1.359* 
MPDYAD (1.419) (1.179) (0.749) (0.788) 
Militarization count -0.025 -0.038 0.234** 0.217** 
SETTMIL (0.060) (0.061) (0.099) (0.103) 
Linked issue -1.785*** -1.712*** 0.349 0.824 
LINKED (0.503) (0.425) (0.555) (0.518) 
Within-cat. salience index -0.072  0.203**  
 (0.163)  (0.094)  
Constant 0.779 -0.259 0.694 1.753 
 (2.751) (1.831) (1.474) (1.304) 
α~ANT (Claim Duration) 0.300* 0.287** -0.152* -0.095 
 (0.184) (0.131) (0.099) (0.089) 
λ2
-1 0.759*** 0.827*** 0.663*** 0.705*** 
 (0.069) (0.074) (0.055) (0.057) 
|αANT| = |α~ANT| (p, Wald1T) 0.063 0.047*** 0.446 0.378 
N 81 81 94 94 
Log-Likelihood -251.353 -249.780 -369.575 -368.769 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables except α’s (one-tailed) 
† = instruments; λ-1: inverse of Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered SEs reported in parentheses. 
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Looking at the coefficients for within-category salience in Table 5.6, we first see that higher 
within-category salience produces lengthier CLAIM DURATIONS in both overall salience 
categories.  This is indicated by the positive and significant coefficient in the CLAIM DURATION 
equation.  Generalizing the result, it is in line with the current prevailing wisdom: the more 
important the issue, the longer it will last.  In the MID DURATION equation, within-category 
salience interestingly has a different effect in each sample.  For issues with high overall salience, 
higher levels of within-category salience have no effect on MID DURATION (Model 11).  Contrast 
this with the coefficient in the moderately salient sample.  Within-category salience is significant 
and positively signed, indicating that MIDs last longer when the issue has higher levels of 
within-category salience.   
On the whole, Models 11 and 12 show that the main results are robust to controlling for 
within-category salience.  The evidence also suggests that the overall salience categories are 
broadly homogenous, providing support for the continued use of the categorization scheme.  
Controlling for within-category variation does, however, provide us with additional insight into 
the factors that affect CLAIM DURATION and MID DURATION.   
5.2.3 Reflecting upon the Curious Moderately Salient Results 
I now return to the curious results from the moderately salient sample.  For the within-category 
salience specification, αANT was weakly significant, providing some support for my hypotheses.  
However, counter to my hypotheses, α~ANT also became weakly significant, and its magnitude 
was not significantly smaller than αANT.  Contrast the weak support for my hypotheses regarding 
moderately salient issues with the strong and robust support I find for my hypotheses regarding 
highly salient issues.  It gives rise to a larger question: why is there only weak evidence of an 
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anticipatory dynamic in moderately salient issues, while there is strong evidence of non-
anticipation in highly salient issues?  Is this reflective of the true relationship between dynamic 
types and issue salience, or is something else at work?   
There are a few reasons why these differences might be the product of statistical artifact, 
not substantive truth.  One possibility involves censored observations.  Claim-dyads that never 
militarize may be consistent with an anticipatory dynamic, but these observations never enter the 
SEM sample.  The SEM analysis may be suffering from a sample selection problem.  This is the 
main concern of the next chapter.   
However, another possible reason relates to the dependent variable coding.  I have 
already discussed how the effects stemming from non-anticipation, particularly an issue 
indivisibility mechanism, take a long time to visibly manifest.  That is, the time horizon is long.  
This rationale formed the basis for an earlier robustness check involving ISSUE DURATION.  In my 
discussion so far, though, I have implicitly treated the time horizon for anticipation mechanisms 
as equivalent to the non-anticipation mechanisms.  There is reason to believe that this may not be 
the case.  In extant work on anticipation, the effects of such behavior appear fairly quickly.  
These short time horizons for anticipatory mechanisms, in fact, give rise to one of the major 
criticisms of game-theoretic work: it tends to be too myopic (e.g., Pierson 2004, 60–62, 99–100).  
My anticipatory mechanisms are representative of extant work, implying that the effects of an 
anticipatory dynamic may also manifest more quickly.  We may see weak evidence of an 
anticipatory dynamic simply because the time horizon implied by the CLAIM DURATION variable 
is too long.  The shorter-term effects from anticipation are undetectable. 
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An easy way to check is to use a CLAIM SPELL coding for the first dependent variable.103  
Whereas CLAIM DURATION relies on a total-time coding formulation, CLAIM SPELL relies on a gap-
time formulation.  CLAIM SPELL records the number of months that pass between the initiation of 
a claim-dyad and the start of a first MID over that claim.  Importantly, the variable resets to zero 
and begins counting again for subsequent MIDs if the dispute is not resolved by the first MID. 
 
Observations containing the CLAIM SPELLs outlined in black enter the split population sample only (Ch. 6). 
 
FIGURE 5.3. Illustration of Coding for Various y1s 
(Time Elapsed Variables Related to the Disputed Issue) 
Figure 5.3 uses Nicaragua and Colombia’s territorial dispute over San Andrés and Providencia to 
visually depict the differences between a CLAIM SPELL and CLAIM DURATION coding, as well as 
the difference between other codings that I have employed for y1.  Nicaragua and Colombia’s 
dispute contains two claim-dyads over San Andrés and Providencia.  The horizontal lines 
immediately underneath the calendar year timeline represent the years in which each claim-dyad 
was active (e.g., 1900-1930 for the first claim-dyad).  These lines  correspond to a variable that 
counted the “overall length” of a claim-dyad, which I display at the bottom of the figure for 
reference.  Triangles are plotted along the uppermost horizontal lines for the years in which a 
MID began (e.g., for the first claim-dyad, a MID began in 1913; it experienced no other MIDs).  
                                                 
103 See fn. 76. 
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The figure’s construction is based on the SEM dataset’s claim-dyad-MID unit of analysis.  The 
first claim-dyad would have one observation in the SEM dataset, as it experienced one MID.  
The second-claim dyad would have three observations, corresponding with the claim-dyad’s 
three MIDs. 
A CLAIM SPELL coding begins counting time periods at the start of each claim-dyad over a 
given issue.  It resets to zero and begins counting anew at the end of every militarization.  For an 
example, take the second claim-dyad in the figure.  Each claim-spell line corresponds with an 
observation in the dataset.  The first claim-spell line corresponds with the first observation, in 
which CLAIM SPELL counts the amount of time between the claim-dyad’s initiation (December 
1979) and the start of the first MID (February 1980).  After the MID concludes, CLAIM SPELL 
resets for the second observation, represented by the second line.  CLAIM SPELL begins counting 
again from zero from the end of the first MID (February 1980)104 to the start of the second MID 
(April 1994).  CLAIM SPELL again resets to zero for the third observation, counting the time from 
the end of the second MID to the start of the third MID, in a similar manner as before.105 
By contrast, a CLAIM DURATION coding never resets to zero within a claim-dyad.  It 
always counts from the beginning of a claim-dyad to the start of a MID.  Using the second claim-
dyad again to illustrate, CLAIM DURATION counts the time elapsed between the claim-dyad’s 
initiation and the first MID for the first observation.106  For the second observation, however, 
CLAIM DURATION resumes counting from the start of the claim-dyad (December 1979) to the start 
of the second MID (April 1994).  For the third observation, CLAIM DURATION again resumes 
                                                 
104 The MID in question ended in the same month that it began. 
105 The fourth line in the claim-dyad represents the amount of time between the end of the last MID and the last time 
point in which the dispute is ongoing.  This “end” observation enters the split population sample only, since the split 
population can accommodate claim-dyads (or, in this case, claim-dyad-spells) that never militarize. 
106 For the first observation for all claim-dyads, the coding for CLAIM SPELL and CLAIM DURATION is identical, 
evidenced by the first line segments in each claim-dyad being of equal length across the two codings.  
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counting from the start of the claim-dyad to the start of the third MID (November 2001).  Notice, 
though, that CLAIM DURATION does reset to zero across claim-dyads.  Figure 5.3 shows this 
nicely, with the CLAIM DURATION lines beginning at the same left endpoint within claim-dyads, 
but not across claim-dyads.107 
Figure 5.4 provides a scatterplot of CLAIM SPELL vs. MID DURATION, simply for 
comparison to the previous two scatterplots in Figure 5.1 (CLAIM DURATION) and Figure 5.2 
(ISSUE DURATION).  The way in which CLAIM SPELL’s coding creates a variable with a shorter 
time horizon is clear, as it “resets” to zero more frequently.  If CLAIM SPELL has a shorter time 
horizon than CLAIM DURATION, and the effects of anticipation have a short time horizon, then we 
should find evidence of an anticipatory dynamic in the sample of moderately salient issues when 
CLAIM SPELL is the first dependent variable, y1.  We should also find no evidence of non-
anticipation in the highly salient sample.  All the models so far suggest an issue indivisibility 
mechanism is at work for highly salient issues.  However, the effects of indivisibility have a long 
time horizon.  They should not be evident when we employ a dependent variable with a shorter 
time horizon.  
Table 5.7 displays the results when CLAIM SPELL is used as y1, the dependent variable in 
the first equation.  I run two sets of models: one uses the main specification from Table 5.1, 
while the other adds within-category salience as a control (comparable to Table 5.6).  The results 
in Table 5.7 comport with my predictions.  There is no evidence of a non-anticipatory effect in 
                                                 
107 An ISSUE DURATION coding never resets to zero, within or across claim-dyads.  It counts the time between the 
start of the first claim-dyad over the disputed issue and the start of the MID in question.  ISSUE DURATION acts as a 
perpetual counter, of sorts, by always counting from the same starting point for a dispute between a given pair of 
states, regardless of how many claims comprise the dispute.  In the figure, all the ISSUE DURATION lines begin from 
the same endpoint, within and across claim-dyads. Returning again to the second claim-dyad, the first observation, 
ISSUE DURATION records the time elapsed between the start of the first claim-dyad over the issue (January 1900) to 
the start of the first MID of this claim-dyad (February 1980).  For the second observation, ISSUE DURATION resumes 
counting from the start of the first claim-dyad to the start of the second MID of this claim dyad, and so on. 
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the high salience samples (Models 13 and 15), indicated by the statistical insignificance of α~ANT.  
In both moderately salient models (Models 14 and 16), αANT is significant at the 0.05 level and 
negative.  The signage is consistent with a strategic prevention mechanism (Hypothesis 3.4).  As 
states expect lengthier MIDs, they are quicker to militarize the dispute; claim-dyad peace spells 
become shorter.  Additionally, there is no longer any evidence of a non-anticipatory effect in the 
moderately salient sample.  α~ANT fails to attain statistical significance at conventional levels. 
There are also interesting differences in the estimates for within-category salience.  
Across the samples, the coefficient for within-category salience in the MID DURATION equation 
behaves the same as before.  It is insignificant in the highly salient sample (Model 15), and 
positively signed and significant in the moderately salient sample (Model 16).  Unlike before, 
however, within-category salience is never significant in the CLAIM SPELL equation, whereas it 
was strongly significant and positive in Models 11 and 12.  What this suggests is that within-
category salience has an effect on the broader length of a disputed issue (CLAIM DURATION), but 
it has little effect on how long the dispute will stay peaceful (CLAIM SPELL).  Put differently: 
within-category salience has an effect on the longer-term trajectory of a dispute, but less so on 
the short-term prospects for peace. 
 
 131 
 
FIGURE 5.4. Scatterplot of CLAIM SPELL vs. MID DURATION 
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TABLE 5.7. Simultaneous Effect of Claim Spell and MID Duration 
 Model 13 
High 
Model 14 
Moderate 
Model 15 
High 
Model 16 
Moderate 
Claim Spell     
Multilateral claim† 0.015 -0.911*** 0.079 -0.725* 
MLATCLAIM (0.362) (0.347) (0.389) (0.380) 
Democracy (mean) -0.029 0.011 -0.028 -0.009 
DEMOCRACY (0.045) (0.035) (0.045) (0.039) 
Interdependence (mean) 0.933 -0.493 0.718 -0.420 
INTERDEP (1.587) (1.268) (1.682) (1.271) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.011 -0.048*** 0.008 -0.045*** 
IGO (0.013) (0.012) (0.015) (0.012) 
Contiguity -0.521 0.849* -0.820 0.872* 
CONTIGUITY (1.082) (0.467) (1.267) (0.462) 
Major power dyad? -0.771 0.343 -1.031 0.465 
MPDYAD (1.031) (0.492) (1.184) (0.494) 
Militarization count -0.108*** 0.053 -0.103** 0.032 
SETTMIL (0.038) (0.078) (0.040) (0.080) 
Linked issue 0.232 -0.325 0.188 -0.608 
LINKED (0.347) (0.390) (0.367) (0.433) 
Within-cat. salience index   -0.060 0.125 
   (0.140) (0.094) 
Constant 4.138*** 5.330*** 4.987** 4.320*** 
 (1.431) (0.784) (2.432) (1.091) 
αANT (MID Duration) -0.078 -0.166** -0.074 -0.154* 
 (0.131) (0.094) (0.134) (0.095) 
λ1
-1 0.793*** 0.735*** 0.799*** 0.733*** 
 (0.069) (0.064) (0.071) (0.064) 
 
(continued on next page) 
 133 
 Model 13 
High 
Model 14 
Moderate 
Model 15 
High 
Model 16 
Moderate 
 
(continued from previous page) 
 
MID Duration     
Multilateral MID† -1.046 -1.358 -1.092 -1.353 
MLATMID (0.887) (0.996) (0.918) (0.971) 
Third party alliance† 0.488 -0.041 0.507 -0.167 
3PALLY (0.635) (0.637) (0.645) (0.631) 
Power ratio† -2.181 -1.309 -2.103 -0.870 
POWERRATIO (1.411) (1.369) (1.484) (1.368) 
Democracy (mean) -0.108** -0.006 -0.112** -0.002 
DEMOCRACY (0.044) (0.045) (0.050) (0.045) 
Interdependence (mean) 3.815** 4.256** 3.867** 4.688*** 
INTERDEP (1.505) (1.754) (1.536) (1.708) 
Shared IGO mshps. -0.011 -0.041** -0.011 -0.055*** 
IGO (0.015) (0.021) (0.016) (0.021) 
Contiguity 1.252 -0.029 1.369 -0.021 
CONTIGUITY (1.499) (0.602) (1.634) (0.590) 
Major power dyad? 1.302 -1.587** 1.417 -1.414* 
MPDYAD (1.197) (0.789) (1.361) (0.754) 
Militarization count 0.047 0.178* 0.043 0.177* 
SETTMIL (0.041) (0.098) (0.049) (0.093) 
Linked issue -1.614*** 0.845 -1.584*** 0.485 
LINKED (0.438) (0.533) (0.477) (0.560) 
Within-cat. salience index   0.023 0.169* 
   (0.137) (0.093) 
Constant 0.809 2.145 0.466 1.261 
 (1.892) (1.414) (2.724) (1.447) 
α~ANT (Claim Spell) 0.201 -0.038 0.191 -0.074 
 (0.190) (0.090) (0.202) (0.090) 
λ2
-1 0.752*** 0.630*** 0.752*** 0.649*** 
 (0.069) (0.053) (0.069) (0.054) 
|αANT| = |α~ANT| (p, Wald1T) 0.155 0.215 0.1765 0.312 
N 81 94 81 94 
Log-Likelihood -293.999 -377.160 -293.892 -374.695 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables except α’s (one-tailed) 
† = instruments; λ-1: inverse of Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered SEs reported in parentheses. 
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5.3 THE IMPORTANCE OF ESTIMATION STRATEGY: WHY SEM? 
By using a SEM setup, I am able to better test the substantive specifics of my argument.  The 
uniqueness of the estimator, however, begs an important question.  What would my results look 
like if I used standard Weibull survival models to estimate each equation separately, instead of 
jointly estimating both equations with the SEM?  Would the estimates of αANT and α~ANT be nearly 
identical?  In short: is the SEM necessary?   
5.3.1 Reason #1: Attenuated α Estimates 
Econometrically, the answer is yes, for two main reasons.  First, our estimates of α will be 
biased, either due to attenuation or inflation, if we use standard survival models.  Examples of 
these models include the exponential, Weibull, and Cox models.  Standard survival models 
presuppose that all the independent variables being regressed on y1 (CLAIM DURATION) are 
exogenous to the process generating y1.  The same assumption applies to y2 (MID DURATION).  A 
reciprocal relationship between y1 and y2 violates the exogeneity assumption.  The violation is 
indicated in the SEM when both α’s are statistically significant.  To illustrate this point, Table 
5.8 shows the main model results when they are estimated using a standard Weibull.  Each 
Weibull column contains the results of two separate Weibull models (labeled “A” and “B”). 
The nature of the bias is dependent upon the signage of the α’s in the SEM.  When the α’s 
are oppositely signed, like they are in the highly salient sample (Model 1), the Weibull estimate 
of α will be attenuated toward zero (Hays and Kachi 2009, 10).  The Weibull estimates will 
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understate the effect of y1 on y2 (or vice versa).  Model 17 contains the standard Weibull results 
for the sample of disputes over territorial issues, which are comparable to Model 1.  The 
attenuation bias is clearly evident, as the Weibull estimates of α are closer to zero than the SEM 
estimates.  The Weibull estimate of αANT is equal to -0.024 in Model 17A, which is less negative 
than the SEM estimate of -0.077 in Model 1.  Additionally, the Weibull estimate of α~ANT is less 
positive than the SEM estimate (0.186 vs. 0.291 [Models 17B, 1]). 
When the α’s from the SEM are signed identically, as they are in the moderately salient 
sample (Model 3), the Weibull estimate of α will be inflated (Hays and Kachi 2009, 10).  The 
Weibull estimate of α will be larger in magnitude compared to the SEM’s estimate of α.  Model 
18 contains the Weibull estimates for the moderately salient sample, which are comparable to 
Model 3.  The inflationary bias in both α’s is clear in Model 18.  The Weibull estimate of αANT is 
equal to -0.187 (Model 18A), which is larger than the SEM estimate of -0.130 (Model 3).  
Further, Model 18B’s coefficient for α~ANT, -0.186, is larger in magnitude than the coefficient in 
Model 3, where α~ANT = -0.101. 
 136 
TABLE 5.8. Estimation with SEM vs. Estimation with Standard Weibulls 
 Model 17 
High 
Two Weibulls 
Table 5.1, 
Model 1 
Model 18 
Moderate 
Two Weibulls 
Table 5.1, 
Model 3 
Claim Duration (A)  (A)  
Multilateral claim† -0.738*** -0.753*** -0.733** -0.705** 
MLATCLAIM (0.202) (0.206) (0.347) (0.347) 
Democracy (mean) 0.003 0.007 -0.049 -0.049 
DEMOCRACY (0.025) (0.025) (0.035) (0.034) 
Interdependence (mean) -1.459 -1.244 -0.223 -0.217 
INTERDEP (0.946) (0.950) (1.300) (1.301) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.009 0.009 -0.006 -0.005 
IGO (0.006) (0.006) (0.012) (0.012) 
Contiguity -2.143*** -2.046*** 1.773*** 1.816*** 
CONTIGUITY (0.617) (0.621) (0.535) (0.531) 
Major power dyad? -0.954* -0.865 0.634 0.731 
MPDYAD (0.575) (0.581) (0.564) (0.562) 
Militarization count 0.067*** 0.073*** 0.319*** 0.301*** 
SETTMIL (0.023) (0.023) (0.095) (0.096) 
Linked issue 0.146 0.095 -0.509 -0.542 
LINKED (0.197) (0.199) (0.394) (0.391) 
Constant 7.921*** 7.781*** 3.870*** 3.833*** 
 (0.826) (0.828) (0.832) (0.824) 
αANT (MID Duration) -0.024 -0.077* -0.187*** -0.130* 
 (0.047) (0.056) (0.078) (0.093) 
λ1
-1 1.409*** 1.397*** 0.712*** 0.714*** 
 (0.133) (0.135) (0.062) (0.062) 
 
(continued on next page) 
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 Model 17 
High 
Two Weibulls 
Table 5.1, 
Model 1 
Model 18 
Moderate 
Two Weibulls 
Table 5.1, 
Model 3 
 
(continued from previous page) 
 
MID Duration (B)  (B)  
Multilateral MID† -1.049 -1.220 -1.494 -1.414 
MLATMID (0.847) (0.880) (0.974) (0.979) 
Third party alliance† 0.365 0.276 0.277 0.119 
3PALLY (0.633) (0.650) (0.647) (0.651) 
Power ratio† -2.250 -2.272 -0.924 -1.112 
POWERRATIO (1.399) (1.401) (1.371) (1.369) 
Democracy (mean) -0.126*** -0.141*** -0.040 -0.023 
DEMOCRACY (0.046) (0.047) (0.046) (0.047) 
Interdependence (mean) 4.389*** 4.564*** 3.892** 4.129** 
INTERDEP (1.507) (1.493) (1.714) (1.724) 
Shared IGO mshps. -0.007 -0.006 -0.031 -0.036* 
IGO (0.015) (0.015) (0.021) (0.021) 
Contiguity 1.607 1.943 0.194 0.066 
CONTIGUITY (1.481) (1.534) (0.597) (0.600) 
Major power dyad? 1.187 1.221 -1.108 -1.359* 
MPDYAD (1.146) (1.179) (0.765) (0.788) 
Militarization count -0.006 -0.038 0.247** 0.217** 
SETTMIL (0.056) (0.061) (0.101) (0.103) 
Linked issue -1.605*** -1.712*** 0.791 0.824 
LINKED (0.414) (0.425) (0.510) (0.518) 
Constant 0.278 -0.296 1.623 1.854 
 (1.962) (1.987) (1.414) (1.427) 
α~ANT (Claim Duration) 0.186* 0.291** -0.186** -0.101 
 (0.137) (0.143) (0.088) (0.095) 
λ2
-1 0.761*** 0.757*** 0.641*** 0.639*** 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.052) (0.053) 
|αANT| = |α~ANT| (p, Wald1T) -- 0.046** -- 0.432 
N 81 81 94 94 
Log-Likelihood -107.3/-144.5 -258.112 -187.6/-178.9 -379.228 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables except α’s (one-tailed) 
† = instruments; λ-1: inverse of Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered standard errors reported in 
parentheses. 
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When our main hypotheses pertain to α, each bias has its own dangers.  Inflated estimates can 
induce Type I errors—we may reject the null hypothesis when we should not.  The dangers of 
attenuated estimates are less egregious.  Attenuation can induce Type II errors—we do not reject 
the null when we should—which is still incorrect, but the lesser of the two evils.  Ex ante, we 
cannot know whether the bias in the α’s will be attenuating or inflationary.  It is evident only 
when we examine the results from the SEM.  This highlights the importance of the estimation 
strategy, and how pivotal it is for obtaining accurate estimates of α. 
The bias of the standard Weibull estimates also has implications for existing research on 
conflict/MID duration (i.e., y2).  My argument and analysis suggests that work to date has 
omitted a relevant variable: CLAIM DURATION.  Ergo, CLAIM DURATION should be included in 
models predicting MID DURATION.  What Models 17 and 18 show, though, is that we cannot 
obtain accurate estimates of CLAIM DURATION’s effect using standard survival models.  This will 
be true for any time counter, like CLAIM DURATION, that represents the effect of time on y2.  
Without an estimation strategy that treats elapsed time (call this y1) as endogenous to y2, the 
estimated coefficient for y1 will be biased.   
5.3.2 Reason #2: Biased β’s 
The bias in α is problematic for an additional reason: it can affect the coefficient estimates for the 
other independent variables, such as DEMOCRACY and INTERDEPENDENCE.  That is, if we use 
standard survival models, the biased estimates of α can induce bias among the β’s, affecting the 
validity of any hypotheses involving β’s.  To eliminate the possibility of biased β’s, one potential 
response is to exclude y1 as a control variable—if y1 is not included in the regression, the β’s 
cannot be affected by bias in α, since no α is estimated.  However, this response is also 
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potentially problematic.  If time elapsed is correlated with any of the x’s, then we have omitted a 
relevant variable.  Instead of bias among the β’s due to attenuation or inflation bias in α, there 
will be bias among the β’s due to omitted variable bias.108   
Whether biased α’s produce biased β’s will depend on a variety of factors, such the 
estimation strategy and the relationship between y1 and the x’s.  In this subsection, I demonstrate 
the importance of proper estimation strategies.  I replicate studies by Krustev (2006) and 
Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke (2010, hereafter “SMB”) to show how their main results are 
affected when estimated using the SEM.   
I have selected these two pieces because they are recent examinations of MID duration.  
In the first article, Valentin Krustev (2006) is interested in the impact of economic 
interdependence on MID duration.  He argues that economic interdependence and MID duration 
should be inversely related.  The opportunity costs associated with fighting are higher when 
levels of interdependence are high, leading to shorter MIDs.  Megan Shannon, Daniel Morey, 
and Frederick Boehmke (2010) are interested in the effect of international organizations on MID 
duration.  They argue that international organizations can mitigate commitment problems 
between disputants by increasing the opportunity costs of fighting and by acting as a credible 
enforcer for agreements.  Both reasons should encourage states to end their conflicts more 
quickly, leading to shorter MID durations.  In both articles, the authors find support for their 
arguments.  By adding a time elapsed variable as a control and estimating each article’s model 
with the SEM, I show that Krustev’s results disappear entirely, while SMB’s are significantly 
weaker in magnitude and significance.   
                                                 
108 See Franzese and Hays (2007, 145–147) for a discussion of the potential tradeoffs between simultaneity bias and 
omitted variable bias in a spatial econometric setting. 
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As a prefacing note, both sets of authors take a dyad-specific approach to their analyses 
of MID duration, as depicted in Figure 4.1, Panel B.  This means that the y1 variable in the 
replications cannot be coded as CLAIM DURATION, because the coding requires a claim-dyad 
approach.  Instead, the replication y1 is a peace month counter that records the number of months 
since the last MID onset.  The operationalization comports with the way in which conflict 
researchers currently view “time.”  Peace months are used to generate “cubic splines,” the 
prevalent modeling approach for handling time dependence (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Beck 
2010; Carter and Signorino 2010a).  Splines treat time as a nuisance to estimation instead of a 
quantity of substantive interest, as I have argued here. 
5.3.2.1 Krustev (2006): Economic Interdependence 
Table 5.9 displays my replications of Krustev’s empirical results.  All results are reported in 
Weibull accelerated failure times.  The lightly shaded row is Krustev’s variable of interest, 
interdependence.  INTERDEP is operationalized as the lowest dyadic trade-to-GDP ratio in the 
dyad in a given year (2006, 250–251).   
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TABLE 5.9. Replication of Krustev (2006): All MIDs, 1950-1992  
 Model 19 
All MIDs 
Replic., Weibull 
Model 20 
All MIDs 
Reduced N 
Model 21 
All MIDs 
Exogenous y1 
Model 22 
All MIDs 
Exog. y1, Instr. 
Model 23 
All MIDs 
SEM 
Peace Months      
Distance     -0.143*** 
     (0.044) 
Contiguity     -1.038*** 
     (0.103) 
Power ratio     0.109*** 
     (0.027) 
Allies     0.531*** 
     (0.101) 
Joint democracy     0.612*** 
     (0.232) 
Trade/GDP (low)     12.677* 
INTERDEP     (7.370) 
Constant     6.237*** 
     (0.347) 
αANT (MID Dur.)     0.166*** 
     (0.043) 
λ1
-1     0.689*** 
     (0.020) 
MID Duration      
Distance -0.130** -0.114** -0.114** -0.133** -0.133** 
 (0.056) (0.056) (0.056) (0.055) (0.058) 
Contiguity -0.395*** -0.355** -0.440*** -0.091 -0.370** 
 (0.152) (0.153) (0.156) (0.163) (0.183) 
Power ratio -0.095** -0.097** -0.100** -0.069* -0.047 
 (0.040) (0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.041) 
Allies -0.487*** -0.471*** -0.415*** -0.321** -0.015 
 (0.141) (0.141) (0.143) (0.142) (0.167) 
Joint democracy -1.358*** -1.339*** -1.314*** -1.128*** -1.098*** 
 (0.269) (0.268) (0.267) (0.263) (0.272) 
Trade/GDP (low) -22.110*** -21.902*** -19.393*** -14.050* -4.707 
INTERDEP (7.273) (7.255) (7.372) (7.635) (8.870) 
Multilateral 
MID†    1.040*** 1.164*** 
    (0.134) (0.144) 
Constant 2.359*** 2.205*** 2.332*** 2.393*** 3.575*** 
 (0.451) (0.457) (0.459) (0.473) (0.578) 
α~ANT (Peace Mos.)   -0.001** -0.212*** -0.571*** 
   (0.001) (0.040) (0.098) 
λ2
-1 0.479*** 0.479*** 0.481*** 0.491*** 0.473*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) 
|αANT| = |α~ANT| (p) -- -- -- -- 0.000*** 
N 1450 1430 1430 1430 1430 
Log-Likelihood -3306.499 -3268.291 -3266.238 -3227.225 -5828.849 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables except α’s (one-tailed); † = instruments; λ-1: inverse of 
Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses.  Wald test used to test magnitude of α’s. 
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I start by replicating Krustev’s main model (his Table 1, Model 1 (2006, 254)), reported here as 
Model 19.109  Krustev argues that high levels of economic interdependence should decrease MID 
DURATION.  Therefore, the reported coefficient for INTERDEP should be negatively signed and 
statistically significant, which it is.  Model 20 is identical to Model 19 except that it only uses the 
MIDs that enter the replication SEM sample.  There is a 20-observation difference between 
Krustev’s N (=1450) and the SEM’s N (=1430).  Most of the observations are lost because of 
corrections to the MID data after the article was published.  Model 20’s reduced N does not 
affect any of the estimates.  INTERDEP remains negative and highly significant. 
The next three models in Table 5.9 demonstrate the implications of my argument and 
estimation strategy.  Model 21 adds “time elapsed” as a control variable and treats it as 
exogenous.  PEACE MONTHS counts the number of months since the last MID onset.  α~ANT is 
negative and statistically significant.  Substantively, longer peace spells are associated with 
shorter MIDs.  Controlling for PEACE MONTHS reduces the size of INTERDEP’s coefficient, but 
only slightly (-19.393 in Model 21 vs. -21.902 in Model 20).  INTERDEP remains highly 
significant at the 0.001 level (two-tailed).   
To estimate the SEM, we will eventually need instruments.  I add MLATMID (ex ante) to 
the specification and run the Weibull analysis again (reported as Model 22).110  Model 22’s 
                                                 
109 Krustev conducts his major analyses using a Cox model.  Since the SEM is based on the Weibull model, we need 
to shift parametric distributions.  I converted the Weibull accelerated failure time (AFT) coefficients to the same 
interpretation metric as Krustev’s Cox results and compared the estimates.  They are practically identical; the results 
are unaffected by changing parametrizations.   
110 The coefficient for INTERDEP is essentially the same if POWERRATIO is also treated as an instrument for MID 
DURATION and the other instrument, ALLY3P, is included.  I report the results with only MLATMID as an instrument 
so as to maximize comparability with Krustev’s original specification.  I cannot include my y1 instrument 
(MLATCLAIM) because Krustev’s data do not distinguish by claim-dyads, and MLATCLAIM is coded based on claim-
dyads.  The SEM is identified based on the other control variables in the PEACE MONTHS equation.  Their values are 
recorded at Point A in Figure 2.1, whereas the value of the MID duration control variables are recorded at Point B, 
Figure 2.1.  This makes the PEACE MONTHS controls predetermined with respect to MID DURATION, and also makes 
them different in value from the MID DURATION controls.   
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estimates show some appreciable differences from the preceding models.  First, α~ANT is still 
negative, but the parameter is now highly significant and is substantially larger in magnitude 
than before (-0.212 in Model 22 vs. -0.001 in Model 21).  Second, INTERDEP is smaller in 
magnitude (-14.050) and is no longer highly significant according to two-tailed tests (p = 
0.066).111  Nonetheless, one may still interpret the results as supportive with Krustev’s argument, 
though the substantive effect of INTERDEP is weaker than what his results would suggest. 
Such an interpretation becomes untenable once we properly treat PEACE MONTHS as 
endogenous and run the analysis using the SEM (Model 23).  From earlier, we know that 
standard Weibull estimates of α~ANT will be biased, either due to attenuation or inflation.  This is 
borne out in Model 23, where we see that the previous estimates were tainted by attenuation bias 
(the α’s are oppositely signed).  α~ANT is now equal to -0.571 and highly significant (compared to 
-0.212 and -0.001 in Models 22 and 21, respectively).   
Importantly, Model 23 also shows how attenuation in α can drastically affect the estimate 
for INTERDEP in the MID DURATION equation.  INTERDEP’s coefficient drops in value to -4.707 
and is no longer statistically significant (p = 0.596, two-tailed).  Counter to Krustev’s argument 
and results, economic interdependence does not appear to significantly shorten militarized 
conflict.  By controlling for time elapsed (here, PEACE MONTHS) and recognizing it as 
endogenous, INTERDEP’s coefficient is not only smaller than previously reported, but it is 
statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
                                                 
111 Krustev’s argument about interdependence yields a directional hypothesis.  One can reasonably argue that 
INTERDEP’s p-value should be halved (0.066/2 = 0.033), returning the coefficient to significance at the 0.05 level.   
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FIGURE 5.5. Path Diagram, INTERDEP Only (Table 5.9, Model 23) 
However, the overall effect of INTERDEP may still reduce MID DURATION.  Up to this point, we 
have only considered direct effects of regressors on dependent variables.112  INTERDEP affects 
MID DURATION in two ways, because of the nonrecursive nature of the SEM (depicted in Figure 
5.5).  First, INTERDEP has a direct effect on MID DURATION (𝑦2:𝛽INTERDEP), which is the quantity 
we have been examining so far.  The reciprocal relationship between y1 and y2—i.e., the α’s—
produces a feedback effect, further affecting y2’s value.  Incorporating the feedback effects yields 
the total effect of INTERDEP (x2) on y2: 
(𝑦2:𝛽INTERDEP)(1−𝛼ANT∗𝛼~ANT).113  Second, INTERDEP also affects MID 
DURATION indirectly through PEACE MONTHS: x1 affects y1, and y1 affects y2.  The indirect effect is 
represented by (𝑦1:𝛽INTERDEP) ∗ (𝛼~ANT).  In the PEACE MONTHS equation, 𝑦1:𝛽INTERDEP is positive 
and α~ANT is negative, suggesting that the indirect effect should be negatively signed.  The total 
effect of x1 on y2, once we account for the feedback, will be equal to 
(𝑦1:𝛽INTERDEP)∗(𝛼~ANT)(1−𝛼ANT∗𝛼~ANT) .  Adding 
together the total effects for x1 and x2 yields the overall effect of INTERDEP on y2: (𝑦1:𝛽INTERDEP)∗(𝛼~ANT)(1−𝛼ANT∗𝛼~ANT) + (𝑦2:𝛽INTERDEP)(1−𝛼ANT∗𝛼~ANT).   
                                                 
112 See Appendix C.3 for more discussion. 
113 So long as |αANT * α~ANT| < 1 (Paxton, Hipp, and Marquart-Pyatt 2011, 92). 
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TABLE 5.10. EFFECT OF INTERDEP ON MID DURATION 
 x1: TOTAL 
EFFECT 
x2: TOTAL 
EFFECT 
OVERALL 
EFFECT 
Effect -6.615 -4.298 -10.913 
Standard Error (6.978) (14.273) (13.157) 
p (two-tailed) 0.269 0.763 0.407 
BC 95% CIs [-24.076, 1.272] 
[-33.880, 
17.877] 
[-39.319, 
8.497] 
N 1430 1430 1430 
Bootstrap Reps† 2277 2277 2277 
†: number determined using bssize (see Poi 2004).  Bootstrapped standard 
error reported in parentheses.  Based on Table 5.9, Model 23.  “BC 95% 
CIs” = bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals. 
 
Table 5.10 displays the three effects with bootstrapped standard errors.  The shaded column 
denotes the main parameter of interest, the overall effect of INTERDEP on MID DURATION.  The 
first two columns of the table display the total direct and total indirect effect of INTERDEP.  Both 
are statistically insignificant.  The effects’ p-values are not significant at conventional levels, and 
the more reliable bootstrapped confidence intervals encompass zero.114  It is interesting that the 
total effect of x1 is larger than the total effect of x2.  x1 only affects y2 indirectly, through its effect 
on y1, while x2 has a direct effect on y2.  One possible interpretation of this result is that the long-
term effects of economic interdependence are stronger than the short-term effects.   
Moving to shaded column, the overall effect of INTERDEP is closer in magnitude to the 
coefficient from Model 22, but like INTERDEP in the MID DURATION equation of Model 23, it is 
still statistically insignificant.  On the whole, then, Krustev’s original results disappear when 
replicated with the SEM.  There is no evidence that higher levels of economic interdependence 
                                                 
114 Traditional coefficient tests involving p-values assume that the underlying distribution of the data is symmetric—
e.g., a Normal distribution.  Bootstrapping relaxes this assumption by treating the distribution as unknown.  The 
procedure pulls repeated samples from the data to obtain an approximation of the unknown distribution.  
Importantly, the approximation need not be symmetric about the distribution’s mean.  For this reason, the reported 
confidence intervals from the bootstrap procedure are better indicators of a bootstrapped parameter’s statistical 
significance than its p-values.  I include the p-values in all the tables containing bootstrapped results for reference 
only.  
 146 
reduce the length of militarized conflict.  By controlling for time elapsed (here, PEACE MONTHS) 
and recognizing it as endogenous, INTERDEP’s coefficient is not only smaller than previously 
reported, but it is statistically indistinguishable from zero. 
5.3.2.2 SMB (2010): Shared IGO Memberships 
A similar bias in β becomes evident when replicating the results from Shannon, Morey, and 
Boehmke (2010).  Their empirical analysis is more sophisticated than Krustev’s.  SMB use a 
Weibull model with a correction for selection effects.  The details of SMB’s selection-based 
Weibull estimator, along with its relationship to the SEM, were discussed in Appendix C.4.   
Table 5.11 reports my replications of SMB’s analysis.  Their sample is comprised of 
politically relevant MIDs beginning between 1950 and 2000.  The lightly shaded row contains 
SMB’s variable of interest, IGO.  IGO is a count of international organizations in which both i and 
j are members, measured in tens (Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke 2010, 1129, 1132).  I begin by 
estimating two basic Weibull models, as points of reference.  The first Weibull, reported as 
Model 24, uses the specification from SMB’s Table 1, Model 2 (2010, 1132).115  Consistent with 
SMB’s argument, the IGO coefficient is negatively signed and statistically significant.  More 
shared IGO memberships reduce MID DURATION.  The second Weibull adds PEACE MONTHS as 
an exogenous regressor (Model 25).  The IGO coefficient becomes only marginally smaller  
(-0.164 to -0.143) and remains highly significant.   
                                                 
115 SMB also include the MID’s highest hostility level as one of their control variables.  I exclude HOSTILITY in most 
of the Table 5.11 models.  The rational expectation logic associated with the SEM requires that all variable values 
are observable at the time of MID onset (i.e., ex ante).  This is clearly not the case for HOSTILITY.  It is only 
observable after a MID has concluded.   
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TABLE 5.11. Replication of Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke (2010) 
 Model 24 
PolRel MIDs 
Standard Weibull 
Model 25 
PolRel MIDs 
Exog. y1 
Model 26 
Replication 
Weibull w/Select. 
Model 27 
PolRel MIDs 
Unclustered SEs 
Model 28 
PolRel MIDs 
SEM 
Peace Months‡   ‡ ‡  
Shared IGO mshps.   0.018 0.018** -0.132*** 
IGO   (0.014) (0.008) (0.032) 
Joint democracy   -0.254*** -0.254*** 0.412** 
   (0.048) (0.037) (0.197) 
Major power dyad   0.637*** 0.637*** -1.067*** 
   (0.158) (0.051) (0.141) 
Power ratio   0.247*** 0.247*** -0.396*** 
   (0.078) (0.038) (0.147) 
Distance   -0.779*** -0.779*** 0.477** 
   (0.084) (0.055) (0.229) 
Peace years 
(Models 26 and 27 only) 
  -0.153*** -0.153***  
  (0.012) (0.007)  
Constant   -0.577*** -0.577*** 4.422*** 
   (0.053) (0.028) (0.108) 
αANT (MID Duration)     0.156** 
     (0.093) 
λ1
-1      0.697*** 
     (0.036) 
MID Duration       
Shared IGO mshps. -0.164*** -0.143*** -0.150** -0.150*** -0.097* 
IGO (0.046) (0.046) (0.073) (0.045) (0.056) 
Joint democracy -0.152 -0.287 -0.141 -0.141 -0.578** 
 (0.214) (0.214) (0.354) (0.257) (0.278) 
Major power dyad -0.675*** -0.809*** -0.667** -0.667*** -1.115*** 
 (0.210) (0.210) (0.269) (0.202) (0.289) 
Power ratio 0.504** 0.415* 0.342 0.342 0.257 
 (0.218) (0.216) (0.307) (0.217) (0.237) 
Distance -0.036 0.146 0.116 0.116 0.554 
 (0.329) (0.328) (0.463) (0.354) (0.421) 
Total actors† 0.109*** 0.116*** 0.122*** 0.122*** 0.131*** 
 (0.015) (0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.018) 
Start year† -0.004 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.007 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.007) 
Highest hostility lv.   0.720*** 0.720***  
   (0.091) (0.092)  
Constant 8.397 2.386 6.776 6.776 -10.906 
 (8.852) (8.951) (11.267) (8.263) (12.451) 
α~ANT (Peace Mos.)  -0.197***   -0.578*** 
  (0.042)   (0.223) 
λ2
-1 0.486*** 0.486*** 0.528*** 0.528*** 0.474*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.020) 
ρ (Error Correlation) -- -- -0.125*** -0.125*** -- 
   (0.018) (0.019)  
|αANT| = |α~ANT| (p, Wald1T) -- -- -- -- 0.001*** 
N (Uncensored) 1482 1482 1482 (48221) 1482 (48221) 1482 
Log-Likelihood -3367.755 -3356.820 -12974.429 -12974.429 -6041.919 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables except α’s (one-tailed).  Splines included, for first stage of Model 
26/Model 27, but not reported.  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses for all models except Model 26, which has standard errors 
clustered by dyad.  λ-1: inverse of Weibull shape parameter.  † = instruments ; ‡ = except for Model 26 and Model 27, which have a first stage 
DV = MID onset with a discrete-time setup.   
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Next, I replicate SMB’s main results using their Weibull-with-selection estimator, same as the 
authors’ Table 1, Model 2.116  The exact replication, with standard errors clustered on dyad, is 
reported as Model 26.  I also estimate the same model with unclustered standard errors (Model 
27) to make these estimates comparable with the SEM’s estimates.117  IGO’s signage remains the 
same in both Model 26 and Model 27, and is still statistically significant at the 0.05 level in both 
models.  SMB also find evidence of a selection effect, indicated by the statistically significant ρ.  
The same unobservables that increase the likelihood of MID initiation also make MIDs shorter.   
Finally, I estimate the model using the SEM (Model 28).  α~ANT is highly significant and 
negative, which is mathematically consistent with SMB’s evidence of a selection effect.118  The 
coefficient on IGO is more important.  It is equal to -0.097, the smallest of all the models in Table 
5.11.  The estimate is no longer significant at the 0.05 level for a two-tailed test, but it is for a 
one-tailed test (p = 0.041), which is in line with SMB’s directional hypothesis for IGO.  I 
conclude that SMB’s argument still finds empirical support, but the effect of IGO is marginally 
smaller in magnitude and less statistically significant than they report.   
For the sake of completeness, I also calculate the overall effect for IGO using the same 
procedure outlined during my replication of Krustev’s results.  The results are reported in Table 
5.12 and are surprising.  The overall effect of IGO on MID DURATION is indistinguishable from 
zero, not negative, as SMB’s argument would imply.  Even more surprising is the total effect of 
IGO on MID DURATION via peace months (x1).  The effect is positive (0.070) and statistically 
                                                 
116 The results in their paper are reported in terms of hazards, not accelerated failure times.  My replication results in 
Model 26 are identical to theirs if my coefficients are reported as hazards. 
117 The SEM cannot currently accommodate clustered standard errors.  Clustering affects hypothesis testing because 
it affects standard error values (but not β’s).   
118 With SMB’s selection estimator, ρ is equivalent to α/4.  Model 27’s ρ is equal to -0.125, which makes the 
equivalent α equal to -0.501.  One of the advantages of the SEM is that it estimates two α’s, allowing for asymmetric 
relationships between the two equations to be modeled.  Notice how SMB’s α is similar in value to α~ANT, its closest 
analog in the SEM.  In Model 28, α~ANT is equal to -0.578.  Also notice, though, that the two values are not identical, 
hinting at the import of estimating two α’s (SEM) instead of just one (SMB). 
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significant, indicated by the exclusion of zero from the bootstrapped confidence interval.  A 
greater number of shared IGO memberships indirectly increases MID duration: the opposite of 
what SMB argue.119 
TABLE 5.12. EFFECT OF IGO ON MID DURATION 
 x1: TOTAL 
EFFECT 
x2: TOTAL 
EFFECT 
OVERALL 
EFFECT 
Effect 0.070 -0.088 -0.019 
Standard Error (0.087) (0.080) (0.101) 
p (two-tailed) 0.423 0.855 0.266 
BC 95% CIs [0.044, 0.148] 
[-0.290, 
0.039] 
[-0.221, 
0.133] 
N 1482 1482 1482 
Bootstrap Reps† 994 994 994 
†: number determined using bssize (see Poi 2004).  Bootstrapped standard 
error reported in parentheses.  Based on Table 5.11, Model 28.  “BC 95% 
CIs” = bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals. 
 
The implications for work on conflict/MID duration are twofold.  First, existing work has 
omitted an important explanatory variable: time elapsed.  I conceptualize time elapsed as the 
amount of time since the start of a disputed issue (CLAIM DURATION), but alternative definitions 
exist.  Thinking more carefully about “time elapsed” may yield additional insights regarding 
militarized conflict useful to both academics and policy practitioners.  Second, I show that 
choosing the proper econometric model is important for obtaining not only accurate estimates of 
time elapsed, but accurate estimates of other covariates.  The conservative take-away point is that 
scholars interested in conflict duration (and durations more generally) should carefully think 
about (a) whether there is a potential ‘time elapsed’ associated with their process of interest, (b) 
whether time elapsed has an effect on duration, and (c) the relationship between their x’s of 
                                                 
119 SMB’s results also hint at this curiosity.  Refer to Model 26, which is the exact replication of their analysis.  It 
shows a positive coefficient for IGO in the PEACE MONTHS equation.  However, the positive effect is statistically 
insignificant in Model 26. 
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interest and time elapsed.  Researchers can then take the appropriate methodological steps to 
ensure that their analyses are valid. 
5.4 CONCLUSION 
In this chapter, I tested the portion of my argument concerning the relationship between CLAIM 
DURATION and MID DURATION.  I found evidence that non-anticipatory dynamics are present in 
the sample of highly salient issues, with non-anticipatory effects being stronger than anticipatory 
effects.  The effects are consistent with an issue indivisibility mechanism: MIDs last longer when 
they occur later in a highly salient issue.  For MIDs over moderately salient issues, I find that 
anticipatory dynamics are predominant, suggesting that expectations about MID duration play a 
bigger role than past factors.  The anticipatory effects are consistent with a strategic delay 
mechanism: the longer that MIDs are expected to last, the earlier they occur in a claim-dyad. 
The results are fairly robust to a variety of specifications.  The findings contribute to our 
understanding of interstate conflict dynamics, issue dynamics, and the connection between the 
two.  In showing that CLAIM DURATION influenced MID DURATION, I then demonstrated the 
implications for research on MID duration.  Biased results will occur when the effect of CLAIM 
DURATION is ignored and the improper estimation technique is employed.  Ultimately, the biased 
estimates impair our ability to draw sound substantive conclusions from our empirical models. 
Table 5.13 summarizes the hypotheses tested in this chapter and whether they found 
empirical support.  The untested hypothesis about peaceful claim-dyads and anticipation 
(Hypothesis 2.1) is the subject of the next chapter. 
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TABLE 5.13. Summary of Chapter 5 Findings 
Hypothesis 3.0 (Overall Salience): When an issue has high 
levels of overall salience, a non-anticipatory dynamic will be 
strongest.  When an issue has moderate or low levels of 
overall salience, an anticipatory dynamic will be strongest. 
SUPPORTED 
Ch. 5, Model 1 and Model 3 
Hypothesis 3.1 (Non-Anticipation, Time Pressure): When 
states militarize disputes quickly, they end up in protracted 
militarized conflicts. 
NOT SUPPORTED 
Ch. 5, Model 1 
Hypothesis 3.2 (Non-Anticipation, Indivisibility): When an 
issue is contested for a long period of time, it becomes defined 
in indivisible terms, giving rise to lengthy militarized disputes. 
SUPPORTED 
Ch. 5, Model 1 
Hypothesis 3.3 (Anticipatory: Strategic Delay): When states 
expect lengthy MIDs, there is an incentive to delay 
militarization as long as possible in order to maximize the 
likelihood of resolution by other means. 
NOT SUPPORTED 
Ch. 5, Model 3 
Hypothesis 3.4 (Anticipatory: Strategic Prevention): When 
states expect lengthy MIDs, there is an incentive to militarize 
preventatively to gain a strategic advantage. 
SUPPORTED 
Ch. 5, Model 3 
(Ch. 5, Model 1) 
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6.0  EVALUATING DYNAMICS: CLAIM DURATION 
This chapter adds peaceful claim-dyads to the sample of militarized claim-dyads.  Its purpose is 
to assess whether peaceful claim-dyads contain evidence of an anticipatory dynamic.  If 
disputants form accurate rational expectations successfully, they may realize that militarization is 
a costly resolution strategy, and states may try to resolve the dispute through other, less costly 
means.  If these alternative strategies succeed, then the claim-dyad will have been resolved 
without ever experiencing a militarization.  The implication is that states may elect not to 
militarize a dispute because of an anticipatory dynamic.  Yet, the previous chapter focused only 
on militarized claim-dyads.   
I use split population models to test for the presence of an anticipatory dynamic.  I use 
two different estimation strategies: a split-population survival model (Svolik 2008) and a 
bivariate probit with partial observability.  I estimate the models using different strategies as a 
way to check the results’ robustness.  At minimum, I expect to find strong support for the sample 
of moderately salient issues.  The empirical results comport with this expectation.  Moderately 
salient issues show signs of an anticipatory dynamic with both estimating strategies.  
Chapter 6 has three major sections.  I begin with a simple analysis of the overall length of 
a disputed issue-claim.  Next, I analyze the sample of peaceful and militarized claim-dyads for 
the presence of a split population.  I conclude by summarizing the results of the two chapters 
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6.1 PRELIMINARIES: OVERALL LENGTH 
My main concern in this chapter is when a claim-dyad militarizes.  But, this gives rise to a more 
basic question: how long do claim-dyads last, on the whole?  Little work examines the overall 
length of a claim-dyad, which I refer to as OVERALLLENGTH.  Despite the lack of empirical 
evidence, numerous assertions are treated as informal, verified truths.  For example, the informal 
wisdom is that territorial claim-dyads last longer than other claim-dyads because of their high 
stakes.  Longer-lasting claim-dyads might also have more opportunities to militarize, which 
makes checking some of these “truths” a worthwhile endeavor.  
I perform a descriptive analysis of the factors associated with OVERALLLENGTH.  
Formally, OVERALLLENGTH measures the number of months between a claim-dyad’s initiation 
and resolution;120 I perform a basic Weibull analysis on the cross-section of claim-dyads in my 
sample.  I use various attributes of the claim-dyad as regressors, including issue type, number of 
lifetime MIDs, and number of lifetime peaceful settlement attempts.   
                                                 
120 Ongoing claim-dyads are coded as being resolved on 12/2001, the last observation point in the ICOW data.  They 
are treated as ongoing in the analysis. 
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TABLE 6.1. Correlates of Overall Claim-Dyad Length 
 
Model 29 
Pooled 
Model 30 
Pooled 
Model 31 
Pooled 
Model 32 
Pooled 
Model 33 
Pooled 
Overall Claim Length      Number of MIDs 0.103 0.159 0.128* 0.199** 0.191** 
NUMMIDS (0.068) (0.100) (0.068) (0.092) (0.093) 
# of fatal MIDs  -0.407*  -0.406* -0.405* NUMFATAL 
 (0.227)  (0.226) (0.226) Highest MID host. lv.  0.199*  0.196* 0.193* HIHOST 
 (0.103)  (0.101) (0.101) Ends in org. violence  -1.178**  -1.193** -1.159** ENDVIOL 
 (0.549)  (0.534) (0.536) # of peaceful attempts 0.141*** 0.116***    NUMPEACE (0.030) (0.030)    # of bilateral atts.   0.176*** 0.150*** 0.148*** BILAT 
  (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) # of binding 3P atts.   0.136   3PBIND   (0.210)   # of non-binding 3P atts.   0.048   3PNONBIND   (0.060)   Territorial issue? -0.025 0.113 -0.046 0.147 0.177 
TERRITORY (0.268) (0.268) (0.278) (0.263) (0.267) 
Linked issue 0.272 0.298 0.273 0.296 0.319 
LINKED (0.240) (0.238) (0.240) (0.237) (0.240) 
Normalized sal. index     0.076      (0.112) Constant 4.588*** 4.520*** 4.579*** 4.547*** 4.549*** 
 (0.158) (0.161) (0.158) (0.157) (0.158) 
λ-1 1.400*** 1.359*** 1.385*** 1.351*** 1.352*** 
 (0.084) (0.082) (0.084) (0.081) (0.081) 
N (Uncensored) 226 (175) 226 (175) 226 (175) 226 (175) 226 (175) 
Log-Likelihood -386.004 -378.530 -384.581 -377.964 -377.736 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed.  Uncensored N reports the number of resolved claim-
dyads.  λ-1: inverse of Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses. 
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Table 6.1 displays the results of the analysis.  It focuses on various specifications in the pooled 
sample of issues.  Model 29 is a basic model containing four variables: (1) the total number of 
MIDs occurring over the claim-dyad (NUMMIDS), (2) the total number of peaceful settlement 
attempts occurring over the claim-dyad (NUMPEACE), (3) the territorial issue dummy 
(TERRITORY), and (4) LINKED.  Only NUMPEACE is significantly associated with 
OVERALLLENGTH.  Dyadic claims tend to last longer when there are a greater number of peaceful 
settlement attempts over the issue.  The non-results of this simple analysis are perhaps the most 
surprising.  Territorial claim-dyads are no more lengthy than maritime or river claim-dyads, nor 
are claim-dyads that are “linked” to claim-dyads with a different salience category.  
Additionally, the number of MIDs is unrelated to OVERALLLENGTH. 
Of these, the MID (non-)result is particularly shocking.  It is hard to believe that the 
number of MIDs has no impact on a claim-dyad’s overall length.  Ex ante, we would expect 
more MIDs to be related to lengthier claim-dyads.  Probing further, I add three MID-related 
variables to the specification.  Perhaps the number of MIDs does not matter, but the number of 
serious MIDs does.  I capture this possibility in two ways.  NUMFATAL counts the number of 
MIDs in which at least one casualty occurred (i.e., fatal MIDs).  HIHOST is equal to highest 
hostility level reached by any MID over the claim-dyad.121  Finally, perhaps whether a MID 
precipitates the end of the claim-dyad influences OVERALLLENGTH.  ENDVIOL is a dummy coded 
1 if the claim-dyad ends with organized violence and 0 if it does not.   
Model 30 adds the three MID variables as controls.  The results are more in line with 
what we would expect, with all three MID variables achieving at least weak significance.  
HIHOST is positively signed, suggesting that claim-dyads last longer when they experience MIDs 
                                                 
121 The variable is a scale that I have coded to range from 0-4: 0 = no MID, 1 = threat of military force, 2 = display 
of military force, 3 = use of force, 4 = interstate war. 
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with higher hostility levels.  NUMFATAL and ENDVIOL are both negatively signed.  Claim-dyads 
tend to be shorter when they end through violent means and when they experience a greater 
number of MIDs with casualties.   
Model 31 performs a similar “unpacking” on NUMPEACE by disaggregating by the type of 
peaceful settlement attempt.  Variables that count the number of bilateral attempts (BILAT), as 
well as the number of multilateral attempts that are binding (3PBIND) and non-binding 
(3PNONBIND), are added to the specification.  I find that the significance of NUMPEACE in Model 
29 is entirely due to BILAT; 3PBIND and 3PNONBIND are insignificant.  More bilateral settlement 
attempts are associated with lengthier overall claim-dyads.  Interestingly, NUMMIDS also 
becomes weakly significant in this model.  The coefficient’s positive sign suggests that more 
MID-prone claim-dyads last longer. 
Model 32 contains the five significant variables from Models 30 and 31—NUMMIDS, 
NUMFATAL, HIHOST, ENDVIOL, and BILAT—plus TERRITORY and LINKED.  As Model 32 shows, 
the five variables remain significant, and the other two remain insignificant.  Model 33 
demonstrates that this continues to be the case when controlling for within-issue salience.  I use a 
normalized measure of the within-salience index; the latter was discussed in the previous 
chapter.122  I normalize the index because its composition varies by dispute type (see Table 5.5).  
This variation makes it problematic to include the index as a regressor in a pooled model, 
because doing so assumes that the index values are comparable across issue types.  Normalizing 
resolves the comparability problem.  I calculate issue-specific z-scores by computing the index’s 
mean and standard deviation for each issue type.  An issue with a normalized score equal to 0 
represents the “average” issue within each group.  Positive values of the normalized index 
                                                 
122 As discussed Ch. 5, the within-category measure is an index ranging from 0-12 whose individual indicators vary 
by issue type.  Higher values indicate more salient issues of that type. 
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represent disputes of greater importance, relative to the average issue of that type.  Negative 
values represent disputes of lesser importance, relative to the average issue of that type.  The 
normalized measure is based on a “relative” metric of comparison, contrasting nicely with the 
raw index’s absolute metric.  In the pooled sample, normalized salience has no effect on the 
overall length of a claim-dyad (Model 33). 
The results of these basic models speak to the piece of my argument pertaining to issue 
indivisibility.  The commonly used examples of disputes over indivisible issues are territorial in 
nature (e.g., Jerusalem).  Often, the disputes also tend to endure across time, partially because 
they are difficult to resolve.  Based on the common examples alone, a positive relationship 
appears to exist between the overall length of a dispute and whether an issue is defined in 
indivisible terms.  Most examples of long-lasting, enduring disputes that readily come to mind 
are also territorial: e.g., Alsace-Lorraine, Gibraltar, and Kashmir.  It is difficult to think of a 
lengthy non-territorial dispute offhand.  Informally, it would stand to reason that only disputes 
over territorial issues can become indivisible, because they seem to be the only disputes that 
endure across time. 
The empirical evidence challenges this informal reasoning.  The models show that 
territorial issues do not last significantly longer than maritime or river issues. 123  In a way, 
Figure 5.1 foreshadows this finding.  For territorial and maritime/river claim-dyads that 
militarize, the CLAIM DURATION averages are fairly close together, as indicated by the points’ 
proximity along the x dimension.  The result is important because it suggests that an issue 
indivisibility mechanism could appear in disputes over any type of issue.  Put differently, the 
                                                 
123 This general relationship is not an artifact of my estimation sample.  It also holds for the full sample of ICOW 
claim-dyads (see Table 4.3 for spatial dimensions; the full territory data go back to 1816).   
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implication is: if territorial disputes last long enough for issue indivisibility to work, then 
maritime/river disputes last long enough for issue indivisibility to work, too.   
While there is no difference in the OVERALLLENGTH of the two salience groupings, the 
other coefficients may still be different.  I rerun the final two models from Table 6.1 on each 
salience grouping to investigate this possibility.  Table 6.2 contains the model results.  When the 
coefficients are significant, they behave the same as they did in the pooled samples.  However, 
many of the coefficients become insignificant.  Further, there are a number of differences across 
the two samples.  The only variable that is significant across all four Table 6.2 models is BILAT, 
which has the same positive sign as before.  ENDVIOL attains significance in the highly salient 
sample, where it is negatively signed (Models 34 and 35).  It is similarly signed in the 
moderately salient sample, but it is statistically insignificant (Models 36 and 37).  Conversely, 
NUMMID is insignificant in the highly salient sample, but positively signed and significant in the 
moderately salient sample.  NUMFATAL and HIHOST are never significant.   
Models 35 and 37 also control for within-issue salience.  I operationalize within-category 
salience using the raw index, as the sample is no longer pooled.  Interestingly, the raw index is 
insignificant in the highly salient sample (Model 35).  Within-category salience is not associated 
with the length of territorial claim-dyads.  However, the index is positive and statistically 
significant in the moderately salient sample (Model 37).  Maritime and river claim-dyads with 
higher index values are lengthier.  The highly salient result is the most surprising, as common 
wisdom would hold that the intractable nature of territorial disputes makes them last longer.  The 
basic analysis here finds no support for this supposition. 
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TABLE 6.2. Correlates of Overall Claim-Dyad Length, by Overall Salience 
 
Model 34 
Territory 
Model 35 
Territory 
Model 36 
Mar/River 
Model 37 
Mar/River 
Overall Claim Length     Number of MIDs 0.065 0.060 0.516** 0.473** 
NUMMIDS (0.092) (0.088) (0.241) (0.233) 
# of fatal MIDs 0.087 0.067 -0.549 -0.497 
NUMFATAL (0.280) (0.273) (0.346) (0.349) 
Highest MID hostility lvl. 0.110 0.097 0.064 0.047 
HIHOST (0.136) (0.135) (0.159) (0.156) 
Ends in org. violence -1.943** -2.077** -0.694 -0.422 
ENDVIOL (0.853) (0.868) (0.766) (0.768) 
Number of bilateral atmpts. 0.114*** 0.104*** 0.238*** 0.245*** 
BILAT (0.037) (0.038) (0.066) (0.066) 
Linked issue -0.084 -0.158 0.430 0.568* 
LINKED (0.396) (0.398) (0.297) (0.305) 
Within-category salience index  0.092  0.111** 
  (0.109)  (0.053) Constant 5.162*** 4.724*** 4.297*** 3.581*** 
 (0.254) (0.566) (0.190) (0.390) 
λ-1 0.964 0.954 1.424*** 1.424*** 
 (0.124) (0.123) (0.097) (0.096) N (Uncensored) 52 (39) 52 (39) 174 (136) 174 (136) 
Log-Likelihood -71.275 -70.904 -297.655 -295.518 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed.  Uncensored N reports the number of resolved claim-
dyads.  λ-1: inverse of Weibull shape parameter  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses. 
 
To conclude this subsection, I emphasize its purpose once again.  The analyses are exploratory 
and descriptive in nature, aimed at uncovering basic associations between claim-dyads’ overall 
length and their descriptive attributes.  A number of interesting patterns emerge that are contrary 
to popular wisdom.  Territorial claim-dyads do not last significantly longer than maritime or 
river claim-dyads, after we control for how many MIDs, fatal MIDs, and bilateral settlement 
attempts the claim-dyad experiences; the hostility level of the most hostile MID; and whether the 
claim-dyad ends through organized violence.  Additionally, territorial claim-dyads with high 
levels of within-category salience do not last significantly longer or shorter than other territorial 
 160 
claim-dyads.  None of these findings constitute causal explanations, but they are nonetheless 
helpful. 
6.2 SPLIT POPULATION: EMPIRICAL TESTING 
6.2.1 Svolik’s Split-Population Survival Model 
Moving to the main analyses of this chapter, I am interested in the presence of an anticipatory 
dynamic among peaceful claim-dyads.  I examine the full sample of peaceful and militarized 
claims for testing.  Figure 6.1 is identical to Figure 5.1, only it adds peaceful claims to the 
scatterplot.  Because I am interested in anticipatory dynamics, I use CLAIM SPELL as my duration 
dependent variable in the rest of this chapter.  
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FIGURE 6.1. Scatterplot of CLAIM DURATION vs. MID DURATION, with Peaceful Disputes 
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I use a discrete-time data structure in this section of the analysis.  Each row represents a claim-
dyad-year.  Svolik’s split-population estimator has two dependent variables: (1) CLAIM SPELL, 
measured in years, and (2) ENDMID, measuring whether the claim spell is terminated by a MID 
(which, in turn, allows us to estimate TRULY PEACEFUL?).  For instance, Table 6.3 shows how 
Colombia and Nicaragua’s first claim over the San Andrés and Providencia Islands would appear 
in the split population dataset.  Figure 5.3 used this dispute to illustrate the various dependent 
variable codings for y1.  From the CLAIM SPELL section of the figure, we see two line segments 
for the first claim-dyad, meaning that the SPELL counter begins counting anew, twice.  The spell 
counter begins counting at the start of claim in 1900, and continues to count until 1913, when the 
claim experiences a MID.  Because the first spell ends with a MID, the ENDMID variable is 
coded as 1 for all observations in the first spell.  CLAIM SPELL resets and begins counting again in 
1914, the first year after the MID begins.  It continues to count until 1930, when the claim is 
resolved bilaterally, through peaceful means.  The spell does not end with a MID, resulting in an 
ENDMID coding of 0 for all observations in the second spell.   
TABLE 6.3. Split Population Data Structure: San Andrés and Providencia 
Claim # Dyad Year Spell # CLAIM SPELL ENDMID 
1 NIC-COL 1900 1 0 1 
1 NIC-COL 1901 1 1 1 
1 NIC-COL 1902 1 2 1 
1 NIC-COL ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
1 NIC-COL 1913 1 13 1 
1 NIC-COL 1914 2 0 0 
1 NIC-COL 1915 2 1 0 
1 NIC-COL ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ ⋮ 
1 NIC-COL 1930 2 16 0 
In total, there are 31 observations in the dataset for this claim-dyad.  The table omits the observations  
falling in the middle of a spell; their coding follows from the observations preceding them. 
 
The parameter of interest in the Svolik models is the likelihood-ratio (LR) test for a split 
population.  A statistically significant LR statistic indicates that a split population is present, π ≠ 
 163 
0.  I have suggested that the existence of a split population might be another observable 
implication of an anticipatory dynamic.  Disputes may never militarize because states have no 
opportunity to militarize the dispute, or states choose not to militarize the dispute, although they 
could have.  The latter would be consistent with an anticipatory dynamic.  In the previous 
chapter, I found evidence of an anticipatory dynamic among moderately salient issues, consistent 
with my argument.  Therefore, I expect the LR test to be statistically significant in the sample of 
moderately salient issues.  I also found evidence of an anticipatory effect in the highly salient 
sample, but the effect was dwarfed in magnitude by the non-anticipatory effect.  Nonetheless, it 
would be unsurprising if we also found evidence of a split population in the highly salient 
sample, but this is of lesser concern.  The moderate salience estimates are the “key” results of 
interest. 
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TABLE 6.4. Main Results: Split-Population Survival Model (Svolik’s Estimator) 
 Model 38 
High 
Model 39 
High 
Model 40 
Moderate 
Model 41 
Moderate 
Claim Spell     
Multiple claims in year† 0.141 -0.180 -0.230 -0.362 
MLATCLAIMYR (0.428) (0.440) (0.310) (0.321) 
Democracy (mean) -0.005 -0.020 0.044 0.021 
DEMOCRACY (0.031) (0.032) (0.030) (0.029) 
Interdependence (mean) 0.932 -0.828 1.530 0.496 
INTERDEP (0.988) (1.146) (1.049) (0.932) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.009 -0.008 -0.033*** -0.059*** 
IGO (0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Contiguity 0.264 -2.151*** 0.443 1.543*** 
CONTIGUITY (0.470) (0.832) (0.346) (0.391) 
Major power dyad? 1.363*** -1.616** 0.415 0.364 
MPDYAD (0.454) (0.791) (0.333) (0.389) 
Militarization count -0.204*** -0.157*** -0.236*** -0.098 
SETTMIL (0.029) (0.031) (0.055) (0.060) 
Linked issue -0.331 -0.074 -0.682** -0.629* 
LINKED (0.260) (0.247) (0.324) (0.375) 
Territorial issue?     
TERRITORY     
Constant 2.516*** 5.222*** 4.420*** 4.057*** 
 (0.604) (1.018) (0.615) (0.696) 
λ1 0.166** 0.100 0.234*** 0.063 
 (0.079) (0.076) (0.077) (0.079) 
Truly Peaceful?     
Third party alliance†  -0.510  -3.992*** 
3PALLY  (1.751)  (1.230) 
Power ratio†  -12.155**  -8.593*** 
POWERRATIO  (6.173)  (2.623) 
Democracy (mean)  0.331  0.190 
DEMOCRACY  (0.504)  (0.119) 
Interdependence (mean)  15.736*  -0.717 
INTERDEP  (8.828)  (2.622) 
Shared IGO mshps.  0.172**  0.156*** 
IGO  (0.078)  (0.054) 
Contiguity  14.475**  -1.938* 
CONTIGUITY  (7.303)  (1.114) 
Major power dyad?  15.399**  -2.041** 
MPDYAD  (7.613)  (1.015) 
Militarization count  -0.992  -0.499*** 
SETTMIL  (0.831)  (0.192) 
Linked issue  1.333  0.888 
LINKED  (1.723)  (1.022) 
Territorial issue?     
TERRITORY     
Constant  -20.739**  1.411 
  (9.781)  (1.976) 
Split pop?  H0: π = 0 (LR stat.)  49.571***  68.203*** 
N 2228 2228 3455 3455 
Log-Likelihood -324.644 -299.858 -416.201 -382.100 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables; † = instruments 
λ: Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses.   
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Table 6.4 displays the main results from the Svolik estimator.  The coefficients cannot be 
interpreted as direct effects, but signage and statistical significance have the usual interpretations.  
Positively signed coefficients represent factors that increase the probability of an event 
occurring.  Negatively signed coefficients represent factors that decrease the probability of an 
event occurring.  The shaded row contains the LR test for a split population.  Two models are 
reported for each sample: a Weibull model with no split population element, and a Weibull 
model with a split population element.  The LR test is computed using these two models.  The 
highly salient sample shows evidence of a split population (Models 38 and 39).  This result is 
unsurprising, for the reasons I discussed above.  More importantly, the moderately salient sample 
also shows evidence of a split population (Models 40 and 41).  In both samples, the LR test is 
highly significant.  The population of peaceful disputes is heterogeneous in each sample.  Some 
of the peaceful disputes had no chance of militarizing, while others could have experienced a 
militarization, but did not.  
Disputes that could have potentially militarized, but did not, have substantive meaning 
for my argument.  Disputants may forgo militarizing a dispute if the costs of doing so outweigh 
the benefits.  That is, disputants form accurate expectations and behave accordingly; an 
anticipatory dynamic is at work.  A strategic delay mechanism would be consistent with this 
behavior.  The other anticipatory mechanism, strategic prevention, does not provide a 
particularly compelling reason for why disputes remain peaceful; it would only suggest that no 
commitment problem exists.  As discussed in Section 3.3.2.2, strategic prevention provides more 
a compelling explanation for disputes that militarize than it does for peaceful disputes.  
I found no evidence of a strategic delay mechanism in any of the Chapter 5 models.  The 
statistical significance of the LR tests in Table 6.4 suggest a potential reason why: evidence of 
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strategic delay is strongest in the population of peaceful disputes, which the SEM cannot 
presently accommodate.  Additionally, some of the suspicions I voiced in the previous chapter 
about moderately salient issues find some merit.  I found weaker-than-expected evidence of an 
anticipatory dynamic in Ch. 5.  I speculated that the weak evidence could be the product of 
excluding peaceful disputes from the analysis, as these disputes would also show signs of an 
anticipatory dynamic.124  The evidence of a split population supports my suspicion.   
Beyond the argument I have made here, we can also see how the presence of a split 
population has implications for obtaining accurate coefficient estimates.  For example, IGO is 
insignificant in Model 38, which is the simple Weibull model for high salience issues.  The 
number of shared IGO memberships has no effect on the length of claim spells, according to 
these results.  However, accounting for the split population in Model 39 reveals a different story.  
IGO is statistically significant in both equations, and the results paint IGOs in a positive light.  
The signage on IGO follows the same pattern in the moderately salient results (Models 40 and 
41).  IGO is negatively signed in the CLAIM SPELL equation, suggesting that more shared IGO 
memberships shorten the length of claim spells.  At the same time, IGO is positively signed in the 
TRULY PEACEFUL? equation.  Disputed issues are more likely to remain peaceful when disputants 
share a greater number of IGO memberships.  The results are consistent with a story in which 
IGOs play a mediating role, in which disputants sharing many IGO memberships resolve their 
disputes quicker and in a peaceful manner.  The split population model provides us with a more 
nuanced view of the way in which IGOs affect disputed issues.  Without the split population 
                                                 
124 A peaceful dispute could also be consistent with non-anticipation, though this would seem less likely.  For 
instance, if a state overestimated the expected duration of a MID, the state would believe that militarization is more 
costly than it would be in reality.  If the overestimated costs outweighed the expected benefits, the state would elect 
to keep the dispute peaceful. 
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element, we would draw incorrect conclusions, as our findings would be based on the biased 
estimates from the simple Weibull models. 
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TABLE 6.5. Pooled Results: Split-Population Survival Model (Svolik’s Estimator) 
 Model 42 
Pooled 
Model 43 
Pooled 
Claim Spell   
Multiple claims in year† -0.037 -0.115 
MLATCLAIMYR (0.229) (0.241) 
Democracy (mean) 0.008 -0.012 
DEMOCRACY (0.020) (0.020) 
Interdependence (mean) 0.940 0.069 
INTERDEP (0.653) (0.564) 
Shared IGO mshps. -0.008 -0.025*** 
IGO (0.006) (0.007) 
Contiguity 0.224 0.617 
CONTIGUITY (0.256) (0.433) 
Major power dyad? 0.772*** 0.809* 
MPDYAD (0.248) (0.415) 
Militarization count -0.218*** -0.135*** 
SETTMIL (0.024) (0.027) 
Linked issue -0.326* -0.181 
LINKED (0.189) (0.234) 
Territorial issue? -0.209 -0.524* 
TERRITORY (0.215) (0.281) 
Constant 3.434*** 3.349*** 
 (0.414) (0.598) 
λ1 0.200*** 0.143*** 
 (0.055) (0.053) 
Truly Peaceful?   
Third party alliance†  -4.585*** 
3PALLY  (1.582) 
Power ratio†  -9.305*** 
POWERRATIO  (2.531) 
Democracy (mean)  0.293 
DEMOCRACY  (0.178) 
Interdependence (mean)  -0.767 
INTERDEP  (2.546) 
Shared IGO mshps.  0.167*** 
IGO  (0.042) 
Contiguity  -0.656 
CONTIGUITY  (1.032) 
Major power dyad?  -2.522** 
MPDYAD  (1.198) 
Militarization count  -1.595*** 
SETTMIL  (0.468) 
Linked issue  0.308 
LINKED  (1.254) 
Territorial issue?  1.453 
TERRITORY  (1.186) 
Constant  1.114 
  (1.882) 
Split pop?  (LR stat.)  89.681*** 
N 5683 5683 
Log-Likelihood -749.755 -704.914 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all 
variables; † = instruments; λ: Weibull shape parameter.   
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The split population framework also gives us more nuanced insights into issue salience.  The 
models in Table 6.5 are estimated on the pooled sample of issues, so that we can compare high 
and moderately salient issues directly.  The coefficient on TERRITORY represents any differences 
across the two groups.  I find two things.  First, highly salient issues are marginally quicker to 
militarize than moderately salient issues.  This is indicated by the negative and weakly 
significant TERRITORY coefficient in the CLAIM SPELL equation in Model 43.  Second, highly 
salient issues are no more likely to remain peaceful than moderately salient issues.  This is 
indicated by the statistical insignificance of TERRITORY in the TRULY PEACEFUL equation.  
Contrast the results of Model 43 with those of the simple Weibull, reported as Model 42.  Model 
42 still shows TERRITORY to have a negative effect on claim spell, but the effect is statistically 
insignificant.  
The non-significance of TERRITORY in the TRULY PEACEFUL equation of Model 43 is 
perhaps surprising, given the conventional wisdom on the subject.  Highly salient issues are 
believed to more prone to militarization than moderately salient issues, in general.  However, 
TERRITORY’s non-significance is less surprising when we consider the earlier analysis involving 
OVERALLLENGTH.  I found that the overall length of territorial claim-dyads did not significantly 
differ from those of maritime and river claim-dyads.  I considered this finding to be a net 
positive, because it suggested that my argument was more generalizable than suggested at first 
blush. 
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Based on estimates from Model 39 (territory) and Model 41 (maritime/river).  The difference between the 
two lines is statistically insignificant, as are the differences between points on the same line. 
FIGURE 6.2. The Effect of CLAIM SPELL on TRULY PEACEFUL 
Likewise, I interpret Model 43’s non-finding for TERRITORY to be helpful.  Figure 6.2 plots the 
effect of increasing values of CLAIM SPELL on the probability of the spell remaining peaceful.  
From the models in Table 6.4, we already know that none of the differences in the figure are 
statistically significant.  This is also borne out by the graph.125  Nonetheless, Figure 6.2 
illustrates a substantive implication of the non-finding.  It shows that claim spells of different 
lengths are no more or less likely to militarize, regardless of the issue’s salience.   
                                                 
125 I plot the confidence intervals (CIs) on a second, unreported graph to confirm this.  Caution should be used in 
checking for statistical significance graphically (see Esarey and Lawrence 2012).  The confidence intervals for each 
line overlap for all CLAIM SPELL values, indicating that the difference between groups is not statistically significant.  
The confidence intervals also overlap within the same group for all CLAIM SPELL values: e.g., the CI for territorial 
disputes at CLAIM SPELL = 0 overlaps with the CI for territorial disputes at CLAIM SPELL = 151.  The same is true for 
maritime/river disputes, which indicates that the changes within the group are also statistically insignificant. 
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This is important because it indicates that the findings from the previous chapter cannot 
be a function of militarization risk.  The analyses in Ch. 5 rely on estimation samples comprised 
of disputes that militarize only.  Of these disputes, the probability that they militarize is equal 
across salience groupings and equal across claim spell-time, statistically speaking.  If the 
propensity to militarize is spell-time invariant, then underlying changes in militarization risk 
cannot explain variation in MID duration, nor can it be responsible for differences in conflict 
dynamics.  Of course, a number of possibilities still remain—militarization risk may still vary 
over ISSUE DURATION.  Model 43 is examining CLAIM SPELL, not CLAIM DURATION.  Nonetheless, 
we have eliminated one of many alternative explanations, which necessarily improves our 
confidence in the SEM results’ validity. 
We can further unpack the effect of issue salience by adding measures of within-category 
salience to the specification.  Table 6.6 displays the results for the highly salient issue sample 
(Models 44 and 46) and the moderately salient issue sample (Models 45 and 47).126  Overall, the 
LR test for a split population continues to be statistically significant in the models.  In the first 
set of models, I operationalize within-category salience using the raw index described in the 
previous chapter.  I view the raw index as an “absolute” metric of comparison.  I find that 
absolute levels of salience have no effect on the length of an issue’s peace spells.  The raw 
index’s coefficient in the CLAIM SPELL equation is insignificant in both the highly salient sample 
(Model 44) and in the moderately salient sample (Model 45).  However, higher values of the 
within-category salience index reduce the probability that both types of dispute will be peaceful.  
The coefficient for the index is signed negatively and is statistically significant for the TRULY 
                                                 
126 I omit the simple Weibull estimates from Table 6.6 to save space. 
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PEACEFUL equation of both models.  While the index’s coefficient is strongly significant in the 
moderately salient sample, it is only weakly significant in the highly salient sample.  
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TABLE 6.6. Svolik Estimator: Within-Category Salience 
 Model 44 
High 
Model 45 
Moderate 
Model 46 
High 
Model 47 
Moderate 
Claim Spell     
Multiple claims in year† -0.245 -0.567 -0.456 -0.547 
MLATCLAIMYR (0.475) (0.481) (0.436) (0.346) 
Democracy (mean) -0.025 -0.007 -0.032 -0.006 
DEMOCRACY (0.033) (0.046) (0.032) (0.032) 
Interdependence (mean) 0.015 0.228 0.030 0.329 
INTERDEP (0.957) (1.117) (0.974) (1.023) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.001 -0.044** 0.002 -0.041*** 
IGO (0.009) (0.017) (0.009) (0.012) 
Contiguity -1.239* 1.610*** -1.133 1.546*** 
CONTIGUITY (0.746) (0.420) (0.728) (0.384) 
Major power dyad? -0.691 0.784 -0.680 0.858** 
MPDYAD (0.731) (0.509) (0.713) (0.379) 
Militarization count -0.162*** -0.095 -0.176*** -0.102* 
SETTMIL (0.030) (0.058) (0.029) (0.054) 
Linked issue 0.234 -1.168*** 0.070 -1.198*** 
LINKED (0.258) (0.347) (0.239) (0.335) 
Within-category salience‡ 0.056 0.089 0.188 0.267 
 (0.079) (0.085) (0.194) (0.179) 
Constant 3.335*** 2.934*** 3.764*** 3.374*** 
 (1.029) (0.719) (0.841) (0.634) 
λ1 0.072 0.042 0.087 0.032 
 (0.077) (0.074) (0.076) (0.072) 
 
(continued on next page) 
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 Model 44 
High 
Model 45 
Moderate 
Model 46 
High 
Model 47 
Moderate 
 
(continued from previous page) 
 
Truly Peaceful?     
Third party alliance† -1.007 -4.810 -3.920 -5.038*** 
3PALLY (2.354) (3.300) (3.752) (1.876) 
Power ratio† -23.444 -10.546 -21.142 -10.828** 
POWERRATIO (15.851) (7.502) (14.837) (4.546) 
Democracy (mean) 0.422 0.249 0.897 0.236* 
DEMOCRACY (0.289) (0.266) (0.555) (0.141) 
Interdependence (mean) -5.168 1.807 -9.590 2.331 
INTERDEP (6.326) (3.885) (8.302) (3.290) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.192* 0.159*** 0.340* 0.159*** 
IGO (0.117) (0.044) (0.204) (0.042) 
Contiguity 8.979 -1.996* 7.140* -1.823 
CONTIGUITY (6.530) (1.194) (3.975) (1.126) 
Major power dyad? 2.066 -3.918 6.206 -4.264* 
MPDYAD (2.194) (3.691) (4.005) (2.219) 
Militarization count -0.229 -0.423** -0.781 -0.423** 
SETTMIL (0.490) (0.205) (0.994) (0.189) 
Linked issue -4.607 2.604** 1.431 2.980*** 
LINKED (4.528) (1.049) (2.351) (1.128) 
Within-category salience‡ -2.924* -0.906*** -16.610 -2.516*** 
 (1.768) (0.264) (10.903) (0.736) 
Constant 18.945 9.166 -13.056 3.445 
 (12.861) (6.869) (8.823) (3.977) 
Split pop?  (LR stat.) 47.454*** 82.232*** 53.659*** 82.638*** 
N 2228 3455 2228 3455 
Log-Likelihood -296.890 -373.014 -294.214 -372.665 
‡- Within-cat. sal. measure Raw index Raw index Normalized Normalized 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables; † = instruments; ‡ = see last row 
for the measure of within-category salience.  λ: Weibull shape parameter.  Unclustered standard errors 
reported in parentheses.   
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I also estimate a second set of models, adding the normalized salience measure discussed in 
Section 6.1 as a control.  The results using the second specification are reported as Model 46 for 
highly salient issues and Model 47 for moderately salient issues.  I find that normalized salience 
has an effect on the probability of a moderately salient dispute remaining peaceful.  As maritime 
or river disputes becomes more salient, relative to other disputes of the same type, it is less likely 
that the dispute will be peaceful.  Normalized salience is insignificant in all other instances, 
including the TRULY PEACEFUL equation in the highly salient sample, where the raw index was 
weakly significant.  I interpret this to mean that absolute levels of salience matter for highly 
salient issues, but relative levels do not.  In moderately salient issues, relative levels of salience 
matter, but absolute levels do not.   
As my main interest is the significance of the split-population statistic, I aim my 
robustness checks at “breaking” this result.  My concern is unobservable factors, other than 
conflict dynamics, that could be responsible for the statistical significance of the split-population 
test.  This suggests a few basic checks, which are displayed in Table 6.7.  First, Svolik’s 
estimator can be identified off functional form.  I estimate a set of models with the same set of 
covariates in each equation.  The split population statistic remains significant in the highly 
salient sample (Model 48) and the moderately salient sample (Model 49).  The statistic also 
remains statistically significant if Models 38 and 40 are reestimated without the insignificant 
predictors of each equation (not reported here).   
Finally, I add a control for whether the dispute is between interstate rivals.  State rivals 
are coded on the basis of perception (Colaresi, Rasler, and Thompson 2007; Thompson and 
Dreyer 2011; Thompson 2001): they are states which perceive each other as competitors and 
enemies, where militarization is a real possibility.  We might expect that rivalries have latent 
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factors influencing both CLAIM SPELL and TRULY PEACEFUL; controlling for RIVALS acts as a 
proxy for these factors, removing their potential effect on the split-population statistic.  Models 
50 and 51 report the RIVALS specifications for highly salient and moderately salient issues, 
respectively.  The split population statistic remains significant in both models.   
Interestingly, the RIVALS coefficient is insignificant in the highly salient sample, and it is 
significant in the moderately salient sample.  Moderately salient disputes between rivals have 
longer claim spells, indicated by Model 51’s positive and statistically significant RIVALS 
coefficient in the CLAIM SPELL equation.  Moderately salient claim spells are also significantly 
less likely to remain peaceful; RIVALS is negative and statistically significant in Model 51’s 
TRULY PEACEFUL equation.  Based on prior research, intuition would perhaps suggest the 
opposite—RIVALS should matter for highly salient issues, and would maybe matter for 
moderately salient issues.  However, the result makes sense.  If conventional wisdom on rivalry 
is correct, territorial disputes highly correlate with the latent properties of rivalry.  There would 
be little underlying variation left for RIVALS to explain in the highly salient sample, rendering it 
statistically insignificant.  The same is not true for moderately salient issues, hence RIVALS’ 
statistical significance in that sample. 
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TABLE 6.7. Robustness Checks for Svolik Estimator 
 Model 48 
High 
Model 49 
Moderate 
Model 50 
High 
Model 51 
Moderate 
Claim Spell     
Multiple claims in year -0.042 -0.945*** 0.229 -0.371 
MLATCLAIMYR (0.480) (0.311) (0.528) (0.289) 
Third party alliance 0.108 -0.364   
3PALLY (0.448) (0.387)   
Power ratio 0.227 1.701*   
POWERRATIO (1.005) (0.920)   
Democracy (mean) 0.028 -0.001 0.013 0.030 
DEMOCRACY (0.032) (0.028) (0.035) (0.029) 
Interdependence (mean) -0.431 -1.850* -1.022 1.511 
INTERDEP (1.300) (1.025) (1.343) (1.069) 
Shared IGO mshps. -0.024* -0.038*** -0.025** -0.072*** 
IGO (0.012) (0.012) (0.010) (0.012) 
Contiguity -1.547 1.802*** -1.511* 2.113*** 
CONTIGUITY (1.232) (0.360) (0.885) (0.396) 
Major power dyad? -1.290 1.278** -0.941 0.675* 
MPDYAD (1.207) (0.529) (0.862) (0.377) 
Linked issue -0.004 -1.705*** 0.032 -1.265*** 
LINKED (0.267) (0.317) (0.284) (0.347) 
Strategic rivals   -0.456 0.941*** 
RIVALS   (0.351) (0.346) 
Constant 3.290** 2.261** 4.610*** 3.774*** 
 (1.558) (1.049) (1.081) (0.684) 
λ1 0.171** 0.009 0.254*** 0.111 
 (0.069) (0.069) (0.069) (0.071) 
 
(continued on next page) 
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 Model 48 
High 
Model 49 
Moderate 
Model 50 
High 
Model 51 
Moderate 
 
(continued from previous page) 
 
Truly Peaceful?     
Multiple claims in year 3.978** 3.066***   
MLATCLAIMYR (1.893) (0.949)   
Third party alliance 0.779 -3.300** 1.404 -5.544*** 
3PALLY (1.542) (1.338) (1.945) (1.515) 
Power ratio -9.344*** -9.493*** -8.986** -6.918*** 
POWERRATIO (3.400) (3.287) (4.316) (2.259) 
Democracy (mean) 0.345 0.143 0.324 0.211* 
DEMOCRACY (0.225) (0.095) (0.251) (0.117) 
Interdependence (mean) 12.314*** 9.725*** 12.575** 0.264 
INTERDEP (4.739) (2.473) (5.291) (2.464) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.138** 0.106*** 0.117** 0.161*** 
IGO (0.054) (0.032) (0.060) (0.046) 
Contiguity 4.478 -1.457 4.939* -3.318** 
CONTIGUITY (2.777) (0.909) (2.597) (1.350) 
Major power dyad? 6.952** -2.611* 6.701** -1.560 
MPDYAD (2.910) (1.382) (2.847) (1.077) 
Linked issue -0.264 3.153*** 0.015 1.441 
LINKED (1.006) (1.096) (1.083) (0.969) 
Strategic rivals   0.067 -4.227** 
RIVALS   (1.242) (1.677) 
Constant -11.795** -1.425 -11.866** 0.737 
 (4.849) (2.556) (4.852) (2.089) 
Split pop?  (LR stat.) 166.486*** 74.043*** 52.435*** 78.901*** 
N 2228 3455 2228 3455 
Log-Likelihood -251.742 -326.153 -311.297 -383.303 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables.  λ: Weibull shape parameter;  
unclustered standard errors in parentheses.   
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6.2.2 Bivariate Probit with Partial Observability 
I also estimate the previous models using a bivariate probit (biprobit) with partial observability, 
as a robustness check of the split-population results from Svolik’s estimator.  ρ is the parameter 
of interest in biprobit models.  It represents the unobserved factors correlated with the errors of 
both equations.  It is identical to ρ in SMB’s estimator and analogous to αANT in the SEM.  There 
is no evidence of a split population if ρ is indistinguishable from zero, indicated by the reported 
LR test statistic.  A statistically significant ρ indicates the presence of a split population.   
Like Svolik’s split population estimator, biprobit models have two equations.  Each 
equation in the biprobit is specified such that it corresponds exactly with each equation in the 
Svolik estimator.  The first biprobit equation models the length of a claim spell, while the second 
equation models the probability of a Truly Peaceful dispute.  Coefficients in a biprobit cannot be 
interpreted as substantive effects, but signage and significance have meaning.  I have inverted the 
biprobit coefficient signs so that they have the same interpretation as Svolik’s estimator.  
Positive coefficients represent factors with a peace-promoting effect, either by increasing the 
length of a claim spell (equation 1) or by increasing the probability that the claim-spell is Truly 
Peaceful (equation 2).  Negative coefficients represent factors with a peace-threatening effect.  
Claim spells are shorter (equation 1) or the probability of a Truly Peaceful claim spell is 
decreased (equation 2).  
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TABLE 6.8. Main Results: Biprobit with Partial Observability  
 Model 52 
High 
Model 53 
High 
Model 54 
High 
SVOLIK 
Model 55 
Moderate 
Model 56 
Moderate 
Claim Spell      
Multiple claims in year† 0.149 0.313 0.225 -0.013 -0.166 
MLATCLAIMYR (0.193) (0.212) (0.513) (0.057) (0.110) 
Democracy (mean) 0.032 0.034 0.023 0.101*** 0.010 
DEMOCRACY (0.019) (0.026) (0.037) (0.026) (0.023) 
Interdependence (mean) 0.607 -0.254 -1.358 -0.447 -0.270 
INTERDEP (0.635) (0.848) (1.372) (0.845) (0.999) 
Shared IGO mshps. -0.004 -0.007 -0.029*** -0.025*** -0.030** 
IGO (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.009) (0.012) 
Contiguity 1.464*** -0.799 -2.342* -1.428*** 0.343 
CONTIGUITY (0.558) (0.513) (1.312) (0.292) (0.256) 
Major power dyad? 0.938*** -1.349* -1.858 -1.254*** -0.054 
MPDYAD (0.323) (0.737) (1.292) (0.284) (0.290) 
Linked issue 0.008 -0.008 0.100 1.112*** -1.024** 
LINKED (0.154) (0.179) (0.291) (0.284) (0.446) 
t 0.671*** 0.692*** 0.252*** 0.850** 0.795*** 
 (0.037) (0.040) (0.070) (0.059) (0.051) 
Within-cat. sal. index  -0.463*** -0.175**   
  (0.148) (0.089)   
Normalized sal. index     0.216 
NORMSAL     (0.226) 
Constant -0.971 2.637*** 6.489*** -0.065 2.343*** 
 (0.591) (0.708) (1.650) (0.519) (0.484) 
 
(continued on next page) 
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 Model 52 
High 
Model 53 
High 
Model 54 
High 
SVOLIK 
Model 55 
Moderate 
Model 56 
Moderate 
 
(continued from previous page) 
 
Truly Peaceful?      
Third party alliance† 0.450 0.148 -0.323 -0.200** -1.129 
3PALLY (0.813) (0.569) (1.782) (0.092) (1.122) 
Power ratio† -3.581** -3.389*** -6.900* -0.440** -2.037 
POWERRATIO (1.408) (1.313) (3.898) (0.189) (2.322) 
Democracy (mean) -0.031 -0.051 0.399 -0.065*** 0.028 
DEMOCRACY (0.059) (0.099) (0.297) (0.022) (0.068) 
Interdependence (mean) 1.533 4.395 9.702* 0.549 1.898 
INTERDEP (1.613) (3.076) (5.703) (0.696) (1.743) 
Shared IGO mshps. 0.011 0.021 0.108* 0.013* 0.057* 
IGO (0.019) (0.019) (0.064) (0.008) (0.031) 
Contiguity -1.941 1.715* 6.144* 1.064*** -0.356 
CONTIGUITY (1.457) (0.997) (3.276) (0.234) (0.605) 
Major power dyad? -0.822 3.097** 6.949* 0.774*** -0.399 
MPDYAD (0.902) (1.452) (3.550) (0.243) (0.957) 
Linked issue -0.631 -0.799 0.061 -0.908*** 1.778*** 
LINKED (0.423) (0.664) (1.205) (0.259) (0.515) 
Within-cat. sal. index  0.230 -0.559   
  (0.523) (0.342)   
Normalized sal. index     -0.934** 
NORMSAL     (0.437) 
Constant -0.971 -1.301 -8.436 -0.065 -2.139 
 (0.591) (2.664) (6.026) (0.519) (1.406) 
ρ   0.814 0.561 -- -0.997 -0.715 
H0: ρ = 0 (LR statistic) 0.757 0.788 ‡ 51.511*** 7.368*** 27.447*** 
N 2228 2228 2228 3455 3455 
Log-Likelihood -303.838 -294.905 -307.174 -378.226 -380.520 
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, two-tailed for all variables; † = instruments; ‡ = LR statistic for split 
population (Svolik)  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses.   
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Table 6.8 displays the biprobit estimates.  As before, the shaded rows contain the parameters of 
interest for these models, ρ and the LR test statistic.  The results are striking.  There is no longer 
evidence of a split population in the highly salient sample.  ρ is insignificant (Model 51), even 
when we control for within-issue salience using the raw index (Model 53).  By contrast, ρ is 
negative and highly significant in the moderately salient sample (Model 55).  This is true even 
when controlling for normalized salience (Model 56).  The negative sign means that the 
unobservables that shorten claim spells are also correlated with a lower probability of 
militarization.127  ρ is empirically analogous to the SEM’s αANT in this setting, though it is 
important to reiterate that ρ and α have different substantive interpretations.  The negative ρ is 
unsurprising in light of the negative αANT in last chapter’s moderately salient SEMs.128 
The results for within-category salience are different from the Svolik estimates for highly 
salient issues.  Model 53 shows that high salience issues with higher raw index values experience 
shorter claim spells.  The index’s coefficient is negative and significant in the CLAIM SPELL 
equation.  Model 53 also shows that the raw index has no effect on the probability that the 
dispute stays peaceful.  Contrast these results with those from the comparable Svolik model 
(Model 44): the raw index had no effect on a claim spell’s length, but it did have a weak, 
negative effect on the dispute remaining peaceful.  Part of the reason for the difference has to do 
with control variables.  The Svolik models control for SETTMIL, but the biprobit models do not, 
as they do not converge consistently when SETTMIL is included.  Model 54 reruns Model 44 
                                                 
127 The reverse also holds: unobservables that lengthen claim spells also are correlated with an increased probability 
of militarization. 
128 It is also unsurprising in light of the negative sign on the other α, α~ANT, in the moderately salient SEM results.  It 
follows that, if both α’s are negative in the moderately salient sample, then ρ will likely be negative, too.  
Additionally, the positive (but insignificant) ρ in the highly salient sample also makes sense.  The highly salient 
sample has oppositely signed α’s in the SEM.  In these models, the positive α~ANT is larger in magnitude than the 
negative αANT.  Ex ante, we would expect ρ to be positively signed for the highly salient results, but we should be 
biased toward finding insignificance because the negative αANT will attenuate ρ’s value toward zero.  What we obtain 
for highly salient issues is exactly this: a positive, but insignificant, ρ. 
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without SETTMIL using Svolik’s estimator, and its within-salience estimates better match those of 
Model 53.  What this suggests is that the raw index is picking up some aspect of disputes with 
multiple militarizations.  When we are able to control for repeated militarizations, we are purging 
that effect from the raw index’s coefficient.  The result is a more accurate estimate of within-
salience’s effect.  Whether the difference is also the product of the different modeling strategies 
is unclear from these models.  Further investigation is warranted. 
Normalized salience behaves the same in the biprobit and Svolik results for moderately 
salient issues.  Model 56 reports the biprobit results, which are comparable to Model 47 from the 
Svolik results.  In the biprobit results, normalized salience has no effect on the length of a claim 
spell in disputes over maritime and river issues.  The coefficient for NORMSAL is insignificant in 
the CLAIM SPELL equation.  However, as normalized salience increases, moderately salient 
disputes are less likely to remain peaceful.  NORMSAL is negative and significant in the TRULY 
PEACEFUL equation, as it was in the same equation of Model 47.   
On the whole, the biprobit estimates give us reason to be cautiously optimistic about the 
Svolik results.  The sample of moderately salient issues consistently shows evidence of a split 
population, which I have argued is indicative of anticipatory dynamics.  The results for highly 
salient issues are more suspect, as the split-population test statistic varies in significance 
depending on the estimation strategy.  
 184 
6.3 CONCLUSION 
In layman’s terms, what have Chs. 5 and 6 shown?  Highly salient issues are prone to non-
anticipation, and moderately salient issues are prone to anticipation.  In this conclusion, I recap 
my key findings by taking four different tacks. 
6.3.1 Chs. 5 and 6’s Collective Results 
In this chapter, I found support for Hypothesis 2.1: peaceful disputes showed evidence of an 
anticipatory dynamic.  I used a series of split population models for empirical testing, since these 
models are designed to investigate heterogeneous populations.  In this case, the population of 
peaceful disputes is heterogeneous: some of the peaceful disputes had no risk of militarizing, but 
some of them could have militarized and did not.  An anticipatory dynamic suggests the latter.  
In particular, the evidence of anticipation was strongest in the sample of disputes over maritime 
and river issues.  This is consistent with Hypothesis 3.0 and my argument, in general.   
Additionally, by using a split population setup, I showed that there is a difference 
between a dispute being at risk for militarization and when an at-risk dispute will militarize 
(Table 6.4, illustrated in Figure 6.2).  In conjunction with Chapter 5’s analysis, the resulting 
implication is that a dispute’s risk of militarizing may stay constant across time, but the potential 
militarization’s length need not stay constant.  Territorial disputes illustrate this implication well.  
They are no more likely to experience militarization than maritime and river disputes, as 
demonstrated by Chapter 6’s analyses.  However, if a territorial dispute does militarize, MIDs 
occurring later in the dispute will be longer lasting, as indicated by the SEM results from Ch. 5.   
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6.3.2 Conflict Dynamics and Overall Salience 
In the sample of territorial claim-dyads, I have shown more broadly that non-anticipatory 
dynamics predominate.  Evidentiary support comes from Chapter 5’s SEMs (Table 5.1).  α~ANT  
was statistically significant from zero, and was significantly larger in magnitude than the 
coefficient representing anticipatory dynamics (αANT).  The support is robust to different 
operationalizations of CLAIM DURATION, in which I vary the variable’s time horizon (Table 5.4, 
Table 5.7).  I used Figure 5.3 to illustrate and discuss these different operationalizations and their 
varying time horizons.   
In the sample of maritime and river claim-dyads, I show that anticipatory dynamics 
predominate (Table 5.1).  The SEM estimates show that αANT is larger in absolute size than α~ANT 
by a significant degree.  The statistical support is strongest when the coding of the issue-time 
dependent variable has short time-horizons.  The support is weaker when the time horizon 
lengthens, as I would expect.  I also find support for the claim in Chapter 6.  The split population 
analyses show that anticipatory dynamics are present among peaceful dyads.  In particular, the 
maritime and river claim-dyads have the most robust evidence of anticipatory dynamics, while 
the evidence for territorial claim-dyads is sometimes weaker. 
6.3.3 Within-Category Issue Salience  
Perhaps surprisingly, given the significant effects of overall salience, I find that within-category 
salience has mostly insignificant effects.  I measure within-category salience in two ways.  First, 
I use an absolute metric of comparison (i.e., the raw salience index; see p. 121).  I found that 
absolute levels of within-category salience do not affect conflict dynamics.  Adding the raw 
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salience index as a control does not affect the α’s in Ch. 5’s SEM results (Table 5.6).  The same 
SEM models also show that the raw index does not always have a significant effect on both 
CLAIM DURATION and MID DURATION, depending on the sample.  Higher values of the raw index 
increase CLAIM DURATION in both highly and moderately salient issues.  By contrast, higher raw 
index values have no effect on MID DURATION in the highly salient sample; higher raw index 
values only increase MID DURATION in the moderately salient sample.  
Additionally, the relationship between the raw index and CLAIM DURATION disappears 
when I use an alternative operationalization for CLAIM DURATION.  I find that within-category 
salience has no effect on CLAIM SPELL in both samples of issues, evidenced by the Svolik models 
in this chapter (Table 6.6).  However, the same models show that, for disputes over moderately 
salient issues, higher values of within-category salience decrease the likelihood that a claim-
dyad-spell is Truly Peaceful.  A similar truth holds for disputes over highly salient issues, but the 
result is weaker. 
The second way I measure within-category salience uses a relative measure of 
comparison (NORMSAL, see p. 156).  The relative measure is the normalized value of the raw 
index, computed for each category of issue.  Normalization is necessary to make sound 
comparisons across salience groupings, as the composition of the raw index varies by issue type.  
When I employ the normalized index, a different story emerges.  Claim-dyads that are more 
important, relative to other claim-dyads of that issue type, are less likely to be Truly Peaceful.  
The result, supported by both the Svolik (Table 6.6) and biprobit models (Table 6.8), is only true 
for disputes over moderately salient issues.  Additionally, higher values of normalized issue 
salience are associated with longer overall maritime and river claim-dyads (Table 6.2).  Overall, 
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the various analyses show that the measurement of “within-category salience” matters, both 
substantively and empirically. 
6.3.4 Dependent Variable Coding 
Finally, the two empirical chapters show that dependent variable coding matters, speaking to the 
importance of sound research design and measurement.  In general, a variable’s coding must 
reflect the substantive argument being made.  My different operationalizations for CLAIM 
DURATION were illustrated in Figure 5.3.  Here, the effects of one of the non-anticipatory 
mechanisms—issue indivisibility—manifests only in the longer term.  To detect evidence of 
these effects, the dependent variable must be coded with a sufficiently long time horizon.  I 
found evidence consistent with this when I ran the SEM with ISSUE DURATION, instead of CLAIM 
DURATION (Table 5.4, Model 10).   
By contrast, my proposed anticipatory mechanisms manifest quickly, becoming evident 
in the short term.  Variables with longer time horizons may wash out these shorter-term effects.  
Accordingly, the dependent variable coding should pick up these immediate fluctuations.  When 
I shift to a CLAIM SPELL coding, with its shorter time horizons to capture the shorter 
manifestation period, the evidence of an anticipatory dynamic strengthens.   
 
What do these findings mean?  What substantive implications can we draw from them?  I reflect 
on both questions in the final, concluding chapter.   
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7.0  CONCLUSION 
At its core, this dissertation has examined conflict dynamics.  What I have principally shown is 
that disputes involving territorial issues exhibit fundamentally different patterns of militarized 
behavior than disputes involving maritime and river issues.  This is a feat in its own right, as it 
challenges our current ideas about conflict dynamics.  Although both groups have an equal 
opportunity to militarize, MIDs over territory last longer as the dispute itself lasts longer.  By 
contrast, I show that when militarizations begin have no effect on how long militarizations last in 
maritime and river disputes, once I correct for the effect of expectations. 
Different audiences will find different aspects of this project interesting.  To newspaper 
reporter writing an article on this project’s findings, the article’s overly sensationalist headline 
would read, “Leaders blinded by emotions!  Incapable of making sound decisions!”  From a 
game-theoretic perspective, the project tests for—and finds evidence of—systematic deviations 
from the predictions of rationalist models of war.  From a domestic politics perspective, the 
project discusses defective decision making over certain types of issues.  Instead of focusing on 
one or two cases, I take stock of decision making in many cases using empirical methods, 
indicating whether the insights gleaned from the “usual” case studies are generalizable or 
whether they are exceptions to the rule.  The truth, of course, is a nuanced combination of all 
these.   
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What implications stem from these findings, both for real world politics and for academic 
research?  I begin by highlighting the major contributions of this dissertation.  I then address 
real-world implications, followed by additional implications for academic research.  Along the 
way, I note future avenues for research.  
7.1 MAJOR CONTRIBUTIONS 
In looking at how international disputes evolve, I developed a typology of dynamic ideal-types.  
The typology is one of the fundamental contributions of this project.  It provides a new 
framework for thinking theoretically about any bargaining process.  Here, I focused on interstate 
disputes and militarized behavior.  The predominant view of bargaining in scholarly work on 
militarized conflict is a game-theoretic, rationalist one.  Conflict-as-process arguments are 
typically viewed as different, wholly outside the realm of rationalist thought.   
I challenge this belief.  I show that each viewpoint has a common set of tenets, which the 
typology makes evident.  Game-theoretic and conflict-as-process arguments both suggest that 
militarized conflict is avoidable when states have enough information about the dispute and can 
interpret it correctly.  When these conditions are both met, I call this an “anticipatory” dynamic. 
The difference between the two arguments lies in their explanation for militarized 
conflict.  Game-theoretic works primarily focus on the availability of information.  On the other 
hand, conflict-as-process arguments emphasize the ability to interpret information correctly, 
which is taken as given in game-theoretic stories.  Instead of being two different coins, game-
theoretic and conflict-as-process arguments are different sides of the same coin.  To emphasize 
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this fact, I assigned the same label—a “non-anticipatory dynamic”—to all explanations for 
militarized conflict, regardless of which argument they originated from. 
Game-theoretic work is notable for its clear explanation for why conflict occurs.  
Similarly, I provide a preliminary set of clear explanations for non-anticipatory dynamics arising 
from conflict-as-process stories.  The two explanations address why information availability or 
processing problems can lead to militarized conflict, even when states (and their decision 
makers) are self-interested and wish to avoid such a costly outcome.  First, time pressures lead to 
militarized behavior by limiting the amount of time for deliberation, which encourages a hasty 
survey of the situation and rushed decisions.  There may not be enough time to gather 
information about the various alternatives or enough time to digest the information, if the 
information exists.  Second, issue indivisibility yields militarizations when rhetoric and emotions 
regarding the dispute build over time.  While visible in the long run, the emotional buildups are 
hard to detect in the short term because they occur so gradually.  The buildup subtly transforms 
the cognitive structures used by state decision makers to filter information and judge its 
importance, affecting decision makers’ ability to interpret information correctly (in the objective 
sense). 
The majority of game-theoretic work assumes that states usually interpret information 
correctly.  My argument could be interpreted by some as an attack on the intrinsic usefulness of 
game-theoretic insights.  Nothing could be further from the truth.  The aim of any theory is to 
enhance our understanding of some phenomenon of interest, which we do by providing a 
deliberate simplification of the world.  The validity of these simplifying assumptions is more 
tenuous in some cases than we would like.  Yet, we do so in the hope of gaining purchase over 
some puzzle by honing in on the ‘key’ pieces of the process.  This simplification, and its ensuing 
 191 
insights, is something that game-theoretic work has done very well.  My argument simply 
highlights where game-theoretic assumptions have the highest propensity of being violated.  
Such cases are perhaps in the minority, which is why some empirical analyses are supportive of 
rationalist arguments.  I show that the violations are not distributed randomly across cases—all 
types of disputed issues are not the same, e.g.—such that deviations from predicted behavior 
occur systematically.  Both the deviant and non-deviant cases are therefore important, because in 
comparing them, we gain an opportunity to uncover new substantive insights (Gerring 2007). 
7.2 REAL-WORLD IMPLICATIONS 
A number of real-world implications also follow from the argument I advance.  First, if 
territorial, maritime, and river issues are all equally at risk for experiencing a militarization, then 
perhaps we need to care just as much about keeping maritime and river disputes peaceful, too.  
This is somewhat contrary to the intense focus on territorial disputes that has characterized most 
issues-based research to date.  It may be the case that disputes over maritime and river issues are 
less likely to experience higher intensity militarizations (e.g., war) than territorial issues.  This is 
a possibility that I do not explore here, but leave to future research.  Further, to keep the peace, 
most have focused on ways to increase the costs of fighting, so as to make military conflict less 
palatable.  An additional implication of my substantive argument is that lessening the value of 
the issue being disputed could also aid prevention efforts, since value acts as a discounting factor 
for militarization costs.  I discuss this in more detail in Section 7.3.  Thinking about possible 
ways to lessen an issue’s value, and whether the ways would be effective or efficient, is another 
question left for future research. 
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Second, decision makers do not appear to be wholly “blinded by emotion.”  They appear 
to be thoughtful, rational beings.  In both the sample of territorial disputes and the sample of 
maritime and river disputes, I found evidence of an anticipatory dynamic.  The caveat is that, in 
territorial disputes, the anticipatory element is overpowered by the non-anticipatory element.  
From this, one could conclude that decision makers are trying to form accurate expectations for 
decisions over any type of issue, but their ability to do so is impaired in territorial disputes.  A 
natural extension is to delve into the causes of the impairment.  Throughout the project—Chapter 
3, in particular—I have offered several possible causes, but discriminating among them was 
beyond my scope here.  Anecdotal evidence suggests a role for domestic politics, in that the mass 
publics become mobilized and “enraged,” limiting leaders’ ability to take a moderate tack in the 
long run.  This is true in democracies and non-democracies alike.  Exploring how such 
mobilizations take place can provide further insight into counteracting them.  For example, 
international organizations that mediate disagreements may be able to work more actively to 
provide domestic cover to politicians (e.g., Allee and Huth 2006; Vreeland 2003).  This is one of 
the first areas that I intend to examine in post-dissertation work. 
Third, the timing of mediation attempts might matter.  From my analysis here, we know 
that when a territorial dispute militarizes has a strong effect on how long the militarization lasts.  
Generalizing this insight about “when,” it stands to reason that a similar truth may hold for 
mediation attempts: when do mediation attempts occur in a dispute, and does “when” influence 
their success?  For disputes over territorial issues, mediations occurring earlier may be more 
effective than those occurring later.  However, research on mediation has not considered this 
possibility fully.  If extant work considers the question of “when,” it usually examines when 
mediation attempts occur relative to an ongoing militarization (e.g., Regan 2002).  Alternatively, 
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studies have focused on the time elapsed since a previous mediation attempt over an issue to 
predict the occurrence of future mediation attempts (e.g., Shannon 2009).  In both scenarios, 
there is no consideration of when the mediation attempt occurs in the context of the disputed 
issue, on the whole. 
The importance of “when” in territorial disputes has additional implications for studies of 
mediation, as these findings are indicative of path dependence.  The occurrence and sequence of 
past events influence those occurring in the future.  This is indicated by the impact of CLAIM 
DURATION on MID DURATION in my analyses of territorial disputes (α~ANT): the length of MIDs is 
affected by the sequence of preceding peaceful years.  The path dependence of territorial 
disputes leads to a number of related questions.  Do events occurring early in a dispute’s lifetime 
affect how long the dispute takes to resolve, overall?  Do early events have a long-term effect on 
the success or failure of future mediation attempts?  Do early events affect the timing of these 
future mediation attempts?  Any of these answers would be of interest to real-world practitioners 
looking to bring peace to some of the world’s hotspots. 
Fourth, disputed issues and militarization patterns may be connected in other ways.  
Earlier, I make the simplifying assumption that interstate disputes arise in a more-or-less random 
fashion, independently of states’ militarized behavior toward one another.  Yet, we can think of 
instances in which disputes may have begun precisely because states were already prone to 
militarized behavior: Argentina and Chile fought repeatedly throughout the 19th century over 
several parts of their disputed Andean border, influencing the initiation of another territorial 
dispute over island ownership in the Beagle Channel in 1904.  Understanding this facet of 
interstate behavior casts light on the ways in which the interplay between context and militarized 
behavior can be leveraged, better equipping negotiators with potential strategies to successfully 
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reach peaceful settlements.  The potential findings would also speak to multiple research agendas 
in interstate conflict, including recent work on cross-dispute linkages (Wiegand 2011a, 2011b), 
bilateral cooperation and issue linkage (Wiegand and Powell 2011), and interstate rivalries 
(Mitchell and Thies 2011; Rasler and Thompson 2006).  I leave this, too, as a question for future 
research. 
Finally, the framework I have developed using militarized conflict between states should 
apply to militarized conflict within states.  I hope to use my research to open a new line of 
inquiry into the causes of civil conflicts.  In refining our notion of disputed issues and dynamics 
in a civil conflict setting, we will be in a better position to enhance the effectiveness of our 
resolution strategies.  We can help smoothen the transition in post-conflict societies. 
7.3 ACADEMIC RESEARCH IMPLICATIONS 
This dissertation also has several implications for the academic study of interstate conflict, as 
well as other phenomena of interest.  First and foremost, this project shows the importance of 
interdependence in studies of militarized conflict.  The factors that affect whether and when a 
militarization begins also affect how long it lasts.  In general, some empirical analyses 
acknowledge the connectivity among different militarization outcomes (e.g., Clark and Reed 
2003; Huth 1996b; Reed 2000; Senese 2005; Senese and Vasquez 2008; Signorino 2002, 2003; 
Slantchev 2003, 2004).  However, the majority of existing research eschews the connectivity, 
opening the door for biased empirical estimates and potentially invalid conclusions.   
My analysis also takes a step farther, in that it allows for some outcome yi to directly 
influence yj, another outcome of interest.  Among the research that does account for possible 
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dependence among different conflict outcomes, the relationship between yi and yj is instead 
captured through correlated error terms.  For instance,  Reed (2000) was among the first of recent 
times to note the connectivity among conflict outcomes, and the connectivity’s ramifications for 
empirical analysis.  He examines militarization onset and whether the militarization escalates to 
interstate war.  However, Reed models the connectivity in terms of unobservable, latent 
factors—the same unobservable factors that cause a dispute to militarize are also responsible for 
the militarization escalating to war.  The analysis does not consider whether a militarization’s 
underlying propensity to escalate to war has a direct effect on the initial decision to militarize at 
all.  Yet, this story is precisely what a game-theoretic explanation would suggest.   
Second—and related to the first—I draw particular attention to the importance of time 
dependence.  The effect of time dependency on the accuracy of empirical estimates is widely 
promulgated and accepted in the discipline.  A variety of techniques exist to correct for the 
effects of “time.”  The inclusion of splines is among the better-known strategies in interstate 
conflict research (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998).  A spline approach, and many of the other 
approaches, treat time dependence as a nuisance to estimation: if unaccounted for, it can affect 
the accuracy of estimates for our variable of interest (e.g., joint democracy, trade, shared IGO 
memberships).  I show that “time,” broadly understood, matters.  Time has substantive 
implications which are largely unexplored because of the current nuisance perspective.129  I also 
address scholars’ current conceptualization of “time” (Beck, Katz, and Tucker 1998; Beck 2010; 
Carter and Signorino 2010a, 2010b; Licht 2011).  I show that how we conceptualize time is 
important for furthering our understanding of conflict processes.  Should it be conceptualized as 
the amount of time since the last militarization between two states (i.e., gap time, like CLAIM 
                                                 
129 See Carter and Signorino (2010a, 2010b) and Beck (2010) for a recent discussion on this broader point. 
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SPELL), which comports with the current spline approach?  Or, as I argue, should we 
conceptualize “time” as the amount of time since the start of the overarching disputed issue (i.e., 
total time, like CLAIM DURATION)?   
More importantly, I have shown that questions pertaining to time—such as a MID’s 
duration—may be characterized not only by time dependence, but by time interdependence.130  
While time dependence suggests that some t affects yj, interdependence further suggests that yj 
also affects t.  Here, CLAIM DURATION affected MID DURATION, but was also affected by MID 
DURATION.  Analogs exist elsewhere in research on militarized conflict, like using the length of a 
civil war to explain the length of post-war peace (e.g., Fortna 2008).  If a post-war peace is 
expected to be long lasting, disputants may try to strengthen their bargaining position by 
continuing to fight, so as  to obtain as much of the disputed good as possible (e.g., Fearon 1998). 
The potential for time interdependence is not exclusive to conflict scholars, though.  
Other subfields have questions involving the interplay between two duration times.  Scholars 
interested in parliamentary democracies have wondered if how long a government survives is 
affected by the lengthiness of the negotiations to form its ruling coalition (e.g., Diermeier and 
Stevenson 2000; King et al. 1990; Warwick 1992).  American politics scholars are interested in 
how long candidates last before withdrawing from the US presidential primary (e.g., Damore, 
Hansford, and Barghothi 2010; Norrander 2000, 2006); one factor could be how early a 
candidate declares his or her candidacy in the preceding year.  The empirical strategies for 
accommodating time interdependence are different than those concerning time dependence.  
Choosing the correct strategy thus becomes imperative.  Simply being aware that a choice exists 
is an important first step.   
                                                 
130 Time interdependence is synonymous with “duration interdependence.” 
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Third, I show the serious, crippling effects that arise from ignoring time interdependence.  
For proof, look no further than my findings regarding MID duration.  Extant work on MID 
duration has primarily focused on state-, geography-, and militarization-specific factors (e.g., 
Bennett and Stam 1996, 2004; Bueno de Mesquita, Koch, and Siverson 2004; Goemans 2000; 
Koch 2009; Shannon, Morey, and Boehmke 2010; Slantchev 2004; Stanley and Sawyer 2009).  I 
show that dispute-specific factors also matter by demonstrating that when certain disputes 
militarize (i.e., CLAIM DURATION) affects the length of these militarizations.  This suggests that 
extant work on MID duration has omitted a relevant variable, which could potentially affect the 
validity of their results.  Analyses that include CLAIM DURATION as a control variable are free of 
this omitted variable bias.  However, analyses failing to account for CLAIM DURATION’s 
interdependence with MID duration will be tainted by another type of bias—simultaneity bias.  
In Chapter 5, we saw the effects first hand when I replicated Krustev’s (2006) and Shannon, 
Morey, and Boehmke’s (2010) studies of MID duration.  The main variables of interest in both 
articles were not related to “time”, but by controlling for time with the appropriate econometric 
technique, the coefficients of interest changed significantly.  The summarizing paragraph from 
that section bears repeating: scholars interested in durations of any sort should carefully think 
about (a) whether there is a potential ‘time’ variable associated with their process of interest, (b) 
whether time elapsed has an effect on the duration, and (c) the relationship between their x’s of 
interest and time elapsed.  Researchers can then take the appropriate methodological steps to 
ensure that their analyses are valid.   
In Section 7.1, I discussed my argument’s implications for game-theoretic research.  
Specifically, my typology of dynamic ideal-types recognizes availability of relevant information 
and perfect/near-perfect information processing as being joint, crucial conditions for an 
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anticipatory dynamic.  I demonstrate the existence of scenarios in which each condition is likely 
to be violated, thus providing several explanations as to why disputes may militarize.  Game-
theoretic work, by contrast, normally takes perfect or near-perfect processing capabilities as 
given.  By recognizing the importance of this condition, and laying out the logic in a rigorous 
way, my typology makes it clear that game-theoretic work overlooks some of these scenarios. 
My results also speak to game-theoretic work on conflict in other respects.  My findings 
from the SEM analysis are consistent with territorial issues’ indivisibility, be it actual or 
perceived, changing over the course of the dispute.  The change is responsible for the form of 
non-anticipation we observe (issue indivisibility).  What this suggests more broadly is that the 
value of territorial issues may differ across the dispute.  However, current game-theoretic work 
holds an issue’s value constant.  Relaxing this assumption could impact the conclusions drawn 
from these models.  For instance, when I relax the assumption in the basic bargaining model used 
in Chs. 2 and 3, we see that issue value acts as a discount factor for the costs of fighting.  This 
means that states may believe the benefits of militarization outweigh its costs for disputes over 
valuable issues, even in the face of extremely costly militarizations.  Allowing an issue’s value to 
vary in formal models may produce additional insights into the processes behind militarized 
conflict. 
Finally, my work also speaks to scholars investigating interstate rivalries.  Research on 
rivalry often analyzes militarization patterns over an entire dyad (e.g., Figure 4.1, Panel A); it 
does not distinguish by the disputed issue underlying each militarization (e.g., Figure 4.1, Panel 
B).  I show that certain elements of the disputed issue are relevant to understanding not only 
individual militarization, but the overall pattern of militarization between states.  A dispute-
centric setup may be useful as an alternative framework for the examination of rivalry dynamics.  
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This dovetails with recent calls for an “issue rivalry” conceptualization for recurrent conflict 
research, where conflict patterns are examined over specific disputes between states (Mitchell 
and Thies 2011). 
 
As a whole, the argument I have advanced in this dissertation speaks to one of the quintessential 
puzzles of politics: when making decisions, do decision makers have an eye on the future as they 
perform cost-benefit analyses, or are they “blinded” by history?  For international disputes over 
issues, I show that history is key for decisions regarding disputes over territorial issues, while 
decisions regarding disputes over issues of lesser importance are influenced the most by 
considerations about the future.  The insight should be generalizable to any international or 
domestic bargaining situation.  We begin by considering attributes of the disputed good, such as 
how long it has been disputed, and its salience level.  Next, we consider the actions available to 
actors, the costliness of these actions, and the resultant outcomes.  We can then proceed to actor-
specific characteristics.  In short, my framework suggests an additional perspective for analyzing  
events other than militarized conflict or for understanding aspects of the domestic decision-
making process, potentially yielding new insights that will further our understanding of political 
processes. 
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APPENDIX A 
GLOSSARY OF TERMS 
Anticipatory dynamic: characterized by outcomes consistent with rational expectations; two 
conditions are met: the availability of relevant information and the ability to correctly process it 
(p. 25) 
Claim duration: the number of months elapsed between the start of a claim-dyad and a MID; 
total-time formulation; equivalent to Segment AB in Figure 2.1, also abbreviated as t, contrast 
with CLAIM SPELL and ISSUE DURATION (pp. 36, 83; fn. 76).  See also Figure 5.3. 
Claim spell: records the number of months that pass between the initiation of a claim-dyad and 
the start of a MID over that claim; gap-time formulation, contrast with CLAIM DURATION and 
ISSUE DURATION (p. 127; fn. 76).  See also Figure 5.3. 
Claim-dyad: main unit in all statistical analyses; represents one disagreement over the allocation 
of a given issue with State i as initiator of the disagreement and State j as the target (i.e., directed 
state pairs) (p. 78) 
Dispute: when official representatives of one state’s government make explicit statements or 
claims that either (a) challenge the status quo regarding the issue or (b) are counter to the explicit 
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statements or claims made by the official representatives of another state’s government; also 
referred to as “disputed issue” (p. 37) 
Disputed issue: see dispute 
Dynamic ideal-type: describes the relationship between the behavior of self-interested actors 
(actions, a) and how actions combine to yield an observed outcome (o) (p. 10) 
Expectations, rational: describes the causal process yielding some outcome of interest; formally, 
actors exhibiting behavior consistent with rational expectations will make efficient use of all 
available information in the present to form unbiased expectations about an outcome in the future 
(p. 14) 
Intangible salience: the importance of an issue due to the indirectly observable goals associated 
with it (p. 39) 
Issue duration: the number of months elapsed between the start of the first claim-dyad over an 
issue and a MID; contrast with CLAIM DURATION and CLAIM SPELL (p. 117).  See also Figure 5.3. 
Issue: the collection of stakes seen as satisfying a state’s goals; an issue can experience multiple 
claim-dyads; operationalized using the Issue Correlates of War data on territorial, maritime, and 
river disputes (pp. 39, 77) 
MID duration: the number of months that MID lasts, based on the MID’s recorded start and end 
dates; equivalent to Segment BC in Figure 2.1 (p. 84) 
Militarization: military force of any sort, employed by one state toward another (e.g., verbal 
threats, mobilization of forces, engaging in active combat); operationalized as a militarized 
interstate dispute (MID) (pp. 12, 77) 
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Non-anticipatory dynamic: characterized by outcomes that are inconsistent with rational 
expectations; states have a dearth of available information with which to form their expectations 
and/or they do not have near-perfect information processing capabilities (p. 28) 
Normalized index (within-issue salience): issue-specific z-scores, computing the raw index’s 
mean and standard deviation for each issue type; a normalized score equal to 0 represents the 
“average” issue within each group, positive values represent disputes of greater importance, 
relative to the average issue of that type, and negative values represent disputes of lesser 
importance, relative to the average issue of that type (p. 156) 
Overall issue salience: the general importance of an issue “to the state’s leadership or…[to] a 
substantial portion of its population,” based on whether the issue has a relatively high or low 
amount of both tangible and intangible salience (Hensel et al. 2008, 121) (p. 40) 
Rational expectations: see expectations, rational 
Raw index (within-issue salience): issue-specific salience variables from the Issue Correlates of 
War data, which are coded as an index ranging from 0-12; the components of the index vary by 
issue type (displayed in Table 5.5); absolute measure of issue salience (p. 121) 
Tangible salience: the importance of an issue due to the directly observable goals associated with 
it (p. 39) 
Truly Peaceful: claim-dyads that could not have militarized, as states lack the requisite military 
capacity to do so; the risk of dispute militarization is practically zero (pp. 26, 95) 
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APPENDIX B 
REFERENCE LIST OF SAMPLE DISPUTES, BY CLAIM-DYADS 
Claim-dyads with 0 MIDs appear in the split-population sample only.  The “MIDs” column 
contains the count of MIDs in the SEM sample.  This number is not necessarily equal to the total 
count MIDs over the claim-dyad. 
 
Symbol Key: 
+ Claim-dyad still ongoing as of 12/2001. 
TABLE B.1. List of Territorial Disputes in Sample 
Dyad Dispute Name Chal. Start End MIDs 
USA-UKG Alaska UKG 1872 1903 1 
USA-CAN Wrangel Island CAN 1922 1924 0 
CAN-RUS Wrangel Island CAN 1922 1924 0 
CAN-UKG Labrador CAN 1920 1927 0 
USA-MEX El Chamizal MEX 1895 1963 0 
USA-CAN Ellesmere Island CAN 1922 1926 0 
CAN-NOR Sverdrup Islands CAN 1922 1930 0 
CAN-DEN Hans Island CAN 1971 2001 0+ 
NOR-DEN Eastern Greenland DEN 1921 1933 0 
HAI-DOM Río Massacre HAI 1934 1935 0 
HON-COL Serranilla Bank and Bajo Nuevo HON 1982 1986 0 
NIC-COL San Andrés y Providencia NIC 1979 2001 2+ 
MEX-FRN Clipperton Island MEX 1897 1934 0 
GUA-UKG Belize GUA 1868 1981 2 
BLZ-GUA Belize GUA 1981 2001 5+ 
GUA-UKG Ranguana and Sapodilla  GUA 1981 1981 0 
BLZ-GUA Ranguana and Sapodilla  GUA 1981 2001 0+ 
HON-UKG Ranguana and Sapodilla HON 1981 1981 0 
(continued on next page) 
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Dyad Dispute Name Chal. Start End MIDs 
(continued from previous page) 
BLZ-HON Ranguana and Sapodilla HON 1981 2001 0+ 
GUA-SAL Cordillera Monte Cristo GUA 1935 1938 1 
HON-SAL Bolsones SAL 1899 1992 1 
HON-SAL Conejo Island SAL 2000 2001 0+ 
HON-NIC Cayo Sur - Media Luna NIC 1998 2001 1+ 
USA-NIC Mangles (Corn) Islands NIC 1965 1971 0 
COL-VEN Los Monjes COL 1951 2001 3+ 
COL-PER Leticia PER 1932 1935 1 
VEN-UKG Essequibo VEN 1951 1966 0 
VEN-GUY Essequibo VEN 1966 2001 7+ 
GUY-NTH Corentyn/New River Triangle NTH 1966 1975 0 
GUY-SUR Corentyn/New River Triangle SUR 1975 2001 2+ 
SUR-FRN Maroni SUR 1975 2001 0+ 
ECU-PER Oriente-Mainas ECU 1854 1945 2 
ECU-PER Cordillera del Cóndor ECU 1947 1998 12 
BOL-PAR Chaco Boreal BOL 1878 1938 10 
PER-CHL Tacna-Arica PER 1884 1929 2 
CHL-ARG Los Andes CHL 1896 1904 1 
CHL-ARG Beagle Channel ARG 1904 1985 19 
CHL-ARG Palena/Continental Glaciers CHL 1903 1998 0 
ARG-URU Río de La Plata ARG 1882 1973 1 
ARG-UKG Falkland Is. and Dependencies ARG 1841 2001 3+ 
UKG-IRE Northern Ireland IRE 1922 1998 0 
UKG-IRE Treaty Ports IRE 1927 1938 0 
UKG-FRN Ecrehos and Minquiers FRN 1886 1953 0 
UKG-SPN Gibraltar SPN 1816 2001 1+ 
NTH-GFR Elten and Tudderen GFR 1955 1963 0 
FRN-GFR Saar (Sarre) GFR 1955 1957 0 
GFR-GDR German Reunification GFR 1955 1972 0 
USA-RUS West Berlin RUS 1948 1971 2 
GFR-GDR West Berlin GDR 1958 1972 2 
NOTE: To obtain sufficient data, territorial claims starting before 1885 are excluded 
from the SEM sample unless they experience at least two MIDs after 1885. 
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TABLE B.2. List of River Disputes in Sample 
Dyad Dispute Name Chal. Start End MIDs 
USA-CAN St. Lawrence River (Niagara): Chicago Diversion CAN 1925 1932 0 
USA-UKG Milk River (St. Mary’s):  St. Mary’s Diversion UKG 1902 1909 0 
USA-UKG Milk River (St. Mary’s):  Milk River Diversion USA 1904 1909 0 
USA-CAN Red River (Souris):  Garrison Diversion CAN 1973 1986 0 
USA-CAN Red River (Souris-Sheyenne):  Devil’s Lake Diversion CAN 1997 2001 0
+ 
USA-CAN Souris River:  Rafferty-Alameda Dam CAN 1989 1992 0 
USA-CAN Columbia River (Kootenay-Frasier): Libby Dam CAN 1951 1961 0 
USA-CAN Skagit River: High Ross Dam CAN 1972 1984 0 
USA-CAN Taku River: Tulsequah Chief Mine USA 1998 2001 0
+ 
USA-MEX Colorado River: Alamo Canal MEX 1901 1904 0 
USA-MEX Colorado River:  Colorado Apportionment MEX 1905 1944 0 
USA-MEX Colorado River:  Wellton-Mohawk Salinity MEX 1961 1973 0 
USA-MEX Colorado River:  All-American Canal Sealing MEX 1989 1999 0 
USA-MEX Río Grande:  Upper Río Grande MEX 1900 1906 0 
USA-MEX Río Grande:  Lower Río Grande USA 1924 1944 0 
NIC-COS San Juan River:  San Juan Navigation COS 1982 2001 1
+ 
ECU-PER Napo River:  Petroecuador Oil Spill PER 1992 1992 0 
BRA-ARG Iguazú River:  Segredo Reservoir ARG 1998 1998 0 
BRA-ARG Paraná River:  Itaipú Dam ARG 1972 1979 0 
PAR-ARG Paraná River:  Yacyreta Dam PAR 1973 1979 0 
PAR-ARG Pilcomayo River:  Lower Pilcomayo Diversion PAR 1980 1983 0 
(continued on next page) 
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Dyad Dispute Name Chal. Start End MIDs 
      
(continued from previous page) 
ARG-URU Uruguay River (La Plata):  Uruguay River Border ARG 1900 1973 1 
BOL-CHL Silala River:  Silala Fees (Ductec) CHL 1999 2001 0
+ 
NTH-BEL Meuse:  Albert Canal NTH 1930 1937 0 
NTH-FRN Rhine:  Alsace Salt Releases NTH 1979 1982 0 
SPN-POR Douro-Tagus-Guadiana:  National Hydrological Plan POR 1993 2000 0 
SYR-ISR Jordan River:  Lake Huleh Diversion SYR 1951 1951 1 
JOR-ISR Jordan River:  Lake Huleh Diversion JOR 1951 1953 0 
SYR-ISR Jordan River:  DMZ Diversion SYR 1953 1954 1 
LEB-ISR Jordan River:  National Water Carrier LEB 1956 1966 0 
SYR-ISR Jordan River:  National Water Carrier SYR 1956 1958 0 
EGY-ISR Jordan River:  National Water Carrier EGY 1959 1961 0 
SYR-ISR Jordan River:  National Water Carrier SYR 1961 1966 0 
JOR-ISR Jordan River:  National Water Carrier JOR 1956 1966 0 
JOR-ISR Jordan River:  Sewage Dumping JOR 1989 1989 0 
JOR-ISR Jordan River:  West Bank Allocation JOR 1989 1989 0 
LEB-ISR Hasbani-Baniyas (Jordan):  Jordan Headwaters Diversion ISR 1964 1966 0 
SYR-ISR Hasbani-Baniyas (Jordan):  Jordan Headwaters Diversion ISR 1964 1966 1 
JOR-ISR Hasbani-Baniyas (Jordan):  Jordan Headwaters Diversion ISR 1964 1966 0 
SYR-ISR Yarmuk River (Jordan):  Bunger Plan ISR 1953 1956 0 
JOR-ISR Yarmuk River (Jordan):  Bunger Plan ISR 1953 1956 0 
SYR-ISR Yarmuk River (Jordan):  Unity Dam ISR 1987 1998 0 
(continued on next page) 
 207 
Dyad Dispute Name Chal. Start End MIDs 
      
(continued from previous page) 
JOR-ISR Yarmuk River (Jordan):  Unity Dam ISR 1987 1998 0 
JOR-ISR East Ghor Canal (Yarmuk/Jordan):  East Ghor Canal ISR 1969 1969 0 
JOR-ISR East Ghor Canal (Yarmuk/Jordan):  East Ghor Canal JOR 1976 1994 0 
JOR-ISR East Ghor Canal (Yarmuk/Jordan):  East Ghor Canal ISR 1999 1999 0 
SYR-JOR Yarmuk River:  Yarmuk Diversions JOR 1987 1987 0 
SYR-JOR Yarmuk River:  Yarmuk Diversions JOR 1992 1998 0 
SYR-ISR Yarmuk River:  Golan Heights Dam SYR 1997 1998 0 
JOR-ISR Yarmuk River:  Golan Heights Dam JOR 1997 1998 0 
SYR-JOR Yarmuk River:  Mafraq Spill SYR 2000 2000 0 
TUR-SYR Euphrates River:  Absolute Sovereignty SYR 1964 2001 0
+ 
TUR-SYR Euphrates River:  Keban Dam SYR 1964 1966 0 
IRQ-SYR Euphrates River:  Tabqa (Thawrah) Dam IRQ 1975 1975 0 
TUR-SYR Euphrates River:  Lake Assad SYR 1983 1983 0 
TUR-SYR Euphrates River:  Ataturk Dam SYR 1984 1990 0 
TUR-IRQ Euphrates River:  Ataturk Dam IRQ 1990 1990 0 
TUR-SYR Euphrates River:  Karakaya Dam SYR 1986 1986 0 
IRQ-SYR Euphrates River:  Iraqi Allocation IRQ 1988 1990 0 
TUR-SYR Euphrates River:  Birecik Dam SYR 1995 2001 2
+ 
TUR-IRQ Tigris/Euphrates Rivers:  Iraqi Allocation IRQ 1988 2001 0
+ 
IRN-IRQ Shatt al-Arab:  Thalweg and Navigation IRN 1932 1937 1 
IRN-IRQ Shatt al-Arab:  Thalweg and Navigation IRN 1953 1954 1 
(continued on next page) 
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IRN-IRQ Shatt al-Arab:  Thalweg and Navigation IRQ 1958 1975 4 
IRN-IRQ Shatt al-Arab:  Thalweg and Navigation IRN 1959 1975 2 
IRN-IRQ Shatt al-Arab:  Thalweg and Navigation IRQ 1979 1990 1 
TUR-SYR Orontes River:  Syrian Dam Plan TUR 1956 1958 0 
TUR-EGY Orontes River:  Syrian Dam Plan TUR 1958 1961 0 
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TABLE B.3. List of Maritime Disputes in Sample 
Dyad Dispute Name Chal. Start End MIDs 
USA-UKG Dixon Entrance UKG 1900 1919 0 
USA-CAN Dixon Entrance CAN 1920 2001 1+ 
USA-CAN Northwest Passage USA 1969 2001 0+ 
USA-CAN Beaufort Sea USA 1920 2001 0+ 
CAN-USA US-Canada Pacific Salmon CAN 1914 1999 3 
USA-CAN Gulf of Maine CAN 1976 1984 0 
USA-MEX US-Mexico Tuna USA 1975 1997 0 
USA-MEX US-Mexico Tuna USA 1979 2000 0 
USA-UKG Rum War UKG 1921 1935 0 
USA-RUS Bering Sea RUS 1900 2001 2+ 
USA-RUS Mid-Atlantic Coast RUS 1965 1990 1 
USA-RUS US-USSR Pacific Coast RUS 1965 1990 0 
CAN-FRN St. Pierre and Miquelon CAN 1971 2001 2+ 
CAN-DEN Canada-Denmark Northwest Atlantic CAN 1971 2001 0+ 
CAN-RUS Canada-USSR Fishing RUS 1969 1976 0 
CAN-JPN Canada-Japan Pacific Coast CAN 1938 1938 0 
CAN-SPN Turbot War SPN 1994 1995 1 
HON-NIC Gulf of Fonseca HON 1912 2001 5+ 
HON-NIC Honduras-Nicaragua Caribbean Sea NIC 1999 2001 1+ 
GUA-UKG Sapodilla (Zapatillo) Cays GUA 1975 1981 0 
BLZ-GUA Sapodilla (Zapatillo) Cays GUA 1981 2001 0+ 
HON-UKG Sapodilla (Zapatillo) Cays HON 1981 1981 0 
BLZ-HON Sapodilla (Zapatillo) Cays HON 1981 2001 0+ 
MEX-GUA Mexico-Guatemala Fishing MEX 1956 1976 1 
USA-PAN Panama Canal Zone Outlets USA 1959 1995 1 
USA-COL Quita Sueno-Roncador-Serrana COL 1900 1972 0 
NIC-COL San Andres and Providencia NIC 1979 2001 0+ 
JAM-COL Serranilla Bank and Bajo Nuevo JAM 1982 2001 0+ 
HON-COL Serranilla Bank and Bajo Nuevo HON 1982 1986 0 
USA-ECU Ecuadorian Pacific Claims USA 1952 2001 8+ 
USA-PER Peruvian Pacific Claims USA 1947 2001 4+ 
USA-CHL Chilean Pacific Claims USA 1952 1986 1 
USA-BRA US-Brazil Shrimp USA 1970 1993 0 
TRI-VEN Gulf of Paria VEN 1962 2001 3+ 
VEN-UKG Essequibo VEN 1951 1966 0 
VEN-GUY Essequibo VEN 1966 2001 0+ 
COL-VEN Gulf of Venezuela COL 1955 2001 4+ 
(continued on next page) 
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UKG-NTH Courantyne NTH 1900 1966 0 
GUY-NTH Courantyne NTH 1966 1975 0 
GUY-SUR Courantyne SUR 1975 2001 1+ 
BRA-FRN Lobster War FRN 1963 1964 1 
CHL-ARG Beagle Channel ARG 1900 1985 5 
ARG-RUS Argentina-USSR Fishing Dispute RUS 1967 1986 2 
ARG-BUL Argentina-USSR Fishing Dispute BUL 1967 1986 1 
ARG-UKG Falklands ARG 1966 2001 4+ 
UKG-ICE Cod War (3-4 miles) UKG 1952 1956 0 
FRN-ICE Cod War (3-4 miles) FRN 1953 1956 0 
UKG-ICE Cod War (12 miles) UKG 1958 1961 2 
NTH-ICE Cod War (12 miles) NTH 1958 1961 0 
BEL-ICE Cod War (12 miles) BEL 1958 1961 0 
FRN-ICE Cod War (12 miles) FRN 1958 1961 0 
SPN-ICE Cod War (12 miles) SPN 1958 1961 0 
GFR-ICE Cod War (12 miles) GFR 1958 1961 0 
DEN-ICE Cod War (12 miles) DEN 1958 1961 0 
UKG-ICE Cod War (50 miles) UKG 1971 1973 1 
GFR-ICE Cod War (50 miles) GFR 1971 1973 0 
UKG-ICE Cod War (200 miles) UKG 1975 1976 1 
GFR-ICE Cod War (200 miles) GFR 1975 1975 0 
DEN-ICE Faroe Islands/Greenland DEN 1976 1997 0 
UKG-DEN Faroe Islands/Greenland DEN 1958 1964 1 
NOR-DEN Jan Mayen DEN 1958 1997 2 
SWD-DEN Sweden-Denmark Continental Shelf SWD 1978 1983 0 
FRN-SPN Bay of Biscay FRN 1976 2001 1+ 
GFR-DEN German Bay GFR 1966 1971 0 
NTH-GFR German Bay GFR 1966 1971 0 
GFR-DEN Greenland Waters DEN 1982 1982 0 
IRE-NTH Irish 50 Mile NTH 1959 1977 0 
UKG-IRE UK-Irish Free State UKG 1929 1929 0 
IRE-SPN Irish Box SPN 1984 2001 2+ 
UKG-DEN North Sea Herring UKG 1977 1984 0 
NOR-ICE Iceland-Norway Fishing ICE 1979 2001 0+ 
UKG-NOR UK-Norway 4 Mile UKG 1911 1951 0 
UKG-NOR UK-Norway 12 Mile UKG 1960 1960 0 
UKG-NOR Norwegian No-trawling UKG 1974 1975 0 
FRN-NOR Norwegian No-trawling FRN 1974 1975 0 
GFR-NOR Norwegian No-trawling GFR 1974 1975 0 
(continued on next page) 
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UKG-BEL UK-Belgium Fishing UKG 1927 2000 0 
UKG-IRE UK-Ireland Delimitation UKG 1977 1988 0 
GDR-POL Poland-East Germany Continental Shelf POL 1985 1989 0 
GRC-TUR Aegean Sea GRC 1964 2001 12+ 
RUS-DEN Sea of Okhotsk POL 1991 2001 2 
RUS-SWD Baltic Sea SWD 1950 1989 1 
RUS-DEN Baltic Sea DEN 1950 1954 0 
POL-SWD Baltic Sea POL 1977 1989 0 
LAT-LIT Baltic Sea LAT 1991 2001 0+ 
RUS-LIT Baltic Sea RUS 1991 1997 0 
GDR-POL Baltic Sea GDR 1985 1989 0 
ROM-UKR Black Sea ROM 1995 2001 0+ 
BUL-TUR Black Sea TUR 1983 1997 0 
RUS-UKR Black Sea UKR 1993 2001 1+ 
NOR-ICE Barents Sea ICE 1998 1999 0 
RUS-ICE Barents Sea ICE 1998 1999 0 
RUS-TUR Bosphorus and Dardanelles RUS 1994 2001 0+ 
AZE-TKM Caspian Sea TKM 1991 2001 0+ 
IRN-TKM Caspian Sea TKM 1991 2001 0+ 
RUS-EST Gulf of Finland EST 1991 1999 0 
EST-LAT Gulf of Riga EST 1991 1996 0 
POL-RUS Bering Sea POL 1992 1995 0 
CRO-BOS Port of Ploce CRO 1994 2001 0+ 
USA-RUS White Sea USA 1911 1911 0 
UKG-RUS White Sea UKG 1911 1911 0 
RUS-NOR White Sea NOR 1911 1911 0 
RUS-JPN White Sea JPN 1911 1911 0 
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APPENDIX C 
TECHNICAL APPENDIX 
Appendix C contains technical details for four different estimators: 
1. Milan Svolik’s split population survival model (2008) 
2. Biprobit with partial observability (hereafter, “biprobit”) 
3. Jude Hays and Aya Kachi’s interdependent duration simultaneous equation model 
(2009, hereafter “H&K”)  
4. Frederick Boehmke, Daniel Morey, and Megan Shannon’s duration-based model 
with sample selection (2006, hereafter “BMS”) 
C.1 SPLIT POPULATION SURVIVAL (SVOLIK) 
Svolik (2008) develops a split population survival model to investigate democratic consolidation 
and authoritarian backsliding.  His key insight is that all observed democracies are not alike.  
Some democracies have no chance of experiencing an authoritarian reversal (“consolidated” 
democracies, like Sweden and the US), whereas other democracies are still at risk (“transitional” 
democracies, like Thailand in 2001 [p. 153]).  Formally, the population of observed democracies 
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is heterogeneous, not homogenous—the risk of authoritarian reversal is not the same for all 
democracies.  Svolik’s split population survival model gives him leverage over two important 
questions.  First, what factors influence whether an observed democracy is consolidated or 
transitional?  Second, what factors influence when a democratic regime will backslide into 
authoritarian rule? 
I face a similar problem for my question about CLAIM DURATION.  If a dispute does not 
experience a militarization, is it because (a) there is truly little chance of a militarization 
occurring or (b) there is a chance of militarization, but one has yet to occur?  The second 
possibility would be consistent with an anticipatory dynamic, which makes 
The log-likelihood for Svolik’s estimator is as follows (2008, 157).  I have modified his 
notation for my application to y1, CLAIM DURATION.  Let 𝛿𝑚 represent whether a claim-dyad 
experiences a MID.  Let P represent whether a disputed issue has no chance of militarizing, and 
is therefore “truly” peaceful (P = 1).  We know that any disputed issue that experiences a MID 
(i.e., 𝛿𝑚 = 1) cannot be truly peaceful, so P = 0.  However, we cannot be sure about the value of 
P for issues that have not yet experienced a MID (𝛿𝑚 = 0).  For the population of cases for 
which 𝛿𝑚 = 0, some may be “truly” peaceful disputes (P = 1), but others could experience a 
militarization sometime in the future (P = 0).  That is, P is unobservable when 𝛿𝑚 = 0, which is 
problematic because we have reason to believe that P = 1 for some of these cases and P = 0 for 
others—a split population.131  We can denote the probability that a dispute is truly peaceful as π, 
making Pr(P = 1) = π and Pr(P = 0) = (1 – π) 
                                                 
131 The presence of a split population for the 𝛿𝑚 = 0 cases is one difference between Svolik’s estimator and BMS’s 
estimator.  BMS treat the population of 𝛿𝑚 = 0 cases as homogenous. 
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The duration portion of the model has the same form as standard survival models.132  Let 
t represent the time at which a dispute militarizes.  Let T represent the total amount of time that 
the dispute is observed and is therefore in the dataset.  For observations where we observe a 
failure (𝛿𝑚 = 1, which necessarily means P = 0), the density function enters the log-likelihood 
function, f(t | P = 0).133  For observations where we have not observed a failure (𝛿𝑚 = 0), the 
observation is potentially right censored.  Observations with right-censored durations enter the 
log-likelihood through the survival function, S(T | P = 0).  The survival function is equal to 1 – 
F(T | P = 0), where F is the cumulative distribution function. 
We now have all the requisite parts to formally write out the log-likelihood function for 
Svolik’s split population survival estimator (2008, 157): 
ln 𝐿 = �𝛿𝑚𝑖 ln[(1 − 𝜋) 𝑓(𝑡𝑖|𝑃𝑖 = 0)]𝑁
𝑖=1
+ �1 − 𝛿𝑚𝑖� ln[𝜋 + (1 − 𝜋)𝑆(𝑇𝑖|𝑃𝑖 = 0)] [1] 
The log-likelihood has two major terms.   
• The first term, 𝛿𝑚𝑖 ln[(1 − 𝜋) 𝑓(𝑡𝑖|𝑃𝑖 = 0)] ≡ 𝛿𝑚𝑖�ln(1 − 𝜋) + ln �𝑓(𝑡𝑖|𝑃𝑖 = 0)��, 
represents disputes where we have observed a MID (𝛿𝑚 = 1, and therefore, P = 0).  If we 
have observed P = 0, then the log-likelihood must be equal to the probability that the 
dispute is not Truly Peaceful, (1 – π), times the density function, f(t | P = 0). 
• The second term, �1 − 𝛿𝑚𝑖� ln[𝜋 + (1 − 𝜋)𝑆(𝑇𝑖|𝑃𝑖 = 0)], represents disputes where we 
have not observed a MID (𝛿𝑚 = 0).  The term has two elements to capture the split 
population.   
                                                 
132 See Box-Steffensmeier and Jones (2004, 12–19). 
133 Svolik uses two different functional forms: a Weibull function �𝑓(𝑡) = 𝜃𝜆(𝜃𝑡)𝜆−1 exp�−(𝜃𝑡)𝜆�� and a log-
logistic function �𝑓(𝑡) = 𝜃𝜆(𝜃𝑡)𝜆−1
�1+(𝜃𝑡)𝜆�2�, where θ is a scale parameter and λ is a shape parameter (Box-Steffensmeier 
and Jones 2004, 26, 33).  The main difference between the two models is the monotonicity of the hazard rate.  
Weibull models have a monotonic hazard rate, while log-logistics have a non-monotonic hazard rate. 
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o The first element represents the case where P = 1—that is, we have not observed a 
MID because the dispute is truly peaceful (π).   
o The second element represents the alternative scenario.  The dispute is not truly 
peaceful (P = 0), but we simply have not observed a MID yet.  The dispute’s 
duration is simply right censored.  This can be expressed by the probability that P 
= 0, (1 – π), times the survival function, S(T | P = 0). 
C.2 BIVARIATE PROBIT WITH PARTIAL OBSERVABILITY 
The general concept of a “split population,” discussed in the context of Svolik’s estimator in the 
previous section, applies here as well.  The simple diagram below illustrates the intuition behind 
split population. 
TABLE C.1. Split Population Diagram 
  Dispute at risk of experiencing militarization? 
  No (0) Yes (1) 
Disputants willing to 
militarize the dispute? 
No (0) No militarization observed 
No militarization 
observed 
Yes (1) No militarization observed 
Militarization 
observed 
 
The split-population element of the bivariate probit model with partial observability has been 
discussed by many in political science, as discussed in Section 4.2.2.1.  For reference purposes, I 
provide the estimator’s log-likelihood function here.  The log-likelihood function for a bivariate 
probit with partial observability is equal to (Poirier 1980): 
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ln 𝐿 = �𝛿𝑚𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1
ln�Φ2�𝑋1𝑖𝛽1,𝑋2𝑖𝛽2;𝜌�� + �1 − 𝛿𝑚𝑖� ln�1 −Φ2�𝑋1𝑖𝛽1,𝑋2𝑖𝛽2;𝜌�� [2] 
where 𝛿𝑚𝑖 is coded 1 if militarization is observed and 0 otherwise.   
The first term, 𝛿𝑚𝑖 ln�Φ2�𝑋1𝑖𝛽1,𝑋2𝑖𝛽2;𝜌��, thus represents the observations that 
experience a militarization.  The second term in the log-likelihood, �1 − 𝛿𝑚𝑖� ln�1 −
Φ2�𝑋1𝑖𝛽1,𝑋2𝑖𝛽2;𝜌��, represents the disputes in which no militarization is observed.  This is the 
“partial observability” portion of the model.  We cannot observe the reason why a dispute stays 
peaceful.  It could be because the dispute was never at risk for militarization (e.g., disputants lack 
the ability to militarize the dispute), represented by “No” column in Table C.1.  It could also be 
because disputants are unwilling to militarize the dispute (e.g., an anticipatory dynamic), 
represented by the “No” row in Table C.1.  Since we cannot distinguish among the three cells in 
which no militarization occurs, we group them all together, which is what the second term in the 
log-likelihood captures.  We simply say that the probability that a dispute will not militarize is 
equal to one minus the probability that the observation will militarize. 
C.3 INTERDEPENDENT DURATION SEM (H&K) 
Hays and Kachi (2009) develop a log-linear model of interdependent continuous-time durations.  
Its general structural form is: 
𝑦1 = 𝛼1𝑦2 + 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜆1−1𝜀1  
𝑦2 = 𝛼2𝑦1 + 𝑋𝛽2 + 𝜆2−1𝜀2 [3] 
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where X = set of exogenous covariates and 𝜀 = i.i.d. idiosyncratic error with a Type-I Extreme 
Value (minimum) distribution.  X is technically comprised of three sets of covariates: {𝑆,𝑍1,𝑍2}.  
S contains the covariates appearing in both equations.  Z1 and Z2 contain the instruments: the 
covariates which only appear in the first or second equation, respectively.  The dependent 
variables are assumed to follow a Weibull distribution, with each yi having its own shape 
parameter, λi. 
The reciprocal relationship between y1 and y2 makes this a nonrecursive SEM.  We can 
rewrite both equations so that all the y’s are on the left-hand side of the equation.  The reduced-
form equations are: 
𝑦1 = 𝛼1(𝑋𝛽2 + 𝜆2−1𝜀2) + 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜆1−1𝜀1(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) ≡ �𝛼1(𝑋𝛽2) + 𝑋𝛽1(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) + 𝛼1(𝜆2−1𝜀2) + 𝜆1−1𝜀1(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) � 
𝑦2 = 𝛼2(𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜆1−1𝜀1) + 𝑋𝛽2 + 𝜆2−1𝜀2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2)
≡ �
𝛼2(𝑋𝛽1) + 𝑋𝛽2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) + 𝛼2(𝜆1−1𝜀1) + 𝜆2−1𝜀2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) � 
[4] 
In matrix form: 
𝒚 = (𝑰 − 𝑨)−1𝑿𝜷 + 𝒗 
 
where 𝒗 = 𝑳(𝑰 − 𝑨)−1𝜺  
 
In doing so, we can see how each y is influenced by its counterpart through the (1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) term 
in the denominator.   
 The A and β matrices represent the effect of the right-hand-side variables on the 
dependent variable in each equation.  Table C.2 shows how the two matrices yield the direct, 
indirect, and total effect of an independent variable on y, generalizable to any system of 
equations with the above form.  I also derive the specific effects for the two-equation SEM case 
in the last column of the table.  I focus on the effects of the endogenous variables, since my 
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hypothesis tests are based on the α’s.  Cell [r,c] of a given effect matrix is equivalent to the 
_____ effect of yc on yr  For example, the second row, first column of the direct effect matrix is 
equal to α2.  Ergo, the direct effect of y1 on y2 is equal to α2 (i.e., α~ANT) 
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TABLE C.2. Matrices and Independent Variable Effects 
Matrix form: 𝒚 = 𝑨𝒚 + 𝜷𝑿 + 𝑳𝜺 
Two-Equation SEM: 
Endogenous Variable Effects (y1, y2) Effect on DV 
Type of Independent Variable 
ENDOGENOUS (y) EXOGENOUS (x) 
Direct Effect  𝑨 𝜷 �
0 𝛼1
𝛼2 0 � 
Indirect 
Effect (𝑰 − 𝑨)−1 − 𝑰 − 𝑨 (𝑰 − 𝑨)−1𝜷 − 𝜷 
⎣
⎢
⎢
⎢
⎡
𝛼1𝛼2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) 𝛼12𝛼2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2)
𝛼2
2𝛼1(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) 𝛼1𝛼2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2)⎦⎥⎥
⎥
⎤
 
Total Effect (𝑰 − 𝑨)−1 − 𝑰 (𝑰 − 𝑨)−1𝜷 � 𝛼1𝛼2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) 𝛼1(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2)𝛼2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2) 𝛼1𝛼2(1 − 𝛼1𝛼2)� 
Source: Paxton, Hipp, Marquart-Pyatt (2011, 95).   
I = identity matrix (k x k, where k = number of equations) 
 
In a linear model, the direct, indirect, and total effects are equivalent to substantive effects on y 
and can be interpreted as such.  This is not the case for non-linear models, such as H&K’s SEM.  
The direct, indirect, and total effects are equivalent to the effect on ln(y), not y.  To obtain 
substantive effects on y in non-linear models, the coefficients must be transformed.  In H&K’s 
model:134 
ln(𝑦1) = 𝛼1(ln(𝑦2)) + 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜆1−1𝜀1 ≡ 𝑦1 = exp{𝛼1(ln(𝑦2)) + 𝑋𝛽1 + 𝜆1−1𝜀1}  ln(𝑦2) = 𝛼2(ln(𝑦1)) + 𝑋𝛽2 + 𝜆2−1𝜀2 ≡ 𝑦2 = exp{𝛼2(ln(𝑦1)) + 𝑋𝛽2 + 𝜆2−1𝜀2} [5] 
In particular, notice how all terms on the right-hand-side are summed before being 
exponentiated.  What this means is that we cannot obtain the effect of a specific x on y without 
also picking values for the other covariates.  This is a common refrain for practitioners of limited 
                                                 
134 As an aside, [5] also illustrates that the α’s are interpretable as elasticities (Gujarati 2002, 175–177).  For 
instance, we could say that a 1 percent increase in y2 produces a α1 percent change in y1.   
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dependent variable models like logit and probit, which are also non-linear.  The Clarify package 
in Stata (King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000; Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001) has become a 
ubiquitous tool for obtaining interpretable effects from a wide variety of linear and non-linear 
models.   
 For interpreting the SEM, I use a procedure akin to Clarify.  I obtain interpretable effects 
through simulation.  Segments of my code build off the Clarify commands.  However, generating 
predicted values of y from a model in which DV = ln(y) has an important wrinkle.135  It arises 
when one realizes that (Greene 2012, 82): 
𝐸(𝑦|𝑋) ≠ exp (𝐸(ln(𝑦) |𝑋)) [6] 
Or, as Kennedy (2003, 40) states more eloquently: E(g(x)) ≠ g(E(x)) when g(x) ≠ x (i.e., g(x) is a 
non-linear function).  We cannot simply exponentiate the expectation of ln(y), in a similar way as 
we did in [5]. 
Greene (2012, 82) shows that the conditional mean of y, when working from ln(y), is 
instead equal to: 
𝐸(𝑦|𝑋) = 𝐸(exp(𝑋𝛽 + 𝜎𝜀) |𝑥)    
𝐸(𝑦|𝑋) = exp(𝑋𝛽) ∗ 𝐸(exp (𝜎𝜀)|𝑥) [7] 
The key becomes finding a consistent way to estimate the second term involving the error.  
Preferably, the procedure is not specific to a particular set of distributional assumptions for ε.   
A common way to do so is Duan’s (1983) smearing estimator.  When the errors are 
homoskedastic, Duan’s estimator amounts to: 
                                                 
135 The phrase “predicted values” refers to generating values of y from x values that (1) are present in the sample 
(equivalent to Stata’s predict) or (2) are counterfactuals, in the sense that they may not represent actual rows in 
the dataset (equivalent to the Clarify suite’s setx mean, e.g., in Stata.) 
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𝐸(exp(𝜎𝜀) |𝑥) = 1
𝑁
� exp (𝜀𝑖)𝑁
𝑖=1
 [8] 
Or, in English: perform the SEM (in which DV = ln(y)), obtain the residuals.  Exponentiate them, 
and then average the exponentiated residuals over the entire sample.136  Take the computed 
average, and use that value for 𝐸(exp(𝜎𝜀)|𝑥).  This yields the quantity of interest for my SEM 
prediction code: 
𝐸(𝑦|𝑋) = exp(𝑋𝛽) ∗ �1
𝑁
� exp (𝜀𝑖)𝑁
𝑖=1
� ≡
1
𝑁
� exp (𝑋𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖)𝑁
𝑖=1
 [9] 
I compute the predicted values for y1 and y2 through Monte Carlo simulation.  I take 1000 draws 
from the coefficient matrix, which includes both α and βs.137  For each s set of simulated 
coefficients, I then form two independent n x 1 error vectors, ε1 and ε2 , from n draws on a Type I 
Extreme Value distribution (minimum).138  Next, I choose the x values at which the predictions 
should be calculated.  Finally, I use the reduced-form version of the SEM ([4]) to generate the 
predicted y1 and y2.139  The final expression becomes: 
                                                 
136 The averaging “smears” the idiosyncrasies over the entire sample, hence the name. 
137 The draws are pulled from a normal distribution of α and βs, with variances appropriate to the coefficient in 
question (i.e., V(α) or V(β)). 
138 In Stata, repeated twice: gen epsilon = ln(-ln(1-runiform())) 
139 We cannot use the structural form of the SEM in [3] to generate the predicted y’s, because the structural form has 
y on the right-hand side of the model.  One cannot use y to form predictions of y.  We can only use exogenous 
factors: the exogenous covariates (X’s) and the idiosyncratic errors (ε’s). 
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𝐸(𝑦1|𝑋) = 1𝑁� exp �𝛼1[𝑠](𝑋𝛽2[𝑠]) + 𝑋𝛽1[𝑠](1 − 𝛼1[𝑠]𝛼2[𝑠])𝑁
𝑖=1 + �� 𝜆1−1[𝑠](1 − 𝛼1[𝑠]𝛼2[𝑠]) ∗ 𝜀1𝑖� + � 𝛼1[𝑠]𝜆2−1[𝑠](1 − 𝛼1[𝑠]𝛼2[𝑠]) ∗ 𝜀2𝑖��� 
𝐸(𝑦2|𝑋) = 1𝑁� exp �𝛼2[𝑠](𝑋𝛽1[𝑠]) + 𝑋𝛽2[𝑠](1 − 𝛼1[𝑠]𝛼2[𝑠])𝑁
𝑖=1 + �� 𝜆2−1[𝑠](1 − 𝛼1[𝑠]𝛼2[𝑠]) ∗ 𝜀2𝑖� + � 𝛼2[𝑠]𝜆1−1[𝑠](1 − 𝛼1[𝑠]𝛼2[𝑠]) ∗ 𝜀1𝑖��� 
[10] 
For each observation i, note that the desired x values (X) and all the parameter values amount to 
scalars, if we are computing counterfactual predictions.  The only values that vary across i are 
the ε’s.  The average value of a scalar is equal to the scalar itself, which makes [10] equivalent to 
[9].  This same principle holds for in-sample predictions, where X will also vary by i. 
The setup also allows us to observe how the predicted y’s react when the errors are 
shocked.  We can “shock” an error by adding 1 to its ε vector.140  Call this (ε + 1).  Since (ε + 1) 
is multiplied by λ, its standard deviation, the shock propagates through the model as a one-
standard deviation change in that error.  Note again the interdependent nature of the model, as a 
shock to ε1 affects not only y1 ([10], 𝐸(𝑦1|𝑋), second term), but y2 as well ([10], 𝐸(𝑦2|𝑋), third 
term). 
Hays and Kachi derive the likelihood for their interdependent duration SEM estimator 
using change-of-variables theorem.  The theorem solves for the joint distribution of y1 and y2—
the key quantity for the likelihood—by exploiting what we know about the ε’s: they have a 
Type-I Extreme Value distribution, and they are i.i.d.  As a result, H&K’s log-likelihood takes 
the form: 
                                                 
140 In Stata: gen ep_shocked = (ln(-ln(1-runiform()))) + 1 
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ln 𝐿 = � ln 𝑓 �𝜀1𝑖� + ln 𝑓 �𝜀2𝑖� + ln|det(𝐉)|𝑁
𝑖=1
 [11] 
where J is the Jacobian matrix for ε.  With covariates, H&K’s log-likelihood is equivalent to 
(2009, 9):141   
ln 𝐿 = �𝜆1�𝑦1𝑖 − 𝛼1𝑦2𝑖 − 𝑋1𝑖𝛽1� − exp�𝜆1�𝑦1𝑖 − 𝛼1𝑦2𝑖 − 𝑋1𝑖𝛽1��𝑁
𝑖=1 + 𝜆2�𝑦2𝑖 − 𝛼2𝑦1𝑖 − 𝑋2𝑖𝛽2� − exp�𝜆2�𝑦2𝑖 − 𝛼2𝑦1𝑖 − 𝑋2𝑖𝛽2��+ ln� 𝜆1𝜆2
𝑦1𝑖
∗ 𝑦2𝑖
∗ |1 − 𝛼1𝛼2|� [12] 
The variance-covariance matrix of the reduced-form errors is equal to: 
𝑉(𝒗) = (𝑳(𝑰 − 𝑨)−1)′ ∗ (𝑳(𝑰 − 𝑨)−1) [13] 
In the two-equation case, this comes out to be: 
𝑉(𝒗) = � 𝛼22𝐷−1 𝛼1𝛼2𝐷−1
𝛼1𝛼2𝐷
−1 𝛼1
2𝐷−1
� [14] 
where 𝐷 =  (𝜆12 + 𝜆22) + [(−2𝜆1 − 2𝜆2)𝛼1𝛼2] + [(𝜆12 + 𝜆22)𝛼12𝛼22]. 
C.4 DURATION WITH SAMPLE SELECTION (BMS) 
Boehmke, Morey, and Shannon (2006) are also worried about interdependence, in a way, when 
they formulate their estimator for continuous-time durations with sample selection.  BMS have 
                                                 
141 Note that y is shorthand for ln(y*), where y* represents the unlogged duration.   
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two dependent variables: ys, a binary selection indicator, and y1, the continuous duration.  Notice 
how BMS’s estimator is more similar to Svolik’s than H&K’s, in that there is only a single 
duration DV, not two.  If we continue to use Svolik’s democratic consolidation example, BMS 
are concerned about the sample of states with democratic regimes.  The same factors that 
influence whether a state is democratic (ys = 1) may also influence the longevity of that 
democratic regime (y1; in Svolik’s model, the timing of democratic reversals).  For my 
application, the easiest comparison involves MID duration.  We only observe MID DURATION if 
a dispute militarizes, and the same factors that influence MID initiation may also influence how 
long the MID lasts. 
To solve for their likelihood function, BMS use copulas.  Copulas derive the joint 
distribution of y1 and y2 by using the known marginal univariate distributions of each y (Trivedi 
and Zimmer 2007, 3).  BMS’s log-likelihood function takes the general form (2006, 196):  
ln 𝐿 = � ln 𝑓�𝑦𝑠𝑖 ,𝑦1𝑖∗ �𝑁
𝑖=1
 
ln 𝐿 = � ln �𝑓�𝑦𝑠𝑖�� + ln �𝑓�𝑦1𝑖∗ �� + ln�1 + 𝛼�2𝐹�𝑦𝑠𝑖� − 1��2𝐹�𝑦1𝑖∗ � − 1��𝑁
𝑖=1
 
[15] 
The second line substitutes the copula into the expression.142  BMS use an exponential 
distribution for 𝑓(𝑦𝑠) and a Weibull distribution for 𝑓(𝑦1∗).143  Like before, f represents a density 
function, while F represents a distribution function. 
α represents the dependence between ys and y1.  In results tables, ρ is normally reported in 
lieu of α.  ρ is the correlation between the errors of the two equations, and is equal to α/4 
                                                 
142 BMS use the Farlie-Gumbel-Morgenstern copula (2006, 195).  Its simplicity makes it one of the more commonly 
used copula forms (Prieger 2002; Trivedi and Zimmer 2007, 15). 
143 See p. 196 of BMS (2006) for their full log-likelihood expression.  It is not pivotal to understanding the rest of 
this discussion. 
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(Boehmke, Morey, and Shannon 2006, 195).  A key difference between BMS and H&K is that 
BMS’s estimator has a single dependency parameter (α), while H&K’s estimator has two 
dependency parameters (α1, α2).  Characterized in this way, it becomes evident that α represents 
the association between the two dependent variables, while α1 and α2 “unpack” α by estimating 
the directional, direct effect of one dependent variable on the other. 
BMS’s use of copulas to derive their log-likelihood marks an important point of 
departure from H&K, who used change-of-variables.  The distinction between the two derivation 
strategies is relevant because they impact the dependence structures (the α’s).  In general, a 
copula-based approach imposes more restrictions on the dependence structure than a change-of-
variable approach.  Recognizing this, Hays and Kachi compare the dependence structure of their 
SEM to that of a copula-derived model with two durations.  They show that the two models are 
only equivalent when (Hays and Kachi 2009, 5, 9):  
 𝛼 = |1 − 𝛼1𝛼2| − 14 exp�−𝑦1∗(𝜆1)−𝑦2∗(𝜆2)� − 2 exp�−𝑦1∗(𝜆1)� − 2 exp�−𝑦2∗(𝜆2)� + 1 [16] 
That is, a copula interdependence structure will be the same as H&K’s only when the copula’s α 
is equal to the expression on the right.  The right-hand quantity includes not only α1 and α2, the 
two dependence parameters from the SEM (as we would expect), but it also includes the Weibull 
shape parameters (λ1, λ2) and the unlogged durations (𝑦1∗, 𝑦2∗).  [16] demonstrates the multitude of 
conditions that must coalesce to yield a copula dependence structure equivalent to H&K’s. 
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APPENDIX D 
CHAPTER 5, MAIN RESULTS – FURTHER ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
The main results from Chapter 5 are robust to a number of alternative specifications, which are 
reported in Table D.1.  In the main results (Table 5.1), α~ANT was positively signed and 
statistically significant in the highly salient sample comprised of disputes over territorial issues, 
while αANT was negatively signed and statistically significant in the sample of moderately salient 
sample comprised of disputes over maritime and river issues.   
First, the results are not sensitive to the selection of instruments (Table D.1, (1)-(4)).  For 
instance, the SEM can technically be identified off functional form (the assumptions about the 
distribution about the idiosyncratic errors) and off the common set of seven control variables, as 
the value of the controls in each equation are recorded at different points in time.144  At best, 
these assumptions are tenuous, which is why I use instruments to identify the SEM.  However, 
by temporarily accepting them, we can include all four instruments as regressors in both 
equations, allowing us to see if the main results are sensitive to the choice of instruments.  The 
first four models of Table D.1 show that α~ANT stays positive and statistically significant in the 
                                                 
144 E.g., the value of the control variables is recorded at Figure 2.1, Point A (or Point C) for the CLAIM DURATION 
equation, and Figure 2.1, Point B for the MID DURATION equation. 
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territorial sample, and αANT stays negative and statistically significant in the maritime/river 
sample. 
In addition, I rerun the analyses while excluding certain types of MIDs (Table D.1, (5)-
(6).  For example, militarizations involving only threats tend to be extremely short, raising 
questions about whether my argument would apply to these types of militarizations.  To check 
this possibility, I focus solely on militarizations involving additional activities, such as troop 
mobilizations or border clashes, and exclude militarizations involving only threats of military 
force from the estimation samples.  I check two different sample exclusion scenarios; in both, 
α~ANT remains positive and statistically significant in the highly salient sample, but αANT is no 
longer statistically significant in the moderately salient sample.145   
Finally, I deliberately used as few control variables as possible (Ray 2003), in order to 
reduce the estimating burden on the SEM: each sample size is somewhat small, and the SEM 
estimates a number of ancillary parameters.  I used extant research to choose my controls, but 
one can imagine additional variables that may also impact MID DURATION, for instance.  
Examples include the distance between i and j, whether i and j are allies, the number of previous 
peaceful settlement attempts over the dispute, and whether i and j are engaged in disputes over 
other issues.  Using the main specifications as a baseline, the results are unaltered if I add each 
variable to the right-hand side of both equations (Table D.1, (7)-(13)).  Further, switching to a 
“weak-link” operationalization of democracy or interdependence has no effect on the results 
(Table D.1, (14)-(15)).  This is a common way to operationalize these variables in previous 
research. 
                                                 
145 In Section 5.2.3, I discussed the potential reasons behind the weakly/non-significant anticipatory results in the 
moderately salient sample.  Those reasons still apply here. 
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TABLE D.1. Abbreviated Robustness Results (CLAIM DURATION Coding) 
Issue 
Sample 
  Instruments 
List of Instruments in 
Reference Models 
 Main 
Models 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 PWRRAT in 
y1 
ALLY3P in y1 MLATCL in y2 FUNCTFORM 
H
ig
h 
O
S 
αANT -0.077* -0.072* -0.060 -0.077* -0.069* y1: CLAIM DURATION  
 (0.056) (0.055) (0.060) (0.056) (0.054) MLATCLAIM 
α~ANT 0.291** 0.286** 0.270** 0.293** 0.283**  
 (0.143) (0.144) (0.149) (0.144) (0.143)  Wald1T 0.046 0.047 0.052 0.045 0.047  
N 81 81 81 81 81  
M
od
er
at
e 
O
S αANT -0.130* -0.137* -0.128* -0.132* -0.131* y2: MID DURATION  
 (0.093) (0.089) (0.093) (0.093) (0.084) MLATMID 
α~ANT -0.101 -0.097 -0.102 -0.097 -0.097 POWERRATIO 
 (0.095) (0.093) (0.096) (0.096) (0.093) ALLY3P Wald1T 0.432 0.402 0.437 0.417 0.412  
N 94 94 94 94 94  
Issue 
Sample 
 Sample Exclusions Controls (Added to Both Equations) 
 (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
 ~THREATS ~(SEIZ|CLASH) FMIDCNT MILRUNTIME DISTANCE ALLY PSETTLE 
H
ig
h 
O
S 
αANT -0.095* -0.084* -0.080* -0.064* -0.077* -0.074 -0.026 
 (0.060) (0.061) (0.053) (0.050) (0.058) (0.060) (0.054) 
α~ANT 0.360** 0.507** 0.294** 0.352*** 0.287** 0.301** 0.245** 
 (0.156) (0.261) (0.141) (0.126) (0.174) (0.145) (0.146) Wald1T 0.025 0.034 0.045 0.006 0.081 0.037 0.045 
N 79 58 81 81 81 81 81 
M
od
er
at
e 
O
S αANT -0.127 -0.142 -0.123* -0.093 -0.127* -0.129* -0.100 
 (0.103) (0.125) (0.090) (0.095) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094) 
α~ANT -0.087 -0.139 -0.110 -0.081 -0.106 -0.103 -0.124 
 (0.096) (0.120) (0.089) (0.094) (0.099) (0.097) (0.100) Wald1T 0.410 0.496 0.466 0.471 0.451 0.439 0.446 
N 89 59 94 94 94 94 94 
  Controls (Added to Both Equations)    
  (12) (13) (14) (15)    
  OTHERISS DEMSW7 DEML INTERDEPL    
H
ig
h 
O
S 
αANT -0.055 -0.080* -0.056 -0.074*    
 (0.054) (0.057) (0.054) (0.055)    
α~ANT 0.273** 0.283** 0.188* 0.268**    
 (0.146) (0.145) (0.130) (0.147)    Wald1T 0.046 0.056 0.130 0.068    
N 81 81 81 81    
M
od
er
at
e 
O
S αANT -0.129* -0.130* -0.117 -0.139*    
 (0.090) (0.094) (0.094) (0.094)    
α~ANT -0.098 -0.100 -0.123 -0.087    
 (0.087) (0.097) (0.097) (0.098)    Wald1T 0.421 0.430 0.486 0.380    
N 94 94 94 94    
* = p ≤ 0.10, ** = p ≤ 0.05, *** = p ≤ 0.01, one-tailed.  Shaded rows indicate the key parameter of interest for 
each sample.  Main models (used as baseline specifications): Table 5.1, Model 1 (high salience); Table 5.1, 
Model 3 (moderate salience).  Unclustered standard errors reported in parentheses. 
 
(interpretation key on next page)  
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Interpretation Key: 
(1).  PWRRAT: POWERRATIO; added as regressor to y1 (in addition to its inclusion in y2) 
(2).  ALLY3P: added as regressor to y1 (in addition to its inclusion in y2) 
(3).  MLATCL: MLATCLAIM; added as regressor to y2 (in addition to its inclusion in y1) 
(4).  FUNCTFORM: SEM identified off functional form assumption and control variables in the 
MID DURATION equation.  All four instruments are included as regressors in both equations. 
(5).  ~THREATS: excludes MIDs that do not escalate beyond threats of force 
(6).  ~(SEIZ|CLASH): excludes MIDs from seizures of property or border clashes  
(7).  FMIDCNT: count of fatal MIDs over this claim-dyad, to date 
(8).  MILRUNTIME: time spent in MIDs over this claim-dyad, to date; exchanged for SETTMIL 
(9).  DISTANCE: capital-to-capital distance in miles, logged 
(10).  ALLY: 1 if state pair has defensive, offensive, or neutrality pact in place at t; 0 otherwise 
(11).  PSETTLE: running count of peaceful settlement attempts over the claim-dyad to date  
(12).  OTHERISS: number of other ongoing claims between the two states at t, inspired by Mitchell 
and Thies (2011)   
(13).  DEMSW7: democratization.  Coded 1 if either state has Polity2 ≥ 7 in t and the same state 
had Polity2 < 7 in t – 5  
(14).  DEML: Weak-link coding instead of dyadic mean.  Lowest Polity2 score in the dyad  
(15).  INTERDEPL: Weak-link coding instead of dyadic mean.  Lowest dyadic value of (total 
dyadic trade/state GDP) 
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